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Abstract 
Takeovers have become frequent in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) 
since the 1960s. However, in China takeovers are a relatively new concept and have only 
recently become more common. The Chinese government has attempted to create a 
clearer roadmap for the takeover players, and over the last two decades has developed a 
relatively complete and stable regulatory framework for takeovers. However, the Chinese 
takeover law is not immune to criticism. As such, it can be expected that the takeover 
regime will experience some fundamental reform in coming years.  
Based on the understanding that various jurisdictions have adopted different ways to 
regulate takeovers, China needs to seek some ideas for improving the existing takeover 
law, in line with the global perspective. Thus, a comparative research method is employed 
in this study with the aim of obtaining a better understanding of Chinese takeover law 
based on the earlier experiences of the UK and US. The goal of this thesis is to make an 
in-depth comparative analysis of the takeover regimes across the UK, US and China and 
put forward recommendations for Chinese takeover law reform.  
To summarise the thesis, descriptions of legal regimes in the UK and US are set out in 
Chapters 2 and 3 respectively. Chapter 4 compares these two regimes and explains how 
divergences have arisen. In order to compare the Chinese regime with the UK and US 
regimes, Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive discussion on how the takeover regime in 
China has evolved and regulates takeover activities. Finally, Chapters 6 and 7 critically 
examine the appropriateness of Chinese takeover law in its own legal context. Chapter 8 
concludes the thesis, with recommendations for future legal reform. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Takeovers have become frequent in the UK and the US since the 1960s. However, in 
China takeovers are a relatively new concept, and these transactions were virtually non-
existent 20 years ago. The first takeover transaction did not occur until 1993, but since the 
late 1990s and especially with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2002, takeovers have seen a growing trend within China and have attracted increasing 
attention all over the world. 
Although takeovers are now playing an increasingly important role in the development of 
China’s economy, it is obvious that the practice is still developing. There is still a 
considerable gap between Chinese practice and commonly accepted standards, due not 
only to lack of experience, but also to more ideological difficulties.1 However, the desire 
to improve the corporate governance of Chinese domestic companies, especially state 
owned enterprises, through takeover transactions has pushed the Chinese government to 
speed up legislation.  
China has so far established a relatively complete legal framework for takeovers and a 
level playing field for takeover participants. This is not only boosting takeovers in terms 
of both scale and volume, but is also encouraging more private sectors to take part in 
takeover activities that were previously dominated by the state or quasi-state players.2 
However, the Chinese takeover law is not immune to criticism. As such, it can be 
expected that the takeover regime in China will experience some fundamental reform in 
                                                
1 For a more comprehensive description of the development of the Chinese takeover market from an international 
business perspective, see Guoxiang Song and Geoff Meeks, ‘The Convergence of the Chinese and Western Takeover 
Markets’ (2009) Social Science Research Network <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1505947> 
accessed 31 March 2010. 
2 Hui Huang, ‘China’s Takeover Law: a Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform’ (2005) 30 Delaware Journal 
of Corporate Law 145, 147.  
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coming years and eventually be transformed into a modern market- (not government-) 
driven system governed by general takeover law.  
1. Research Purpose  
In response to the booming takeover market in China, takeovers have become a topical 
issue, receiving a massive amount of attention among policy makers, academic scholars 
and professionals alike. There is a large literature which attempts to address how to 
develop a healthy Chinese takeover market in general. Most of this literature focuses on 
topics such as what are the new scenarios and challenges in the Chinese takeover market, 
what makes a successful takeover deal, whether or not to allow foreign capital to gain 
controlling positions in Chinese companies through takeovers and how to improve the 
Chinese takeover regime to meet international standards.  
From a legal perspective, without doubt, there seems to be a consensus that it is vital to 
regulate the Chinese takeover market by a set of well-designed rules. Based on the 
understanding that various jurisdictions have adopted different ways to regulate takeovers, 
China is beginning to seek some suggestions for improving the existing takeover law, in 
line with the global perspective. In the UK and US, there is an extensive body of 
theoretical and empirical studies on whether their experiences of takeover law are suitable 
for other countries (especially in Europe), considering the differences in their own legal 
traditions. However, real comparative analysis about the takeover law, particularly in the 
UK, US and China, is very rare. Little critical work has been undertaken on a legal 
framework for Chinese takeovers, based on extensive legal analysis of takeover regimes 
in the UK and US. This thesis attempts to fill the gap by making an in-depth comparative 
analysis across these three countries and putting forward recommendations for Chinese 
takeover law reform based on understanding the UK and US regulations.  
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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With moves to internationalisation, efforts to achieve a unification of legal rules in 
different countries seem to be an increasing trend. However, the debate on whether this is 
always beneficial is ongoing. 3  What is clear is that policy-makers, scholars and 
practitioners have been seeking a common language in the takeover regulation to address 
similar problems raised by takeover activities. This comparative study of takeover laws 
will enable Chinese policy makers and jurists to better understand foreign attitudes 
towards takeovers; it will therefore be of interest to judges and lawyers who deal with 
takeover cases in China and to legal reformists, in general those who aim to improve the 
legal system of takeovers to meet international standards. Moreover, it is hoped that the 
outcome of this study will contribute to the improvement of Chinese corporate 
governance in the context of takeovers. 
2. Research Scope  
Economic reform in China, which did not begin until 1978, cannot be completed 
overnight due to the numerous political, ideological and economic obstacles. Although 
the Chinese government declared in 1993 that China would move towards a market-
oriented economy, signalling the end of 44 years of socialist economic planning,4 the 
remarkable development of its economy required many regulatory changes, which have 
been introduced in piecemeal fashion. As a result, it is not surprising that the enactment 
of different laws and regulations at different times, on different issues and by different 
law-making bodies, has created a multi-layered and partly incoherent legal system in 
China.  
                                                
3 For an extensive discussion on harmonisation of takeover regulation across Europe, see Marc Goergen and Marina 
Martynova and Luc Renneboog, ‘Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms in 
Europe’ (2005) 21 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 243. 
4 The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China adopted A Decision on 
Certain Issues in Establishing a Socialist Market Economic System on 14 November 1993. 
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This is certainly true of China’s takeover regulation, which is fragmented with different 
rules applied in different scenarios, e.g. the nature of the parties involved in the takeovers, 
the legal form of the target company, the acquisition mode and the sector to which the 
target company belongs. It is therefore an impossible task for this research to cover every 
aspect of the existing laws with respect to takeover transactions, and to compare all of 
them with the takeover regimes in the UK and US.  
In China, numerous laws have been promulgated to regulate foreign participation in the 
capital market, including sectors permitted for foreign investment, qualification to invest 
in the stock market, transactional procedures, ownership percentages, and so on, while 
domestic investors and institutions are subject to another set of laws. This work 
approaches the subject of takeovers primarily from the perspective of domestic 
companies. The focus is therefore on takeover activities carried out by Chinese domestic 
companies on China’s mainland. It will not include takeover transactions involving 
foreign-invested enterprises as either sellers or buyers in China. As a result, law solely 
governing foreign investment will not be discussed, and in particular those cross-border 
takeover transactions conducted inbound and offshore in Hong Kong, Macau and beyond 
are excluded.  
Similarly, since foreign-related takeover transactions in China will not be addressed, 
national economic security and anti-trust issues will fall outside the scope of this research. 
For the same reason, government regulations on takeovers involving state industrial 
policies, market access or assignment of state-owned shares and approval procedures of 
the relevant departments of the State will not be covered. The research concentrates on 
the rules governing the mechanism for takeovers without government intervention. 
Moreover, as Davies and Hopt have pointed out, in privately held companies, hostile 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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takeovers are more difficult to recognise than in publicly traded companies, and also the 
shareholders’ agency problem is less obvious.5 Hence, listed companies are the centre of 
attention in this thesis and the rules discussed mainly govern takeovers of companies with 
shares traded on a public market. 
3. Research Questions 
In a global context, it is common to see a country borrow or transplant another country’s 
laws in the development of its own national legal system. However, any transplantation of 
foreign law is subject to local political and economic conditions. There are significant 
economic and political differences between China and the UK and US, so it is necessary 
to find out if either the UK or US model is suitable for Chinese takeover law. The general 
research question of this thesis is therefore how to improve the Chinese current takeover 
law when comparing with the UK and US takeover regimes. 
In order to provide a systematic analysis of divergent forms of takeover regime in these 
two highly developed capital markets, the first two research questions to answer are what 
are the main differences between UK and US takeover law and why these differences 
exist. In the pursuit of optimal doctrines for China, by balancing the advantages and 
disadvantages of the contrasting takeover rules in the UK and US, an attempt is made to 
answer the following questions: whether their current takeover rules exist in Chinese 
takeover law and, if yes, whether they are beneficial and suitable for China’s own 
political and economic environment; if not, what may be suggested as possible for 
Chinese takeover law reform. 
                                                
5 Paul Davies and Klaus Hopt, ‘Control Transactions’ in John Armour and others (eds), The Anatomy of Corporate Law: 
a Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford University Press 2004) 227. 
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4. Research Methods 
With the increase in cross-border activities and the effect of widespread political 
movements, there is a growing need for comparison of legal systems from different 
jurisdictions.6 Comparative law seems to have become the centre of interest among 
academic scholars and legal practitioners worldwide.  
4.1 Comparative Law and Objectives 
Comparative law, defined by Rainer, is a branch of jurisprudence which leads research 
into various aspects of different legal systems and compares and analyses them.7 It is 
regarded as a ‘systematic application of the comparative technique to law’,8 involving 
comparison of two or more legal systems, or of parts of two or more legal systems. 
Making the comparison provides a deeper understanding of certain features of the subject 
being studied, and therefore better knowledge of the different rules and institutions that 
are compared.9 Meanwhile, acquiring knowledge of foreign legal systems by comparison 
promotes a better understanding of one’s own legal system.10 
Comparative law is regarded as one of the most effective ways to gain a better 
understanding of one’s own legal system.11 It helps researchers to be aware of the fact 
that the laws of their own legal system are not the only solution in the world. Moreover, 
comparative law promotes a better understanding of the foreign legal systems embraced 
                                                
6 See e.g., Oscar G. Chase, ‘Legal Processes and National Culture’ (1997) 5 Cardozo Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 1. The author compares differences between German and American legal systems and attempts to 
evaluate the proposed trans-national reforms. 
7 J. Michael Rainer, Introduction to Comparative Law (Manz 2010) 2. 
8 Walter J. Kamba, ‘Comparative law: A Theoretical Framework’ (1974) 23 International and Comparative law 
Quarterly 485, 489. 
9 Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment I of II)’ (1991) 39 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 1, 5. 
10 Joan Church and AB Edwards, ‘Comparative Law/Comparative Method’ in Hosten (ed), Introduction to South 
African Law and Legal Theory (Butterworths 1995) 1261. 
11 Rainer (n7) 5. 
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in the study. In other words, comparative law provides a broader perspective of other 
legal systems, rather than its successes and failures.12 As Kamba has pointed out, the 
knowledge gained by comparing different legal systems may help legislators to ‘fashion 
rules or principles of positive law’.13  
Admittedly, comparative law as a method of legal research is applied for several closely 
related academic and practical purposes. Firstly, it can be used to prepare or create new 
legislation. Secondly, it makes a significant contribution to interpreting a particular law 
within a national legal order. As Sacco has observed, it is one of the distinctive features of 
comparative law that it plays an important role in the interpretation of legal norms of 
various legal systems.14 Thirdly, the comparative method can be employed in legal 
studies and research to seek legal unification and harmonisation. Unification refers to the 
process of unifying two or more different legal systems into a single system, whereas 
harmonisation is to eliminate major differences and create minimum standards between 
different legal systems.  
Last but not least, comparative law serves as a means for the legislature to inform itself 
about other countries’ solutions and to gather ideas from their experience for future legal 
reform. It is argued that the study of foreign legal systems becomes a legitimate enterprise 
only if it results in proposals for the reform of domestic law.15 It is important to bear in 
mind that the above objectives of comparative law should not be regarded as exhaustive. 
There is no reason to require that comparative law be limited to any particular purpose. A 
                                                
12 Rudolf B. Schlesinger, ‘The Role of the “Basic Course” in the Teaching of Foreign and Comparative law’ (1971) 19 
American Journal of Comparative Law 616, 618. 
13 Kamba (n8) 487. 
14 Sacco (n9) 1.  
15 Rodolfo Sacco, ‘One Hundred Years of Comparative Law’ (2001) 75 Tulane Law Review 1159, 1160.  
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comparative researcher therefore enjoys ‘considerable freedom in deciding which of these 
purposes to pursue in any particular study’.16 
4.2 Comparative Law in Legal Reform 
It is widely acknowledged that there are diverse solutions in different legal systems trying 
to solve similar types of social and economic problems. Finding good solutions should 
not be limited to the nationality of the respective legal system as law is not national in 
nature.17 The transplantation of legal rules between different legal systems is therefore 
‘the most fertile source of [legal] development’.18 Smits supported this view by stating 
that  
all legal systems share the common goal of finding and applying the best and most 
just legal rules. All legal systems try to approximate this goal, and it is likely that 
some of them will have succeeded earlier or more convincingly that others. This 
means that it is useful to compare the solutions reached elsewhere with domestic 
solutions in order to develop one’s own law in accordance with that of other legal 
systems.19  
When looking at the laws of foreign countries, except for promoting a greater 
understanding of similarities and differences, comparative law also helps to explain why 
these differences exist and to initiate possible law reform.20 Seeking a good foreign model 
to follow is important for legal reform. However, it is more important to find out what 
solution to avoid based on other countries’ experience. As such, comparison makes a 
                                                
16 Kamba (n8) 490. 
17 James Gordley, ‘Comparative Legal Research: Its Function in the Development of Harmonized Law’ (1995) 43(4) 
American Journal of Comparative Law 555, 555. 
18 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn, University of Georgia Press 1993) 95. 
19 Jan M. Smits, ‘Comparative Law and its Influence on National Legal Systems’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP Oxford 2006), 487. 
20 Hiram E. Chodosh, ‘Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology’ (1999) 84 Iowa Law Review 1025, 1027. 
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great contribution to understanding foreign laws which are to be or have been borrowed 
and one’s own legal system against their own background.21 According to Kamba, one of 
the most significant functions of comparative law is to help improving national legislation 
by modifying or abolishing its existing rules.22  
The UK and US have two of the most advanced judicial systems in the world dealing with 
stock markets and takeover transactions. These two countries have similar capital markets 
and business practices where most publicly listed companies have dispersed ownership, 
and controlling shareholders are the exception. They have both recognised the positive 
impact of hostile takeovers on efficient corporate governance, and have established a risk-
taking entrepreneurial culture which encourages the development of takeovers as a 
market for corporate control.23 A well-developed takeover regime has been set up to 
regulate takeover activities within their own territories. However, surprisingly, each 
jurisdiction has adopted a strikingly different approach towards takeover regulation.  
When searching for an optimal regulatory takeover model for China, a sensible starting 
point would be to examine the contrasting models of the UK and US. It is also inevitable 
and essential to compare these two most advanced takeover regimes in order to assess the 
current Chinese takeover position and put forward recommendations for legislative 
reform. Thus, a comparative research method is employed in this study with the aim of 
obtaining a better understanding of Chinese takeover law and put forward a reform 
proposal based on the earlier experiences of the UK and US.  
                                                
21 Sacco (n9) 3. 
22 Kamba (n8) 495. 
23 Paul Davies, ‘The Regulation of Defensive Tactics in the United Kingdom and the United States’ in Klaus J. Hopt 
and Eddy Wymeersch (eds), European Takeovers: Law and Practice (Butterworths Tolley 1992) 209-210. 
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Although there is plenty of literature trying to determine whether one country’s particular 
takeover regulations are better than another’s, this research does not support the view that 
there is a single best takeover model in the world, and will try to avoid evaluating one 
model as superior to another, as suggested by Ventoruzzo.24  In this research, the 
comparison of the UK and US takeover laws is not undertaken to discover which is the 
best, but to identify the main differences between these two legal systems and explain 
why these differences exist, more importantly, to find out the implications to Chinese 
takeover law reform.  
China is no longer the country which historically regarded itself as the centre of the globe, 
without questioning the various aspects of its own legal system. She is in closer contact 
with other countries than ever before. Chinese policy makers and legal scholars are 
beginning to examine the Chinese legal system in a comparative way without treating the 
law as a self-contained system of legal norms. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that 
learning from foreign experience does not mean simple copying. The Chinese 
government is attempting to construct a modern legal system by learning from overseas 
experience but with Chinese characteristics. The value of the comparative legal research 
method adopted in this thesis is not only in understanding the different ways that 
takeovers are regulated in the UK and US, but also, more importantly, in seeing how best 
to improve existing Chinese takeover law by resolving the problem of which takeover 
rules are suitable to the Chinese environment. 
 
 
                                                
24 Marco Ventoruzzo, ‘Europe’s Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means and Political 
and Economic Ends’ (2006) 41 Texas International Law Journal 171, 176. 
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4.3 Comparative Research Methods  
It is generally recognised that there is no single, comprehensive and standard method to 
be applied to all comparative studies and research. Different techniques and procedures 
are employed according to the varied comparative purposes. In this research, since the 
comparison is invoked as an aid to legal reform, the comparative method generally 
involves the following: comparing the different legal systems; determining similarities 
and differences between the legal systems being compared; analysing whether and how 
the differences between legal systems are justifiable and proposing policy 
recommendations for furthering legal reform. All of these basic comparative methods will 
be used to find the most distinctive differences between UK and US legal systems, to 
examine China’s system against these differences and then to propose recommendations 
for Chinese legal reform. 
In terms of the comparative process, there are four stages in this research.25 The first stage 
consists of a description of the legal norms and concepts concerned, an introduction to the 
relevant legal history and an examination of the legal solutions provided by the systems in 
question. Second, the identification stage is concerned with similarities and differences 
between the legal systems being compared. The third, explanation stage covers the 
analysis and explanation of the differences between the systems under consideration. 
Finally, in the proposal stage, recommendations for legal reform are put forward. These 
stages are not distinctly separate from each other and are not necessarily undertaken in a 
particular order.   
                                                
25 For a more comprehensive discussion on comparative methods, see John C. Reitz, ‘How to Do Comparative Law’ 
(1998) 46(4) American Journal of Comparative Law 617; TJ Scott, ‘The Comparative Method of Legal Research’ 
<http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/J%20Scott%20-
%20Comparative%20research%20perspectives%20_Private%20law_.pdf > accessed 15 April 2013. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
July 2013 12 
It is worth noting that simply contrasting provisions cannot be regarded as comparative 
law because this is limited to a normative description. Exploring the reasons why the 
different legal systems have adopted different rules to solve common factual problems is 
essential to the comparative method. In other words, comparison as a research method 
cannot be completed by merely identifying differences and similarities, but must go 
further and seek to explain the differences. As Reitz has observed, a significant part of 
comparative law is answering the question of how one legal system may achieve more or 
less the same result as another legal system without using the same rules.26  
In this research, two sets of comparison are employed. The comparison of UK and US 
law is undertaken first, and this forms the basis of understanding Chinese takeover 
regulations as well as its comparison with the UK and US systems. After acquiring 
knowledge of legal systems in the UK and US, the second comparison is conducted 
between the UK, US and China, with the aim of analysing the full effect of the divergence 
between the UK and US on Chinese takeover regulation, and to discuss the 
appropriateness of the practice of Chinese takeover law in its own legal context. 
5. Research Structure 
This thesis begins with Chapter 1 (Introduction) and ends with Chapter 8 
(Recommendations). The rest is structured in six chapters as follows: 
Chapters 2 and 3, belonging to the first stage of the comparative process, description, 
explain the relevant takeover regulations from the perspective of the UK and US. For the 
purpose of comparison, the investigation of individual legal regime in the UK and US 
provides the conceptual understanding and thus contributes to identifying the similarities 
                                                
26 Reitz (n25) 628. 
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and differences in the next chapter. The aim of these two chapters is to form the 
theoretical basis for the comparison between the UK and US systems. 
After the description of both the UK and US systems, Chapter 4 seeks to compare the 
ways in which these two countries regulate takeover activities and to explain the reasons 
for the divergence between these two legal regimes. This chapter involves two stages of 
comparative process, namely, identification and explanation. Of the numerous takeover 
rules, many are universal, but some are still controversial. In Chapter 4, two controversial 
rules adopted by the UK are viewed as the most distinguishing differences of takeover 
regulation in the UK and US, namely the non-frustration rule and the mandatory bid rule. 
These two rules are also considered to have particularly important effect on the process of 
takeover activities. Based on the finding of these contrasting provisions, in order to assess 
the two different approaches adopted in the UK and US, substantial attention is paid to 
exploring the effect of these two rules, and to see whether there are functional 
counterbalances respectively in the UK and US.  
After explaining how the divergence of takeover law in UK and US has arisen, Chapter 5 
returns to the first stage of comparison to undertake a comprehensive examination of the 
Chinese current legal regime. It begins with the institutional background in China, 
regarding a series of economic reforms and their effects on Chinese corporate governance. 
In the Chinese environment, the transplantation of foreign law is not only path-dependent 
but is also subject to the local situation with unique legislative and administrative settings. 
Before proceeding to make the recommendations, it is necessary to understand the 
ownership structure of Chinese listed companies and the implications for the development 
of the takeover market. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a better understanding of 
how the takeover regime in China has evolved; to pave the way for a comparison of the 
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Chinese model with UK and US models; and to put forward recommendations for 
Chinese takeover law reform. 
Chapters 6 and 7 critically examine China’s current takeover regulations, followed by 
recommendations for Chinese legal reform in Chapter 8, to help Chinese legislators to 
improve the suitability of Chinese current takeover law when facing the trade-off between 
promotion of takeovers and protection of shareholders. Two comparative stages are 
involved in chapters 6 and 7: identification and explanation. Stage of proposal is in 
Chapter 8.  
As the purpose of this thesis is to provide recommendations on Chinese takeover law 
reform, before discussing the specific elements of legal regime in China it is necessary to 
consider one crucial issue faced by the legislators: whether the effect of the takeover 
regulation is to facilitate or hinder hostile takeovers. There is a significant amount of 
literature debating whether hostile takeovers are good or bad. The literature which tries to 
justify the regulatory systems in the UK and US is reviewed in Chapter 6. This is 
deliberately delayed until a firm understanding is gained of how takeover regulations 
diverge in the UK and US and why this divergence has arisen.  
Based on the examination of the arguments for and against takeovers, especially hostile 
takeovers, the goal of Chapter 6 is to find out: how defensive tactics should be employed, 
considering the relationship between the target board and target shareholders; who has the 
right to accept or reject the hostile takeover offer, shareholders or directors? Should the 
Chinese takeover law leave the shareholders to decide, as in the UK model, or protect 
board’s right to defend against the hostile takeover as in the US?  
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In Chapter 7, the comparison of takeover regulations focuses on how the tender offer 
should be carried out, by examining the relationship between the bidder and target 
shareholders. The rules that protect target shareholders’ interests against the opportunism 
of bidders, may also have an adverse effect on takeover market by facilitating competing 
takeover bids and thus potentially impeding takeovers. In particular, one of the most 
controversial rules of the equality principle, which requires the takeover bidder to make a 
general offer to the remaining target shareholders once it has acquired sufficient shares to 
obtain control of the target company, is comprehensively assessed in the Chinese context. 
Figure 1-1 Structure of Thesis 
 
6. Conceptual Background 
Before discussing specific takeover regulations, it is necessary to provide a conceptual 
background and define the scope of certain key concepts and terms which are used 
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throughout this work. The purpose of this section is to establish a common language to 
understand the analysis of the different takeover regimes which are examined in the 
following chapters.  
6.1 Mergers and Acquisitions 
It is acknowledged that similar terms can mean different things when applied in different 
scenarios or defined by different group of people, as in mergers and acquisitions. 
From the accountant’s point of view, who is left in control of the enlarged company after 
the takeover deal decides whether the transaction is a merger or an acquisition. In other 
words, the substance of the transaction is used to distinguish between mergers and 
acquisitions. Where two companies of similar size are combined, it does not matter 
whether the shareholders of the both companies exchange their shares for those in a 
newly merged company, or the shareholders of one of the merging companies exchange 
their shares for shares in the other merging company; the shareholders of the combined 
company mutually accept the risks and rewards of the new company and no one party to 
the merger obtains control over the other. This transaction is regarded by accountants as a 
merger. An acquisition, on the other hand, is characterised by the purchase of a smaller 
company by a larger one. The larger company can initiate a hostile offer to purchase the 
smaller firm in the face of resistance from the smaller company’s management. After the 
deal is sealed, the larger company will receive control over the smaller one.  
From the legal point of view, the mechanism used by the acquiring company determines 
whether the transaction is a merger or an acquisition. As a consequence, the real 
difference lies in how the purchase is conducted. If the acquiring company asks the target 
company’s shareholders to agree to a reorganisation in return for cash or acquiring 
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company’s shares, this reconstruction is called a merger. However, if one company 
purchases another company’s shares or assets and clearly establishes itself as the new 
owner, or the target company becomes a subsidiary of the acquiring company, the 
purchase is called an acquisition, no matter whether the target company ceases to exist 
and the buyer swallows the business, or the buyer merges the assets of the target company 
privately after it has become its subsidiary.  
However, in this thesis, the term ‘takeover’ will be used simply to mean any merger or 
acquisition involving trading activities on the shares of a listed company with a view to 
acquiring corporate control, providing that there have been some public approaches rather 
than a purely private contract between the acquiring and target companies, e.g. buying 
shares in the target company, whether from all its shareholders or only the controlling 
shareholders, by private purchase agreement. Moreover, it needs to be stressed that 
‘acquirer’, ‘bidder’, ‘purchaser’ and ‘offeror’ will be used interchangeably in this work to 
mean the party launching the offer for the target company.  
6.2 Friendly and Hostile Takeovers 
Takeovers can be either friendly or hostile. The distinction is normally based on whether 
the takeover is against the wishes of existing target directors and managers. Taking over a 
company by announcing offers to the target shareholders directly, without the support of 
the target board, is regarded as a hostile takeover, as against a friendly takeover where the 
target board welcomes the offer.27 A hostile takeover occurs when an outsider seeks to 
obtain ownership of enough shares to be able to control the target company. The motives 
behind a hostile takeover may vary, but almost always involve at least the pursuit of 
                                                
27 John F. Weston and Mark L. Mitchell and John H. Mulherin, Takeovers, Restructuring and Corporate Governance 
(Pearson Prentice Hall 2004), 35-36. 
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financial gain, through replacing inefficient management of the target company in order 
to produce greater future profits, or incorporating the target’s complementary assets into 
its own company for greater productivity, or breaking up a conglomerate target company 
to sell its component parts at a profit.28  
Whatever the purpose, the hostile takeovers give the acquirer an opportunity to directly 
approach target shareholders without the need to negotiate with the target board.29 
However, generally speaking, hostile takeovers are more expensive than friendly ones as 
the bidding process may result in a higher premium because of the involvement of other 
competing bids, and extra fees such as investment bankers’ fees and legal fees.30 Friendly 
takeovers, on the other hand, have the risk of damaging the minority shareholders’ 
interests, because a friendly takeover can be conducted outside the market via a private 
purchase agreement, in which controlling shareholders might accept a ‘lower-than 
optimal price per share’ without minority shareholders’ participation.31 
It should be kept in mind that the distinction between hostile and friendly takeovers may 
be less obvious than the terms suggest. Many seemingly friendly deals may have hostile 
components because the board’s decision on whether to recommend an offer could be 
influenced by many elements; for example, its estimate of the bidder’s chance of success 
in the hostile offer.32 A friendly bid can actually be conducted under the threat of 
launching a hostile attack. As such, the starting point of a hostile takeover can be the 
target management. If the proposal is rejected by the target management, then the offer 
                                                
28 Barbara White, ‘Conflicts in the Regulation of Hostile Business Takeovers in the United States and the European 
Union’ (2003) 9 Ius Gentium 161, 166 
29 Jennifer G. Hill, ‘Takeover, Poison Pills and Protectionism in Comparative Corporate Governance’ (2010) European 
Corporate Governance Institute Law Research Paper No. 168/2010 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1704745> accessed 3 
May 2011, 2. 
30 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers What Can Go Wrong and How to Prevent It (John Wiley & Sons 2004) 15. 
31  Marco Ventoruzzo,  ‘The Thirteenth Directive and the Contrasts Between European and U.S. Takeover Regulation: 
Different (Regulatory) Means, Not so Different (Political and Economic) Ends?’ (2006) Bocconi Legal Studies 
Research Paper No 06-07 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=819764> accessed 21 July 2011, 87. 
32 Erik Berglöf and Mike Burkart, ‘European Takeover Regulation’ (2003) 36 Economic Policy 171, 177. 
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can go straight to the target shareholders. 33  The bidder can threaten the target 
management by stating that if the offer is not recommended, the offer will be sent directly 
to shareholders. Similarly, a deal initiated as a hostile takeover can be completed as a 
friendly one.  
6.3 Takeover Devices  
Takeover transactions can be undertaken in various ways, used individually or 
collectively, namely mergers, purchase of shares on the market or a tender offer to all the 
target shareholders.34  
6.3.1 Mergers 
The traditional takeover device to achieve corporate reconstructions is the merger, which 
is initiated and controlled by a company’s board, rather than its shareholders. Although a 
merger needs to be approved by shareholders,35 it will be not easily achieved if an 
incumbent board opposes the merger proposal, because the board normally acts as 
goalkeeper to determine which transactions should be presented to shareholders for 
consideration.36 Theoretically, shareholders are able to remove the board on their own 
initiative, but it is not easy for them to monitor the board and campaign for its defeat in a 
shareholders’ meeting, due to coordination difficulties among dispersed shareholders.  
                                                
33 Gaughan (n30) 16. 
34 Note that a private purchase agreement with a small number of controlling shareholders is also one of the takeover 
devices, but it will not be discussed here as it is outside the scope of this study. 
35 In fact, it can and has been done by proxy battle, i.e. getting the voters of the target company to accept reconstruction. 
In the UK, for example, 75% of votes are required, rather than the usual 51%. Reconstruction can also have a tax 
advantage.  
36 Charles R.T. O’Kelley and Robert B. Thompson, Corporations and Other Business Associations: Cases and 
Materials (5th edn, APSEN 2006) 755. 
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6.3.2 Open Market Purchases 
Open market purchase takes place where the acquirer simply negotiates with target 
shareholders and buys a certain amount of shares on the stock exchange over a period of 
time.37 It can be used as a takeover device to obtain control in the target company when 
there is opposition from the incumbent management. However, this type of transaction is 
desirable only if there are a few controlling shareholders in the target company. Open 
market purchase might be incredibly costly if shares in the target company are widely 
held. Legal disclosure requirements normally make share prices spike immediately after 
the bidder announces the acquisition when triggering the threshold.  
6.3.3 Tender offers / Takeover bids 
Tender offers are made by the bidder directly to all shareholders of the target company, 
offering to purchase all or a certain number of the target company’s shares at a specified 
price within a specified time, with the purpose of receiving sufficient acceptances to 
obtain control of the target company.38 Tender offers are arguably the most advantageous 
method of acquiring the control of shares widely held in a company.39 The hostile 
takeovers are mostly conducted by tender offer, which means the bid can be announced 
directly to target shareholders, bypassing the target management and board of directors. 
Of course, a tender offer can be conducted in a friendly manner if it is supported by the 
target board. If the bidder manages to obtain enough shares, he can take control of the 
target company either by using its majority status in a general meeting to replace the 
                                                
37 George Bittlingmayer, ‘The Market for Corporate Control (including Takeovers)’ (1998), 5 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=81808> accessed 16 July 2011. 
38 Davies and Hopt (n5) 225. 
39 Daniel R. Fischel, ‘Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash 
Tender Offer’ (1978) 57 Texas Law Review 1, 6. 
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existing board with its own (called a proxy fight), or by merging the target company into 
its own company as a subsidiary.40  
Unlike open market purchases, which may leave an offeror in a minority position with 
insufficient shares for control, a tender offer is exercised by private contract between the 
acquirer and the target shareholders on the condition of tendering enough of the 
outstanding shares to give control in the target company.41 The bidder will normally offer 
a higher price than the current market value of those shares at the time of the offer. 42 
Each target shareholder then has to make their own decision on whether to tender their 
shares to the bidder. If the target shareholders decide to tender their shares, once all the 
conditions to the tender offer have been satisfied, the bidder is obligated to buy the 
tendered shares from the target shareholders. The method of payment may vary, such as 
an exchange of cash, securities in the bidding company or a combination of these two.  
In this study, the term ‘tender offer’ refers to a cash tender offer. This is because tender 
offers in cash are regarded as the most effective means now available for transferring 
corporate control from a resisting incumbent management to those who believe they can 
better manage the assets of the target company.43 Moreover, because ‘tender offer’ is the 
term used in the US with the same meaning as ‘takeover bid’ in the UK, these two terms 
are interchangeable in this work.  
 
 
                                                
40 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard University Press 
1996) 162. 
41 White (n28) 167. Also see Easterbrook and Fischel (n40) 162. The tender offer is also called voluntary transaction 
between the bidder and the target’s investors.  
42 Ronald J. Gilson and Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions (2nd edn, Foundation Press 
1995) 35. 
43 Patrick J. Davey, Defenses Against Unnegotiated Cash Tender Offers (Conference Board 1977) 1-4. 
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6.4 Takeover Defences 
Takeover defences refer to techniques and strategies which may prevent the change of 
control over companies or make the target company less attractive to the bidder by raising 
the cost of a takeover or making it more complicated.44 They are normally used by the 
target board or incumbent managers to defend an unwanted takeover bid, in order to 
preserve their positions in the target company. As hostile takeovers attempt increase, 
takeover defences are used by target boards more and more frequently to counter this 
threat. Takeover defences can be adopted both prior to and after the announcement of a 
bid (so called pre-bid defences and post-bid defences).45 Given the great variety of 
defensive tactics that can used to thwart a hostile takeover, the following list comprises 
those being commonly adopted, but it is not necessarily exclusive. Although the defences 
are listed in two categories, there can be overlap between them.   
Pre-bid defences are put in place in advance of any specific takeover bid, and serve to 
deter potential takeover bids by restricting the acquisition of shares in the target company 
or thwarting the exercise of control in the shareholders’ meeting. Examples of pre-bid 
defences include: amending the articles of association to introduce poison pills (discussed 
below),46  and/or staggered board (discussed below); ‘dual-class stock’, also known as 
‘super-voting stock’, referring to differential share structures under which these stocks 
have disproportionately higher voting rights but low liquidity or dividend rights; and 
golden parachutes, which bind the target company to pay high compensation packages to 
incumbent directors and managers in the event of a change of control. 
                                                
44 Ventoruzzo (n24) 182. 
45 They are also known as prevention takeover defences and active takeover defences, see Gaughan (n30) 18. 
46 Although the poison pill technique can be adopted after a hostile takeover bid has been made, it is normally applied 
prior to the bid with the purpose of frightening the potential bidder. 
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Post-bid defences are used in the course of a takeover battle when an unwanted bidder has 
made an offer to the target shareholders. They include white knight (discussed below); 
greenmail, involving paying off a potential bidder in return for not undertaking a hostile 
takeover; an option to sell the most valuable business and assets (‘crown jewel’) of the 
target company, such as a patent or trade mark which may be of particular interest to the 
bidder, thus making the target company less attractive; share repurchase, referring to 
repurchase of its own shares by the target company to reduce the number of shares that 
are available for the potential bidder to buy and raise the share price above the bid price; 
Pac-Man defence involving launching a bid for the bidder’s company by the target 
company.47  
Some of the most typical and commonly employed takeover defences are worth 
discussing in more detail. 
Poison Pills 
Poison pills were invented by Martin Lipton in the US takeover battles of the early 1980s 
involving shareholder rights plans, which are amendments to the company’s articles of 
association. They automatically trigger the issue of a large number of new shares to the 
target public shareholders rather than to the bidder, at a discounted price, by an event 
such as the bidder gaining a controlling block of the company’s shares.48 The most 
common poison pill is an arrangement where the existing shareholders of the target 
company will receive a large amount of convertible rights to preferred shares if a single 
shareholder obtains a specific percentage of the target’s voting shares, which normally 
                                                
47 For a comprehensive list of takeover defences, see Suzanne S. Dawson and Robert J. Pence and David S. Stone, 
‘Poison Pill Defensive Measures’ (1987) 42 Business Lawyer 423, 423. 
48 For a detailed examination of poison pill, see William Carney and Leonard Silverstein, ‘The Illusory Protections of 
the Poison Pill’ (2003) 79 Notre Dame Law Review 179, 181-2. 
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gives a controlling shareholding in the company, without approaching the target board. 
These preferred shares are convertible into ordinary shares at an extremely attractive price, 
normally half the market price. 
More importantly, the potential bidder is not allowed to exercise the rights plans even if 
he holds shares in the target company. Poison pills are designed to dilute the bidder’s 
shares in the target company because of the massive distribution of additional shares 
which are not available to the bidders. As Underhill and Austmann have pointed out, the 
employment of a poison pill not only destroys the bidder’s voting majority, but also 
dilutes the bidder’s investment in the target company.49 Hence, although poison pills now 
take a variety of forms, they all have a common feature that discriminates against the 
hostile bidder.50 
Poison pills have been widely used by target boards and described as ‘the most powerful 
and effective’ takeover defensive measure in the US.51 According to Bebchuk et al, ‘as 
long as the pill remains in place, no other defensive measures are necessary because the 
bid is completely blocked’.52 Poison pills are used to prevent the bidder from exceeding 
the ownership trigger threshold and deterring them by essentially raising the cost of the 
bid.53 A takeover bid will be more expensive to a prospective bidder with the existence of 
poison pills. It is therefore argued that following the invention of the poison pills, a target 
board is given the super power to easily fend off unwelcome takeover offers.54 
                                                
49 Underhill and Austmann (n48) 105. 
50 John P. Lowry, ‘Poison Pills in U.S. Corporations – A Re-examination’ (1992) Journal of Business Law 337, 341. 
51 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK (Oxford University Press 2004) 333. 
52 Lucian Arye Bebchuk and John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian, ‘The Powerful Antitakeover Force of 
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy’ (2002) 54 Stanford Law Review 885, 889. 
53 Tim Jenkinson and Colin P. Mayer, Hostile Takeovers: Defence, Attack and Corporate Governance (McGraw-Hill 
Book 1994) 33. 
54 John C. Coates IV, ‘The Contestability of Corporate Control: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence on Takeover 
Defenses’ (2000) 79 Texas Law Review 271, 276. 
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There has been notable deployment of poison pills over the last three years. In 2010, 
Pershing Square Capital Management and Vornado Realty Trust acquired 26% of shares 
in the retail giant J.C. Penney. J.C. Penny, which adopted a poison pill to avoid a larger 
buyout in the company by diluting their holdings with new offers, should there be an 
attempt to purchase additional shares. In 2011, Air Productions threatened to buy out 
Airgas. Airgas tried to deter the takeover by using a poison pill to place the stock price 
higher than Air Productions could afford to pay. Lundin, a copper and zinc mining 
company, used a poison pill to thwart a takeover by issuing new shares if a single 
company offered to buy 20% or more of the shares of the company.55 
In addition to making the hostile takeover prohibitively expensive, poison pills give 
power to the target board to revoke the pill either before or after the occurrence of a 
triggering event, which enables the target board to consider a friendly takeover bid. 
Poison pills are usually redeemed if a target board wants to sell the company to a friendly 
acquirer. Their existence compels a potential bidder to approach the target board directly 
and negotiate a settlement with them before making a tender offer.56 
Although there are arguments which claim that poison pills only serve to ‘entrench 
management and encourage disaffected shareholders to litigate’,57 poison pills have been 
in widespread use due to their ability to delay a hostile takeover bid, giving the target 
board time to adopt other defensive measures and, more importantly, making the deal 
unattractive to the bidder by increasing the overall costs of launching a bid. The other 
reason for the popularity of the poison pills as a defensive tactic in the US, is that it can 
                                                
55 For more information about the cited three cases, see Kalen Smith, ‘How Companies Use Shareholder Rights Plans 
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be adopted by the target board without the approval of target shareholders, in order to 
deter unwanted bids effectively and easily.58 
Staggered board 
A staggered board is a specific type of pre-bid defence designed to strengthen the target 
board’s ability to remain in control.59 The board is divided into several, usually three, 
parts of approximately equal size; and each can only be re-elected or removed in 
staggered years. As a result, even where a bidder has purchased a majority of the target’s 
shares, it is unable to appoint a majority of the target board until two successive elections 
have taken place because only one-third of the board can be removed annually. The 
difficulty of replacing the existing board allows the target board to retain control for a 
longer time. The threat of delay is enough to force a bidder to approach the existing target 
board, as no bidder would wish to wait for at least two annual elections of directors to 
gain control of the target board. 
In practice, the staggered board is often used in conjunction with poison pills to serve as 
an even more powerful anti-takeover mechanism. The staggered board makes it difficult 
for a bidder to replace the target board members either by initiating a proxy fight or re-
election at a shareholders’ meeting so that the new board can redeem the poison pills and 
the bidder can proceed with its takeover offer. It is argued that the combination of 
staggered board and poison pills provides enormous discretion to the target board to 
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fender offer a hostile bid and is proven to raise the odds of a target company remaining 
independent from 34% to 61%.60 
White Knight  
A white knight is a defence which allows the target board to find a more appropriate and 
friendly bidder to acquire the target company, following the receipt of a hostile offer from 
an unwelcome bidder. The alternative bidder, whose bid is recommended by the target 
board, is classified as a ‘white knight’.61 The white knight must be willing to acquire the 
target company on more favourable terms than the current bidder’s offer, which could be 
a higher offer price or willingness to keep the target current board in place after the deal 
is sealed. In the face of a hostile takeover bid, the target board will recommend another 
bidder largely because it is deemed that a change of control in the target company is 
inevitable.62 
7. Corporate Governance and Takeover Regulation 
Put simply, corporate governance means governance of companies.63 Companies, one of 
the three general forms of business organisation (along with sole proprietorships and 
partnerships), were designed to encourage the investment of capital by limiting 
shareholders’ losses from bankruptcy to their investment, excluding assets held in their 
own name.64 The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
issued its influential OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in 1998 and stated that 
corporate governance identifies the distribution of rights and duties of different 
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participants such as board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders in the 
corporation. 
7.1 Corporate Ownership 
It is generally recognised that shareholders have two forms of ownership right, cash flow 
right and control right. Cash flow rights enable shareholders to receive the generated 
profits of the company, while control rights give them voting rights to manage the assets 
they own in the company. There are two distinct types of corporate ownership 
internationally, depending on the level of concentration of these two shareholder rights, 
dispersed or concentrated.65 It is argued that the concentration level of corporate share 
ownership is crucial in maximising the firm’s value.66 
Under dispersed ownership, both cash flow rights and control rights are widely 
distributed among the shareholders, and no single shareholder or a group of shareholders 
is able to control the company. In contrast, concentration ownership means that not only 
cash flow rights are concentrated, but also control rights are held by one or a group of 
controlling shareholders. When shareholding is dispersed, cash flow rights and control 
rights are usually linked together by ‘one-share-one-vote’ rules and thus result in freely 
tradeable dispersed control by numerous shareholders. However, in a company with 
concentrated ownership, these two types of right are separated and concentrated control in 
the hands of those who hold controlling shares in the company.67 
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7.2 Agency Costs  
Agency costs arise between two parties, principal and agent. When the agent promises to 
take action for the welfare of the principal, but acts in his own interest instead, agency 
costs are incurred.68 Since there are many interested parties associated with business, 
principal and agent relations exist in various ways; for example, shareholders and 
management, controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, creditors and 
shareholders.  The importance of corporate governance derives from a need to monitor 
the behaviour of different interested parties and to minimise the agency costs of these 
principal and agent relations.69 This thesis focuses on the conflicts of interest between the 
target shareholders and directors in dispersed ownership companies and controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders in concentrated ownership companies. 
In a publicly held company, agency costs arise largely because of the separation of 
ownership and management. As Berle has famously pointed out, shareholders lose much 
of their control, particularly in a large company with a widespread shareholding, through 
the separation of ownership and management in the modern corporation.70 Although 
shareholders are still the owner, they do not act in the same way as the traditional owner. 
In a dispersed shareholding company, each shareholder holds a very small percentage of 
the total shares outstanding, and thus has less and less incentive to oversee the operations 
of the company. For this reason, shareholders hire managers to deal with daily matters 
and expect them to pursue the business goals and maximise financial gains on their 
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behalf.71 According to Berle and Means, the wealth of a great number of individuals is 
aggregated under the direct control of a few professional managers.72   
When managers are in charge of a company’s daily affairs, shareholders are not usually in 
a position to change the actions of managers when they do not approve of them. Hence, 
there is potential conflict of interest between those who actually control the company and 
beneficial ownership.73 When managers, the agents of the shareholders, pursue their own 
self-interest at the expense of shareholders, the owners of the company are said to incur 
agency costs. As Forstinger has observed, agency costs always exist to some extent and 
can never be completely eliminated.74 As a result, under the dispersed ownership structure, 
the focus of corporate governance is to reduce these agency costs and make management 
accountable. 
In the case of concentrated ownership companies, where the controlling shareholders are 
able to monitor the managers, there is less concern that the managers will take actions that 
are not in the best interests of shareholders. Nevertheless, agency costs arise between 
controlling shareholders who own the majority of the controlling interest, and non-
controlling shareholders (minority shareholders). Concentrated ownership gives the 
controlling shareholder substantial discretionary powers to use the firm’s resources to 
benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders; for example, transferring 
resources out of the company to parent or other related parties.75 Hence, non-controlling 
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shareholders are subject to agency costs when their interests are expropriated by the 
controlling shareholders.  
7.3 Directors’ Fiduciary Duties 
In order to minimise the agency costs, a board of directors is elected by shareholders to 
look after their interests by overseeing management. The directors are usually members 
of management, apart from the chief executive officer and independent directors. As 
Easterbrook has pointed out, shareholders have ownership without control while directors 
have control without ownership.76 The directors, in turn, appoint managers to run the 
company, and dismiss them on behalf of the shareholders. The directors do not generally 
monitor the company on a daily basis but receive periodic updates from management and 
review their performance through various financial statements. 
As argued by Cheffins, the separation of ownership and control is central to both the 
success of the corporation and ‘its gravest abuses’.77 The main advantage of separation is 
that it enables company resources to be used more efficiently and managed towards a 
unified set of goals. However, it gives directors enormous power over the company, 
including the power to hire and fire its chief officer. There is a risk that directors may take 
advantage of their superior information to use corporate resources for their personal 
interest.78 As Adam Smith stated,  
The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should 
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watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
company frequently watch over their own. Like the Stewards of a rich man, they 
are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and 
very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail more or less, in the management of the 
officers of such a company.79  
At this point, the law enters to solve the problem and regulate directors to act in the 
interests of shareholders by imposing fiduciary duties on them. Directors’ fiduciary duties 
are now a well-accepted body of law in almost all jurisdictions. ‘Fiduciary’ was defined 
by Millet L.J. as ‘… someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a 
particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and 
confidence … The principal is entitled to the single minded loyalty of his fiduciary’.80 
Therefore a fiduciary owes a duty to his principal and must act solely in the interest of 
that principal. This is the essence of fiduciary duties. When directors are insufficiently 
diligent and do not require managers to act in shareholders’ interests, they breach these 
fiduciary duties.81 
In the context of hostile takeovers, there is an even more severe conflict of interest 
between board and shareholders. Therefore, in addition to the fiduciary duties owed to 
shareholders by the directors when they monitor the management of the company, a set of 
specific duties is established by takeover regulations with which the target directors need 
to comply when attempting to employ defensive measures to fend off a takeover bid. 
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These duties can be more demanding than the fiduciary duties as shareholders are more 
vulnerable in the context of takeovers.  
7.4 Market for Corporate Control 
A functioning takeover market, also known as a market for corporate control, is claimed 
as a key corporate governance mechanism to mitigate agency costs in public held 
companies.82 The market for corporate control is thought to be one of most vital concepts 
of corporate governance, allowing corporate control to shift to managers who can employ 
the assets more profitably. It is worth mentioning that a market for corporate control 
works well only when the target company’s shares are in dispersed ownership, because 
small and scattered shareholdings are more likely be obtained in the stock market and 
thus make the takeover against management possible.83 
During the 1960s merger wave, the concept of a market for corporate control was 
introduced by Henry Manne in his famous work Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control.84 Manne has argued that, ‘the lower the stock price, relative to what it could be 
with more efficient management, the more attractive the takeover becomes to those who 
believe that they can manage the company more efficiently’.85 Later, Fischel agreed that 
‘the lower the market price of the securities compared to what it would be with better 
management, the more attractive the firm is to outsiders with the ability to take the firm 
over’.86  
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In a more recent restatement, according to Gilson the market for corporate control states 
that:  
a decrease in corporate profits, whether because of inefficient management or 
because of efficient but self-dealing management has diverted too much income 
to itself, cause the price of corporation’s stock to decline to a level consistent 
with the corporation’s reduced profitability. This creates an opportunity for 
entrepreneurial profit. If shares representing control can be purchased at a price 
which, together with the associated transaction costs, is less than the shares’ 
value following displacement of existing management, then everyone – other 
than the management to be displaced - benefits from the transaction. Selling 
shareholders receive more for their stock than its value under previous 
management; new management receives an entrepreneurial reward through the 
increased value of acquired shares; the society benefits from more efficiently 
used resources.87 
The market for corporate control is based on the theory of an efficient capital market, 
suggesting that share price accurately and promptly reflects the value of the firm based on 
all publicly available information. It is argued that, in an efficient capital market, the 
ability of its management could be one of the factors affecting the share price of the 
company. If a business is poorly managed, its share price will be lower than under more 
competent management. This poor management, reflected in the low share price, could 
attract a potential takeover bidder’s attention. In other words, the tender offer at a 
premium price over the market price indicates that removing the incumbent management 
would generate more financial gain for the bidder.   
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Takeovers are therefore regarded as a key mechanism in determining the active allocation 
of corporate control by transferring inefficiently used assets to those who can use them 
more efficiently.88 Allen has suggested that the company benefits from corporate control 
if it can be transferred freely between buyers and sellers, and its assets subject to most 
efficient use.89 When there is a difference between a company’s current share value, 
reflected in its potential value, added to by the more efficient management, the bidder can 
profit by buying and improving the management. In the meantime, shareholders gain 
from the shifting control because they receive a premium over the market price.  
In addition to the financial gains from a takeover offer, as Easterbrook and Fischel have 
pointed out, shareholders benefit even if their company never becomes a takeover 
target.90 Managers may have strong incentives to improve a company’s performance to 
keep share prices high, so as to reduce the probability of being a target for a takeover bid, 
because the threat of a successful takeover bid often results in the replacement of current 
management. Monitoring by outsiders therefore poses a threat to management if they 
operate the company inefficiently.91 
The market for corporate control, combined with the threatening role played by hostile 
takeovers in particular, is of great importance in creating incentives for management to 
maximise the welfare of shareholders. As a result, takeovers are regarded as an external 
corporate governance mechanism that disciplines managers to act in the interests of the 
shareholders. As Nuttall has stated, managers are more disciplined, operate more 
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efficiently, and pay more dividends to shareholders when there is the threat of a hostile 
takeover.92  
7.5 Takeover Regulation  
The regulatory framework is regarded as an important mechanism in establishing sound 
corporate governance and curtailing market misconduct.93 Takeover regulation is defined 
as the body of rules under which takeover activities must be conducted within a particular 
system.94 It constitutes an important part of corporate governance, affecting the level of 
shareholder protection and the development of the market for corporate control. Takeover 
regulation therefore influences the distribution of gains from takeovers among those 
parties whose interests are directly involved, namely the bidders, target board and target 
shareholders.95  
From the bidders’ perspective, they prefer rules that make takeovers easier and enable 
them to gain control of the target with fewer barriers. The target board, who want to retain 
their positions in the target company, prefer rules that make takeovers harder. When both 
bidders and target board have roughly equal resources, it is suggested that takeover 
regulation is not justified in favouring either side. In the face of a takeover, especially a 
hostile one, existing shareholders are very vulnerable as both the bidders and target board 
can expropriate their wealth. Hence, ensuring fairness and justice for shareholders is 
regarded as one of the main goals of takeover regulation. As Ferrarini and Miller have 
argued, takeover regulation should be reasonably even-handed as between bidders and 
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target board, but principally aimed at protecting shareholders.96  
However, shareholder protection rules may have an adverse effect on the takeover market. 
One of the fundamental dilemmas of takeover regulation is to balance the conflict of 
interest between bidders and target shareholders. The takeover regulation will be 
considered to be target-friendly when it makes hostile takeovers more costly for bidders, 
or even impedes them altogether. In addition, the target board potentially faces a conflict 
of interest between maintaining the independence of the target to keep their jobs and 
allowing the takeover to create value for its shareholders. This conflict is intensified in 
the context of hostile takeovers. As a result, a set of rules is required to govern the 
behaviour of directors and deal with the issue of who has the right to adopt takeover 
defences and decide whether to accept or reject a takeover bid.  
In spite of the fact that promotion of an efficient takeover market and protection of 
shareholders can be consistent in some instances, in most situations they may be 
diametrically opposed.97 A functioning market for corporate control cannot be achieved 
separately from the protection of shareholders. As Huang has suggested, the best possible 
takeover regulation ‘consists of nothing more than trying to strike a balance between 
promoting takeover market and protecting shareholders’ interests’.98 However, takeover 
regulation cannot be neutral with regard to its outcome because it ultimately determines 
who win the battle and survive in the takeover market.99 There are no specific figures to 
show how far shareholder protection should be at the cost of reducing the possibility or 
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threat of takeovers. It is the legislator’s job to make a trade-off on the basis of the 
particular political situation and the changing commercial environment.  
Chapter 2 Takeover Regime in the United Kingdom 
July 2013 39 
Chapter 2 Takeover Regime in the United Kingdom 
Takeover law in the UK has arguably the longest history in the regulatory experience of 
takeovers.100 The conduct of takeovers and mergers is regulated by the Panel on Takeovers 
and Mergers (Takeover Panel) and subject to the principles and rules of the City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers (City Code). The Takeover Panel and the City Code have 
traditionally operated without statutory backing. With the implementation of the European 
Directive on Takeover Bids 2004/25/EC (Takeover Directive), they have been given the 
force of law for the first time in their long history.  
1. The City Code and the Takeover Panel 
The City Code has developed since 1968 to reflect the collective opinion of those 
professionally involved in the field of takeovers, addressing issues such as appropriate 
business standards, fairness to shareholders, and an orderly framework for takeovers. 
However, the City Code was not enacted to determine the financial advantages of a takeover, 
as these are matters for the company and its shareholders to decide; nor does it deal with the 
public interest, which is within the scope of government and competition authorities.101  
The Takeover Panel was established as an independent body to issue and administer the City 
Code and to supervise and regulate takeovers and other matters to which the City Code 
applies, in accordance with the General Principles and Rules set out in the City Code.102 
Under Section 942(2) of the Companies Act 2006, the Takeover Panel may ‘do anything that 
it considers necessary or expedient for the purpose of, or in connection with, its function’. 
The Takeover Panel’s main function is to ensure that shareholders are treated fairly, that they 
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are not denied an opportunity to decide on the merits of a takeover, and that shareholders of 
the same class are afforded equivalent treatment by an offeror.	  
1.1 History of the City Code 
In the UK, hostile takeovers did not occur until 1953, when Charles Clore, for the first time, 
sent a tender offer directly to the shareholders of shoe retailer J. Sears & Co.103 He informed 
one of the J. Sears & Co. directors of his interest in purchasing the company and asked the 
board to recommend to its shareholders so that they can accept an offer from him. The board 
turned down his proposal. As Armour has argued, Clore’s first attempt appeared as an 
enormous shock for the target board in particular, as well as for the City in general.104 
Responding to this, the target board was desperate to frustrate these unwanted bids, so as to 
protect themselves against losing their positions in the company. 
The emergence of the hostile takeovers at that time is explained by a number of factors.105 
For the first time, the Companies Act 1948 required companies to disclose information on 
their current earnings, which made them more readily detectable by outsiders.106 The sharply 
increasing tax burden on companies also caused a large reduction in company profits. 
According to the findings of Bull and Vice, generally speaking the dividend to shareholders 
was reduced from 52% of gross trading profits in 1938 to 20% in 1952.107 Because of the 
low level of distribution to shareholders, share prices failed to keep pace with companies’ 
growth. Furthermore, under the restructuring of British industry, the main focus of 
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manufacturing shifted from textiles and heavy capital goods to light electrical engineering 
and machine tools. These changes made the differences between efficient and inefficient 
companies more visible than before, so indicating a growing number of undervalued target 
companies that were taken over by the hostile bidders, with the aim of realising maximum 
profits on return.108 
In another famous case in 1953, the board of Savoy Hotel Ltd adopted a complex scheme 
known as ‘the Worcester Scheme’ to frustrate a bid, with the aim of preventing a bidder 
from changing into offices its wholly owned subsidiary Berkeley Hotel Ltd, without the 
approval of its shareholders.109 The Board of Trade appointed Mr. E. Milner Holland, Q.C., a 
leading barrister in company matters, to investigate the conduct of the Savoy Hotel’s board, 
and to report whether the board’s action was improper.110 After the investigation, Mr. 
Holland concluded that the action of the directors was invalid, although they believed that it 
had been in the best interests of the company and its shareholders, because in his opinion, 
‘such a use of directors powers … however proper the emotive behind it, is not a purpose for 
which those powers were conferred on the Board …’ and the shareholders of the Savoy 
Hotel were not given the opportunity to ‘alter the decision of their present board as to the 
present or future use of the property of the Company’ as they were not consulted.111  
Uncertainty regarding the target board’s right to take action upon a hostile bid emphasised its 
discretion in using defensive measures to thwart an unwanted bid. In the meantime, the 
hostile bidders were free to doing whatever they should to make their bid succeed. However, 
it was the target shareholders who really lost out in this practice, as they were not normally 
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given the opportunity to have voice an opinion on the takeover bid.112 As a result, there was 
a strong need for regulatory intervention to protect shareholders’ interests. In response to this, 
the courts applied the proper purpose doctrine to scrutinise takeover defences.113 However, 
institutional investors, who were the main lobby group for takeover-related legislation in the 
UK, called for a Code of Conduct to regulate hostile takeovers by enacting proper law, 
because the delay caused by the litigation and the uncertainty of courts’ decisions were not 
acceptable.114  
As a result, in 1959, the Governor of the Bank of England set up a City Working Party, 
formed of representatives from institutional investment entities, merchant and commercial 
banks, and major organisations in City,115 to produce the first set of regulations specifically 
dealing with takeovers, based on the philosophy that takeovers were beneficial to the 
business community if they were properly regulated. Notes on the Amalgamations of British 
Businesses (Notes) was published in October 1959, laying down the general principles that 
there should be no interference in the free market for the shares of companies, that 
shareholders are entitled to make the decision on whether to sell or retain their shares, and 
that shareholders should be given adequate and timely information in order to enable them to 
make a sound decision.116 It can be seen that the principle of shareholder primacy was 
established at the beginning of regulatory experience of takeovers in the UK. 
As Johnston has commented, the Notes was regarded as the first experiment in self-
regulation in the UK in relation to takeovers, and in many ways shaped the form of the City 
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Code that was to come later.117 However, the absence of mechanisms for adjudication and 
enforcement meant that the Notes’ influence on the UK takeover market was still inadequate 
in terms of protecting shareholders.118 The increasing adoption of takeover defences by 
target boards, along with the call for a statute to regulate takeovers, led to revising and 
extending the Notes and, in 1967, the drafting of a new set of takeover rules by the Bank of 
England’s City Working Party:119 ‘the City Code’ came into effect on 27 March 1968. The 
Takeover Panel was established on the same day, to supervise the administration of the City 
Code and give authoritative rulings and advice on its application. The UK’s non-statutory 
takeover regime was formally established at that point and was well received by City 
participants in general. 
1.2 Implementation of the Takeover Directive 
The Takeover Directive was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union on 21 April 2004, after just over thirty years of negotiation. The first 
proposal of a directive with regard to takeover bids dates back to 1989. For the first time, 
minimum EU rules were set in force, governing takeovers of companies whose shares are 
traded on a regulated market.120 The aim of the Takeover Directive was to promote the 
competitiveness of European companies, to strengthen the single market in financial services 
by facilitating cross-border restructuring, and to enhance minority shareholder protection 
within the European Union.121  
                                                
117 Johnston (n105) 432. 
118 John Armour and David A. Skeel Jr, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergence 
of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 1727, 1759.  
119 The Confederation of British Industry and the National Association of Pension Funds were added to the membership of 
the City Working Party. 
120 For a definition of regulated markets, see article 4.1(14) of the Takeover Directive. 
121 Joseph A. McCahery and others, ‘The Economics of the Proposed European Takeover Directive’ in Ferrarini Guido and 
others (eds), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford University Press 2004) 46. 
Chapter 2 Takeover Regime in the United Kingdom 
July 2013 44 
The Takeover Directive had to be implemented by all European Member States no later than 
20 May 2006. In response to this requirement, the UK Government implemented it by 
bringing into force the Takeovers Directive (Interim Implementation) Regulations 2006 
(Regulations 2006) on 20 May 2006 to meet the implementation deadline for the Takeover 
Directive. The Regulations 2006 put the City Code and the Takeover Panel on a statutory 
footing for the first time. It ceased to have effect when the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) 
came into force on 6 April 2007. Under part 28 of the CA 2006, the rules set out in the City 
Code now have the force of law and the Takeover Panel now has a statutory status for 
making and enforcing the City Code.  
Although the UK government had to implement the Takeover Directive and give the City 
Code and the Takeover Panel statutory backing, it had always intended to produce a system 
in compliance with the Takeover Directive, but, importantly, one in which the Panel could 
operate in practice much as before. Under the new statutory framework, the essential 
characteristics of the takeover regime overseen by the Takeover Panel have been recognised 
and preserved, including flexibility, speed and certainty in decision making, independence 
and regulatory autonomy, principle-based regulation, the involvement of key City and 
business participants in developing takeover rules, professional expertise in regulatory 
activities, and a consensual approach to regulation amongst those involved in the markets.122 
As the director general of the Takeover Panel, Mr. Robert Hingley, has emphasised, ‘these 
characteristics are important to the financial community in order to avoid over-rigidity of the 
Rules and the risk of takeovers becoming delayed by litigation of a tactical nature, which 
may frustrate the ability of shareholders to decide the outcome of an offer’.123  
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It is worth mentioning that there have been no dramatic changes to the content of the City 
Code since the implementation of the Takeover Directive in 2007. After all, the substantive 
content of the Takeover Directive was significantly influenced by the City Code and its key 
provisions.124 As Johnston has noted, ‘in terms of content, nothing has changed since the 
Directive was implemented, although some of the Code’s provisions now have 
Parliamentary approval’.125  Although the CA 2006 provides the Takeover Panel with 
statutory power to supervise takeover bids, it replicates the City Code’s existing rules and 
procedures to the greatest extent possible.126 The Panel continues to make rulings on the 
interpretation, application and effects of the City Code and to give directions as it did under 
the non-statutory system.  
1.3 Overview of the City Code 
The City Code comprises an Introduction, General Principles, Definitions, Rules and related 
Notes and Appendices, and the Rules of Procedure of the Hearing Committee. The rules may 
change from the time to time.127 
1.3.1 Structure of the City Code 
The City Code has been revised several times since it came into force in 1968. Its first 
version consisted of ten General Principles and 35 rules. It now contains six General 
Principles which provide the core regulatory philosophy and standards of commercial 
behaviour.128 These six General Principles are all taken directly from Article 3 of the 
Takeover Directive. They replaced the original ten General Principles and apply to takeovers 
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and other matters to which the City Code applies. It is worth mentioning that although these 
principles all come from the Takeover Directive, they are mainly based upon the previous 
General Principles of the old City Code. They are expressed in broad general terms and the 
City Code does not define the precise extent of, or limitations on, their application. They are 
applied in accordance with their spirit in order to achieve their underlying purpose. 
In addition to the General Principles, the City Code now contains 38 specific rules which fall 
into two categories: expansions of the General Principles and provisions governing specific 
aspects of takeover procedure. The rules are in some cases accompanied by extensive notes, 
setting out interpretations and practices which have become established through actual cases 
brought before the Takeover Panel or the Takeover Panel Executive. Although most of the 
rules are drafted in less general terms than the General Principles, they are framed in non-
technical language and should to be interpreted so as to achieve their underlying purpose, 
like the General Principles. Therefore, their spirit must be observed as well as their letter.129 
The Takeover Panel will block actions that breach the spirit of the City Code, although they 
may comply technically with the rules of the City Code. 
1.3.2 Jurisdiction of the City Code 
The scope of the companies and transactions to which the City Code applies was 
substantially amended to reflect the implementation of the Takeover Directive. The 
Takeover Directive determines the scope of jurisdiction of the competent authority in any 
EU Member State by reference to the location of the registered office of the target company 
and the regulated market on which its securities are traded.  
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Since the Takeover Directive was implemented in 2007, the City Code has applied to all 
offers for companies which have registered offices in the UK, the Channel Islands or the Isle 
of Man, if any of their shares are listed on a regulated market in the UK130 or on any stock 
exchange in the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man. Therefore, an offer for a company whose 
shares are listed on a UK market that is not a regulated market, such as AIM or the PLUS 
Quoted Market, will only be subject to the City Code if the company satisfies the residency 
test. The residency test refers to whether the company’s place of central management and 
control lies in the UK, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man. When considering whether a 
company is resident, the Takeover Panel will look at the structure of the board, the functions 
of the directors and other relevant major influences on the management of the company.131  
The City Code applies to a wider range of transactions than those covered by the Takeover 
Directive, which only applies to public, control-seeking offers. The City Code also applies to 
takeover bids, mergers and other transactions that are used to obtain or consolidate control of 
a relevant company, as well as partial offers to shareholders for shares in the relevant 
companies. Moreover, the City Code applies to all relevant transactions at any stage of their 
implementation, including offers that are in the contemplation stage but have not yet been 
announced.132   
One of the main functions of the City Code is to regulate changes of control in companies. 
‘Control’ is defined in the Definition Section of the City Code as an interest, or interests, in 
shares carrying 30% or more of the voting rights of a company, irrespective of whether such 
interest or interests give de facto control. Hence, the City Code does not apply to 
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acquisitions that result in the ownership of less than 30% of the target company’s voting 
rights or to offers for non-voting and no-equity capital, except offers under Rule 15 
regarding appropriate offers for convertibles, etc. 
1.3.3 Enforcement of the City Code 
The Takeover Panel has been responsible since 1968 for enforcing the rules contained in the 
Takeover Code, through a consensual approach with the parties engaged in the takeover 
activities. Before the implementation of the Takeover Directive, the Takeover Panel obtained 
its authority and backing through various bodies within the takeover market to which most 
companies and the Takeover Panel itself belong: the Bank of England, the Board of Trade, 
the London Stock Exchange, trade associations, investment banks and professional bodies, 
such as the Financial Services Authority (FSA). These bodies, represented in the City 
Working Party, all pledge to bind their members to the City Code and to impose sanctions on 
them if the Takeover Panel requests them to do so.133 The takeover participants, therefore, 
comply with the Takeover Panel’s rulings not because of any forceful approach but the threat 
of losing the necessary licence to practise in the City. As Sir John Donaldson MR has stated, 
the Takeover Panel  
enjoys no contractual relationship with the financial market…use their collective 
power to force themselves and others to comply with a code of conduct of their own 
devising … Perched on the 20th floor of the Stock Exchange building in the City of 
London, both literally and metaphorically it oversees and regulates a very important 
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part of the United Kingdom financial market. Yet it performs this function without 
visible means of legal support.134  
The Takeover Directive requires the supervisor of takeovers to be vested with all the 
necessary power to carry out its duties, including that of ensuring that parties to a bid comply 
with the rules made or introduced pursuant to the Directive. 135  Hence, since the 
implementation of the Takeover Directive in the UK, in the event of a breach of the City 
Code the Takeover Panel has had the statutory power to enforce the Code.136 However, it can 
be argued that the Takeover Panel does not necessarily need these ‘new’ statutory powers, 
given the near-complete compliance with its rulings under the previous non-statutory 
system.137 There has been no great change in the way the Takeover Panel works, although it 
is fair to say that it now has the legal power to enforce the City Code.  
1.3.4 Relationship between the Takeover Panel and the Courts 
As the supervisory authority to carry out regulatory functions in relation to takeovers, the 
English courts are reluctant to intervene in any ongoing takeover case and will only give 
guidance to the Takeover Panel at a later stage regarding how to avoid a similar error in the 
future. In R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc,138 the Court of Appeal 
made it clear that litigation on takeover issues is not encouraged and decisions of the 
Takeover Panel would be set aside only under the very unusual circumstance when the panel 
is acting in breach of the rules of natural justice. In his judgement in the case of Datafin, 
Lord Donaldson MR introduced the non-intervention principle, by stating that: 
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beyond a peradventure that in the light of the special nature of the panel, its functions, 
the market in which it is operating, the time scales which are inherent in that market 
and the need to safeguard the position of third parties, who may be numbered in 
thousands, all of whom are entitled to continue to trade upon an assumption of the 
validity of the panel’s rules and decisions, unless and until they are quashed by the 
court, I should expect the relationship between the panel and the court to be historic 
rather than contemporaneous. … court to allow contemporary decisions to take their 
course, considering the complaint and intervening, if at all, later and in retrospect by 
declaratory orders which would enable the panel not to repeat any error and would 
relieve individuals of the disciplinary consequences of any erroneous finding of 
breach of the rules.139 
Considering ‘the highly sensitive and potentially fluid financial market’, as Lord Bingham 
MR stated in a later case, ‘the courts will not second-guess the informed judgement of 
responsible regulators steeped in knowledge of their particular market’.140 Although the 
courts will normally not intervene in takeovers, it is admitted that the Takeover Panel’s 
rulings are always subject to judicial review, although such review is rarely granted. Thus, it 
is pointless for a person bringing a judicial review to challenge the Takeover Panel’s 
decision because the non-intervention principle adopted by the courts makes the litigation 
unlikely to be instantly helpful to his case.  
Even when presenting the bill that led to the CA 2006 in parliament, Lord Sainsbury of 
Turville stated, in relation to takeover problems, that ‘the Bill’s provisions aim to ensure that 
tactical litigation seeking to delay or frustrate a takeover bid will not become a feature of our 
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takeover market’.141 Before the Takeovers Directive was implemented the Takeover Panel 
worried that the consequence of giving itself and the City Code statutory backing would 
‘damage the consensual flexibility with which it had operated and lead to more obstructive 
litigation, a feature of takeovers in the US from which the UK has remained remarkably 
free’.142 However, after the implementation, there has been no significantly enhanced scope 
of litigation.143 In accordance with Section 961 of the CA 2006, the Takeover Panel is 
exempted from liability from the performance of its functions, unless it acts in bad faith. As 
the UK government indicated, the provisions in the CA 2006 would neither undermine nor 
be inconsistent with the restrictive approach in Datafin.144 Until now, the relationship 
between the Takeover Panel and the courts has continued to follow the non-intervention 
principle of the Datafin case.  
2. Shareholder Protection Rules 
It is widely acknowledged that protecting the interests of shareholders is a common theme 
throughout the whole document of the City Code. It is regarded as a substantial and 
sophisticated body of rules aiming at ensuring good business standards and fairness to 
shareholders.  
2.1 Sufficient Time and Information  
In accordance with General Principle 2 of the City Code, the shareholders of a target 
company should be given sufficient time and information to consider any offers, including 
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competing offers, for their shares on their merits and thus are able to reach a properly 
informed decision on a takeover offer.  
2.1.1 Sufficient time 
According to the City Code, an offer must initially remain open for at least 21 days after the 
date on which the offer document was posted.145 This is the first closing date of an offer, 
although it can be extended by stating the next closing date.146 After an offer has become, or 
is declared, unconditionally accepted, it must remain open for acceptance for not less than 14 
days after the date on which it would otherwise have expired.147 This rule gives an extra 14 
days to any shareholders who have been unable to make a decision, or who wanted to see 
whether control would be passed over without their support. However, it is not necessary to 
keep the offer open for a further 14 days if it has been made clear in the offer document that 
the offer was accepted unconditionally from the outset. 
The ‘final day rule’ in Rule 31.6 provides that the offer must become or be declared 
unconditional by the sixtieth day following the date on which the offer document was first 
posted to the shareholders. This rule imposes a regulatory deadline before which the offeror 
must secure the success of the offer, otherwise it will lapse. Rule 31.7 further provides that 
all conditions of the offer must be fulfilled (or waived), or the offer must lapse, within 21 
days of the first closing date or of the date on which the offer becomes or is declared 
unconditional as to acceptances, whichever is later. 
In the meantime, if an offer is revised, it must be kept open for at least 14 days following the 
date on which the revised offer document was posted.148 Shareholders in the target company 
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are therefore given an additional 14 days in which to make a decision on the revised offer. 
Those shareholders who have already accepted the offer are given the right to withdraw their 
acceptance, even 21 days or more after the first closing date of the initial offer, unless and 
until the offer becomes unconditional as to acceptances on the sixtieth day after the posting 
of the initial offer document.149  
As a result, the earliest date on which the target shareholder can withdraw their acceptance is 
42 days following the posting of the initial offer document. The rationale behind this rule is 
to enable an accepting shareholder to change his/her mind at the last minute in the case of a 
competitive bid. It is common for a competing bidder or the target board in a hostile bid to 
try to take advantage of the existence of withdrawal rights, by sending withdrawal forms to 
the target shareholders, reminding that they are entitled to withdraw any accepted offer. 
Accordingly, the original bidder will also try to extract a waiver of this right by asking target 
shareholders with significant shareholdings to agree that acceptance is irrevocable.150  
2.1.2 Sufficient information  
Proper disclosure is an essential principle in maintaining a fair and efficient market. Hence a 
large number of rules deal with how to make sure that the target shareholders are both 
properly informed and advised. Takeover Panel Statement 2003/16 states that ‘disclosure 
underpins market transparency which, in turn, constitutes a fundamental protection for 
shareholders and others who deal in the UK securities markets’. Rule 23 implements this 
philosophy by requiring that shareholders be given sufficient information and advice to 
enable them to come to a properly informed decision regarding the offer. Such information 
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should be available to shareholders early enough to enable them to make a decision in good 
time.  
Article 6(3)(i) of the Takeover Directive, which is implemented by Rule 24.1 of the City 
Code, lists in detail the comprehensive information that the offeror must disclose in its offer 
documents to the shareholders, such as the offeror’s intentions with regard to the future 
business of the offeree company, its strategic plans for the offeree company, and the long-
term commercial justification for the proposed offer. The offer document should normally be 
posted to the target shareholders within twenty-eight days of the announcement of a firm’s 
intention to make an offer.151 In reality, the offer document is often posted as quickly as 
possible to increase the pressure on the target of a hostile bid, or to try to reduce the risk of 
there being a competing bid. 
During an offer period, parties to a takeover and their ‘associates’ should publicly disclose 
all dealings in relevant securities by 12 noon on the business day following the transaction, 
in accordance with Rule 8.1 and Note 3. ‘Relevant securities’ includes the securities of the 
target that is being offered for, or which carry voting rights, and the securities of the offeror 
that carry substantially the same rights as any to be issued as consideration for the offer. 
Moreover, during an offer period, any person, whether or not an associate, who is interested 
(directly or indirectly) in 1% or more of any class of relevant securities of the bidder or 
target company, or as a result of any transaction will be interested in 1% or more, must 
publicly disclose their dealings.152 
In addition to requiring sufficient information to be given to shareholders, Rule 19.1 requires 
that all the information about the offer must be produced to the ‘highest standards of care 
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and accuracy’ and be adequately and fairly presented. Accordingly, the language used in 
documents should be unambiguous, so as to reflect ‘clearly and concisely’ the position being 
described.153 Rule 19.3 further provides that parties involved in an offer or potential offer 
should take care not to issue factually inaccurate statements which may mislead shareholders 
and the market, or create uncertainty. As a result, the person who is required to disclose the 
relevant information is also liable for the accuracy of the information he provides.  
2.2 Equal Treatment  
The primary goal of the City Code is to ensure that shareholders are treated fairly and are not 
denied an opportunity to decide on the merits of a takeover. The fair treatment of 
shareholders is fundamental to the spirit of the City Code and is covered by General 
Principle 1, which requires that all shareholders of a target company of the same class should 
be treated equally. This means a bidder is not allowed to announce a takeover bid which 
discriminates between classes of target shareholders. With respect to the information 
disclosure requirements mentioned above, the City Code also emphasises the importance of 
the equality of information provided to shareholders by stipulating that all target 
shareholders should be provided with the same information about the companies involved in 
a takeover transaction, and as nearly as possible at the same time and in the same manner.154 
2.2.1 Equality of the Offer Price 
In pursuit of shareholder equality, there are substantial requirements on the bidders to make 
sure the target shareholders have equal treatment in offer price. These rules are intended to 
avoid price discrimination and unequal treatment between shareholders who obtain a 
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premium from the bidders for accumulating a block of shareholders prior to commencing a 
formal offer, and the other shareholders in the target company.155 
According to Rule 6.1, if a bidder has acquired an interest in shares in the target company 
during the three-months prior to the commencement of the offer period, or during the period 
between its commencement and an announcement of a firm intention to make an offer, the 
offer to the target shareholders of the same class shall not be on less favourable terms. The 
same obligation exists where a bidder acquires any interest in shares in the target company 
during the offer period. Under Rule 6.2, after the announcement and before the offer closes 
for acceptance, if a bidder acquires an interest in shares at a higher price than the offer price, 
the offer should be revised to no less than the highest price paid for those shares. 
2.2.2 Partial Offers Restriction  
There is a great deal of debate in connection with the concept of partial offers, which are 
defined as those where the bidder offers to purchase the same percentage of every 
shareholder’s holdings.156 As a tactic to pressurise shareholders to tender, bidders might 
launch their offer as a two-tier bid in which they offer an above-market offer price only for 
that percentage of the shares necessary to give them majority control in the target company 
and announce a plan to merge out the remaining minority shareholders at a lower price 
following the change of control. Even if the bidder offers the same price for the remainder of 
the shares, there is a risk that the payment may be made much later or in the form of debt 
securities.157 The effect of the two-tier bid is argued to have a similar coercive effect on the 
shareholders as does the partial offer, because the lower or much disadvantaged second-tier 
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price is comparable to the expected value of the minority share after the partial offer 
succeeds.158  
The ability of a bidder to launch a partial or two-tier offer puts shareholders under pressure 
to tender at the front-end, in order to avoid holding minority shares and gaining only the 
back-end of a second-tier offer once control has been transferred. In the UK, the City Code 
recognises the coercive effect of two-tier bids and treats them as partial bids by providing 
that, if a certain consideration is offered for part of each shareholder’s holdings and a lower 
consideration offered for the balance, such an offer may be treated as a form of partial offer 
in spite of the fact that the offer is being made to all shareholders in the target company and 
the Takeover Panel’s consent must be sought.159 
The provisions of the City Code governing partial offers in particular are contained in Rule 
36. According to Rule 36.1, every partial offer is always subject to the Takeover Panel’s 
consent, although it further provides that the Takeover Panel’s consent will normally be 
granted where the partial offer will not enable the bidder to hold 30% or more of the voting 
rights of the target company. This is because 30% is defined as a control threshold in the 
City Code.160 Under the widespread shareholding structure in the UK, the City Code 
assumes that a person holding no more than 30% of shares does not have control over the 
company. In other words, Rule 36.1 implies that a bidder may acquire up to 29.9% of the 
target company’s voting rights by private negotiation or partial offer, without any 
intervention from the Takeover Panel and the City Code.  
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In the case of a partial offer which could result in the bidder carrying 30% or more but less 
than 100% of the voting rights of a company, consent will not be granted by the Takeover 
Panel providing there are acquisitions 12 months before the offer.161 The reason for this rule 
is to prevent favourable offers of these pre-purchases being made to certain shareholders and 
not to others, again in line with General Principle 1 of the City Code which requires that all 
shareholders of the target company be treated equally.  
Furthermore, Rule 36.3 prohibits the acquisition of any interest in shares being made by the 
bidder either during the course of a partial offer or at any time in the 12 months after the end 
of the offer period if the offer was successful, except with the consent of the Takeover Panel. 
This rule also applies to partial offers that have resulted in the bidder carrying less than 30% 
of the voting rights of the target company, although the consent of the Takeover Panel will 
normally be granted for acquisitions of shares within twelve months of the end of the offer 
period. However, under a general offer for all of the target company’s shares, a bidder is 
allowed to acquire target company shares through private or market purchases during the 
offer period, as long as the highest price paid is also available under the offer.  
Where a partial offer is made which could result in the bidder carrying not less than 30% but 
not holding more than 50% of the voting rights of a company, the number of shares being 
sought must be stated precisely in the offer document, and the partial offer may not be 
declared unconditional as to acceptances unless acceptances are received for not less than the 
number of shares being sought under the offer.162 As Gearing suggested, this rule prevents 
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bidders from acquiring effective control of the target company without paying the full price, 
‘that is the offer must be fully successful’.163  
Rule 36.5 further requires that such partial offers must be conditional on the affirmative 
approval of the offer by shareholders holding over 50% of the voting rights in the target 
company (who are independent of the bidder and its concerned parties) no matter whether 
they intend to accept the offer or not.164 This approval provides a significant protection 
against a coercive partial offer, by ensuring that shareholders holding over 50% of the voting 
rights approve the making of a partial offer. This is because if such partial offer is successful, 
the bidder could obtain control of the target company without giving all shareholders the 
opportunity to exit for 100% of their shareholdings in the target company.165 
Where a partial offer is made that could result in the bidder holding shares carrying more 
than 50% of the voting rights of the target company, according to Rule 36.6 in order to warn 
of the bidder’s controlling position, the offer document must contain specific and prominent 
reference to this and to the fact that, if the offer succeeds, the bidder will be allowed to 
acquire further shares (not subject to Rule 36.3) without triggering an obligation to make a 
general offer under Rule 9.   
Moreover, in order to reduce the potential for shareholder inequality, it is required that a 
partial offer must be made to all the shareholders of the class to which the offer relates. If the 
shares accepted are more than the percentage the bidder wishes to acquire, the partial offer 
must be accepted on a pro rata basis in relation to the number of shares tendered by each 
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shareholder.166 In the case of a partial offer for a company with more than one class of shares, 
if it gives the bidder 30% or more of the company’s voting rights, a comparable offer must 
be made for each class of shares.167 
It can be argued that in connection with General Principle 1 regarding equivalent treatment 
for shareholders, the shareholders in the target company receive wide protection, due to the 
fact that the City Code governs not only a specific takeover offer, but also pre-offer and 
post-offer share purchases.168 On the one hand, as Kenyon-Slade has observed, the City 
Code, especially Rule 36, ‘largely removes the most severe part of shareholder coercion and 
discrimination, by significantly restricting partial and two-tier bids’. It practically forces the 
bidders, who intend to obtain control of the target company, to make a general offer for all 
the shares of the target company.169 On the other hand, it is not surprising to find that partial 
offers are a relatively rare phenomenon in the UK. This is probably because a partial bid 
itself is not regarded as a useful tactic from the bidder’s point of view, because of the 
restrictions imposed by the City Code.170  
2.2.3 Mandatory Bid Rule  
UK takeover law led the way to the mandatory bid rule (MBR), which is regarded as one of 
the best known rules of the City Code. A mandatory bid refers to a general offer required by 
law when a person acquires a certain statutory percentage of shares in a company. However, 
this approach was not immediately introduced in 1968 by the City Code. In 1971, David 
Rowland purchased a large amount of Venesta International’s shares in the market and hence 
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succeeded in obtaining a controlling interest in the company without making a takeover bid. 
This led to concern by the Takeover Panel that under the current rules, there was no 
obligation on the person who has obtained control by a series of purchases in the market to 
buy the remaining shares in the company. Thus, in the case of Venesta, the Takeover Panel 
concluded that Rowland’s open market purchase took away the opportunity of the minority 
shareholders of Venesta International to sell their shares at terms as favourable as Rowland 
offered.171 In reacting to this event, the Panel proposed a MBR requiring any bidder 
purchasing 40% or more of a company’s shares to launch a general offer on all the 
outstanding shares in the target company. This 40% threshold was lowered to the current 
level of 30% in 1974. 
The MBR is now laid down in Rule 9 of the City Code, specifically designed to protect 
minority shareholders by regulating the situation under which a general offer must be made, 
as contained in Article 5 of the Takeover Directive. It is a classic application of the 
requirement for the equivalent treatment of all shareholders provided by General Principle 1, 
which states that ‘if a person acquires control of a company, the other holders of securities 
must be protected’. The philosophy underlying this rule is that control of a company cannot 
be obtained by paying a premium price to the controlling shareholders, leaving the remaining 
non-controlling shareholders under a new controller, without offering the non-controlling 
shareholders the same price for their shares.172 This was reinforced in the 1991 Annual 
Report of the Takeover Panel: 
if effective control of a company is obtained by the acquisition of shares, the principle 
of equality of treatment for shareholders requires that all shareholders should have the 
opportunity to obtain the price per share paid for that control (it will usually be a 
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premium price) and that they should have the opportunity to get out of the company if 
they do not like what has happened.  
In accordance with Rule 9.1, a bidder must make an offer to acquire all other equity shares 
of any class, whether voting or non-voting, and also to acquire any other class of transferable 
securities carrying voting rights, once it has acquired 30% or more of the voting rights of the 
target company. Rule 9.5 further grants all target shareholders the chance to sell their shares 
for the highest price paid by the bidder for shares to transfer control within the offer period 
and the 12 months preceding the announcement of that offer. Furthermore, any other 
conditions attached to mandatory bid offers are prohibited, even at higher levels of 
acceptance.173 The City Code also acknowledges that in certain circumstances it would be 
inequitable and unnecessary to satisfy the equality of treatment principle by requiring a 
bidder to make a general offer. The situations in which the Takeover Panel may consider 
dispensing with the obligation to make a general offer are explicitly expressed in the City 
Code.174 
3. Directors’ Duties and Takeover Defences 
Takeovers in the UK are subject to the City Code, while the directors’ duties are generally 
governed by the common law and the statutory requirements relating to companies. When 
considering the defensive tactics available to target directors in facing a hostile takeover bid, 
their duties must first be taken into account. 
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3.1 Directors’ Fiduciary Duties under the Common Law  
In order to regulate the behaviour of directors and prohibit them from exploiting personal 
interests while they are managing a company, the general approach taken by common law is 
to impose fiduciary duties upon them.175 The UK is considered to be one of the first regimes 
to establish directors’ fiduciary duties and to introduce the concept of the director as a 
trustee.176 As agents of a dispersed group of shareholders, it is recognised by the business 
judgment rule that directors should be entrusted with managing the company’s affairs and 
making major decisions. The court therefore should not interfere with the general operation 
of a company by its directors if their actions comply with their fiduciary duties. 
These fiduciary duties grant discretion to directors who are running the affairs of the 
company on behalf of shareholders, as long as they act in good faith (bona fide) in what they 
consider to be the best interest of the company. The fiduciary duty of directors to act bona 
fide is expressed in the famous guiding statement of Lord Green in Re Smith v Fawcett Ltd: 
‘[W]here the articles of a company confer a discretion on directors … [t]hey must exercise 
their decision bona fide in what they consider – not what a court may consider – is in the 
best interest of a company, and not for any collateral purpose’.177  
In addition to this overriding duty, fiduciary duties also fall into several other categories: 
acting for a proper purpose,178 acting with reasonable care and diligence,179 not allowing 
personal interests to conflict with the interest of the company, 180 and not profiting from their 
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positions.181 When facing an unwanted takeover bid, the directors’ decisions on takeover 
defences are subject to their fiduciary duties, as are any other managerial actions. 
The duty of acting for a proper purpose is a very important fiduciary duty imposed on the 
board by the common law, which requires that directors’ decisions must be motivated by a 
proper purpose. The philosophy of the proper purpose doctrine is that directors are delegated 
the powers necessary to manage the company, but they cannot abuse these powers for a 
purpose beyond the scope of their delegation.182 It provides the limits to the business 
judgement rule by requiring the court to examine the purpose behind the directors’ activities, 
even if they act in good faith and in the best interest of the company. In the context of hostile 
takeovers, according to Dean, proper purpose duty can be interpreted as meaning that, even 
if they are acting in good faith in what they consider to be the best interest of the company, 
the directors should not attempt to obstruct a takeover by abusing their powers.183  
In the case of Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd,184 Cramphorn Ltd was the target of a hostile takeover 
for its ordinary and preferred shares, and its directors responded by creating a trust for the 
benefit of the employees, with themselves as trustees, and allotting to the trust a large block 
of unissued preference shares carrying ten votes per share. The directors regained control of 
Cramphorn Ltd by nominating the trustees and obtaining indirect control over the additional 
votes attached to these new shares. However, the shareholders of Cramphorn were not 
consulted on this arrangement initiated by the board.  
Although the directors’ decisions satisfied the business judgement rule by acting in good 
faith throughout, and in the company’s best interest by allotting shares to employees and 
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enhancing their wealth, the court invalidated the new shares issued by the directors and held 
that they had violated their fiduciary duties because they had acted primarily for the 
improper purpose of preventing the takeover and enabling them to remain in control of the 
company.185 As the court stressed, it would not ‘permit directors to exercise powers … in 
such a way as to interfere with the exercise by the majority of its constitutional rights’.186  
In the later case of Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd, which is another leading case 
concerning directors’ duty to act only for ‘proper purpose’, a defensive issuance of shares to 
the board’s preferred bidder was held to be invalid by the court on the grounds that this 
action was an improper use of their powers and thus breached their fiduciary duties.187 From 
both Hogg and Howard Smith, it can be seen that no matter whether the directors honestly 
believed that their actions were in the best interest of the company, they are only allowed to 
use their powers in a proper way and will breach their fiduciary duty if their motivation is 
improper. 
3.2 Codified Directors’ Duties under the Companies Act 2006 
The CA 2006 codifies directors’ fiduciary duties in Part 10; these were traditionally 
governed by common law. It is made clear in Section 170(3) of the CA 2006 that the 
directors’ ‘codified’ duties are based on certain common law and equitable principles as they 
apply in relation to directors, and take the place of those rules and principles when it comes 
to the duties owed to a company by a director. Further, Section 170(4) of the CA 2006 
requires that these duties be interpreted and applied in the same way as common law rules or 
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equitable principles, and that the corresponding common law rules and equitable principles 
be taken into account when interpreting and applying the codified general duties.  
The provisions on the general duties of directors consist of a general introduction in Section 
170, followed by seven specific duties in Sections 171 to 177: 
(1) act in accordance with the company’s constitution and exercise powers only for the 
purpose for which they are conferred; 
(2) act in the way the directors consider, in good faith, would be most likely to promote 
the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole; 
(3) exercise independent judgement but not fetter their discretion unless acting in 
accordance with an agreement which has been duly entered into by the company or in 
a way authorised by the company’s constitution; 
(4) exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence as would be expected of a reasonably 
diligent person; 
(5) avoid direct or indirect interests that conflict with the interests of the company; 
(6) not to accept benefits from third parties; 
(7) declare the nature and extent of any interest in a proposed transaction or arrangement. 
It is noteworthy that directors, who are appointed by the shareholders as agents of the 
company and act in the interest of the company as a legal entity, owe their fiduciary duties 
only to the company, but not per se in the interests of shareholders.188 The CA 2006 codified 
the duties of directors and, in the meantime, under Section 170(1), expressly states that the 
directors’ duties contained in the following sections are owed to the company and not 
directly to any others, particularly the shareholders. Indeed, directors’ fiduciary duties are 
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only owed to shareholders in very rare circumstances. As in the case of Peskin and another v 
Anderson and others, Mummery LJ held that the fiduciary duties owed by directors to the 
shareholders ‘are dependent on establishing a special factual relationship between the 
directors and the shareholders in the particular case’.189 As a result, a shareholder wishing to 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty will have to bring a derivative suit against directors. 
3.3 Non-Frustration Rule under the City Code 
When faced with a hostile takeover, the protection of shareholders’ interests by the proper 
purpose rule in common law is inadequate. This is because the court has to ‘conduct a 
detailed examination of the factual context in which a decision was taken in order to 
ascertain the purposes behind [it]’ and ‘it caused considerable uncertainty and delay’.190 
Moreover, it is argued that the CA 2006 is also inadequate to protect the target shareholders 
as it simply reflects the common law position, requiring directors to act within powers and 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.191 As 
Parkinson has suggested, unless the law requires the directors to ‘promote the success of the 
business venture in order to benefit the members’, rather than the company as a whole, the 
protection of minority shareholders is totally inadequate.192  
It is admitted that the regulation attempting to govern directors’ behaviour when facing a 
hostile bid merely under directors’ fiduciary duties is incomplete. In the takeover context, it 
should be clear that ‘directors owe their duties to shareholders and other parties interested in 
takeover activities for which the company is involved’.193 Indeed, Deakin and others have 
stated that the City Code ‘embodies in a particularly clear way the principle that, during the 
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course of a takeover bid, directors of the target company are meant to act as the agents of the 
shareholders’.194 The adequate protection is only provided by the City Code, which imposes 
a higher standard of fiduciary duties on the directors than in common law.195  
In the City Code, the ability of directors to defend against hostile takeovers is no longer 
judged by an investigation of their motivation. The common law approach has been replaced 
by the City Code rules which clearly stipulate that shareholders have the final say on the 
outcome of a takeover bid.196 As a general principle, the City Code requires a target board of 
directors not to deny the target shareholders the opportunity to decide on the merits of the 
bid.197 Without doubt, when facing a takeover bid, the most important duty the directors of 
the target company owe to the target shareholders is not to take any action designed to 
frustrate a takeover offer which the shareholders may want to accept. 
The Takeover Directive has the same attitude as the City Code towards a board’s ability to 
use takeover defences, setting forth a board Neutral Rule in Article 9(2), which requires the 
board of a target company not to take any action which may result in the frustration of the 
bid, without its shareholders’ approval, from the time the target company is informed of a 
bid until the bid lapses. The UK government has opted into Article 9 of the Takeover 
Directive and retained the restrictions on boards’ frustrating actions in Rule 21 of the City 
Code, the so called non-frustration rule. 
As Kenyon-Slade has argued, General Principle 3, together with Rule 21, has established a 
fundamental framework for the manner in which takeover defences should be adopted in the 
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UK.198 It is made clear that directors may not use their powers to preclude the majority 
shareholders’ right to determine the success or failure of a hostile takeover. The target board 
must be set aside when hostile takeovers are imminent so that shareholders can have the final 
say on whether to accept a takeover bid.199 Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the 
requirement of gaining shareholder approval for ‘frustrating’ actions is also consistent with 
the common law approach, which prevents the transaction being in breach of the directors’ 
fiduciary duties.200 
Under Rule 21 of the City Code, NFR severely restricts the target board’s ability to take any 
action which may frustrate any offer or bona fide possible offer or result in shareholders 
being denied the opportunity to decide on a bid on its merits, without the approval of the 
shareholders at a general meeting, once the target directors have reason to believe that an 
offer might be imminent. It should be made clear that ‘once the target directors have reason 
to believe that an offer might be imminent’ means during the course of an offer, or even 
before the date of the offer when the target board is first formally approached by the bidder 
with respect to the bid. 
The defensive measures that a target board is not allowed to undertake, as specified in Rule 
21, include issuing any further shares in the target company; granting any options on any 
unissued shares in the target company; creating or issuing any convertible securities or 
securities carrying the right to subscribe to company shares; making any disposal or 
acquisition of assets of a ‘material amount’ (a value of 10% or more); entering into any 
contracts other than in the ordinary course of business, without obtaining shareholder 
approval. It is worth noting, however, that the above list of prohibited actions is not 
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exhaustive. The Takeover Panel must be consulted in advance if there is any doubt as to 
whether any proposed actions would fall within Rule 21.201 As Davies has stated, the NFR 
covers all frustrating actions no matter whether they are specifically mentioned in the Rules 
or not, ‘even the initiation of litigation on behalf of the target once an offer is imminent’.202  
3.4 Directors’ Duties as to Information 
Although the NFR gives power to the shareholders of the target company and not its 
directors or management, to make the decision as to the acceptance of the takeover bid once 
a bona fide offer is imminent, it does not impose a ‘passive rule’ on the target board. In this 
sense, the board does not have to hold an absolutely neutral attitude towards a takeover bid. 
However, the City Code does impose another important duty on a board defending a hostile 
bid, which is related to information. It requires the target board to give the shareholders their 
opinion on the takeover bid, which may have an influence on the shareholders’ decision on 
the offer. The advice given to shareholders may consist of criticisms on the price and terms 
of the hostile takeover offer and a recommendation not to accept it. The shareholders may 
have second thoughts on the offer. In addition, the directors have the right to put proposals to 
the shareholders which may have the effect of frustrating the bid, but such proposals cannot 
be implemented without the approval of shareholders.  
In order to ensure that shareholders are properly informed when a company is faced with a 
takeover bid, the Takeover Directive requires directors to provide relevant and timely 
information to all shareholders. Section 943 of the CA 2006 implemented this by requiring 
the Takeover Panel to lay down certain rules. Accordingly, the City Code imposes a high 
standard of duties on directors when they are circulating information. General Principle 2 of 
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the City Code requires the board of directors, when advising shareholders, to give its views 
on the effects of implementation of the bid on employment, conditions of employment, and 
the location of the company’s places of business. This General Principle is supplemented by 
detailed rules. 
According to Rule 25 and Rule 30.1, the board of the target company must give shareholders 
its opinion on the offer and the reasons on which it is based, in the board circular normally 
within 14 days of the posting of the offer document, no matter whether it is recommending 
for or against acceptance of the offer, or is remaining neutral. The board’s opinion on the 
offer includes its views on the effects of implementation of the bid on all the company’s 
interests. If there are different views on the takeover offer among the target directors, the 
minority directors’ views must be published in the circular that is sent to the shareholders.203  
The City Code also requires the target directors to accept responsibility for the information 
contained in any documents sent out to its shareholder. Rule 19.2 requires that the directors 
of the target company should be expressly responsible for the information provided in each 
document in connection with an offer, and confirm that this is to the best of their knowledge 
and belief (having taken all reasonable care to ensure that such is the case). None of the 
directors should be excluded from such a responsibility. If it is proposed, the consent of the 
Takeover Panel is required. According to Deakin and others, the significance of this rule is 
to establish a legal duty of care owed by the target directors to the shareholders to whom the 
information is issued, and in which case the directors do not owe the duties to the company 
as they owe general fiduciary duties to.204 
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Together with Rule 3.1, this rule requires that, once the target board has been approached, it 
must hire a competent independent advisor whose advice on any offer must be made known 
to all the target shareholders in the board circular. If there is a disagreement between the 
target board and its independent advisor on the merits of an offer, or if there is failure to 
reach a firm recommendation, the target shareholders should be informed of the arguments 
for and against acceptance of the offer and the Takeover Panel should be consulted in 
advance.205  
The Takeover Panel also states that financial advisors should be responsible for guiding their 
clients and any relevant public relations advisors, with regard to information releases during 
the course of an offer.206 Financial advisors must consult the Takeover Panel whenever 
necessary and co-operate fully with it. As Kenyon-Slade pointed out, the requirement to 
appoint an independent advisor reduces the chance that directors will act in their own 
interests and not in the best interests of the company.207 
3.5 Takeover Defences 
The NFR in the City Code restricts, to a great extent, the directors’ exercisable powers of 
adopting defensive measures when facing a hostile takeover bid, and ensures that the 
shareholders have the full opportunity to assess and decide whether or not to accept a 
takeover offer. The common law also has the same attitude towards this issue. In the case of 
Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum Ltd,208 the court rejected the attempt by the target board to 
transfer treasury shares to a favoured bidder in order to thwart a takeover bid, on the grounds 
that a majority of the shareholders were in favour of the offer.  
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However, it is worth noting that defensive measures are not forbidden at all in the UK. 
Directors are still able to take actions with frustrating effects, but the decision to undertake 
such actions lies with the shareholders at the general meeting.209 Although the target board is 
prohibited from taking any action which may frustrate a takeover bid for the company, 
without obtaining post-bid shareholder approval, the board of the target company can still 
search for a white knight within the company’s normal business operations, without this 
being authorised by the general meeting. White knights are generally accepted in the UK.210 
Although the competing bid may in practice frustrate the first takeover bid, a competing bid 
only means a second choice for the shareholder and is nevertheless an obstacle to the first 
bid.211 Therefore, it should not be regarded as a takeover measure and subject to shareholder 
approval. Of course, the directors are still subject to their fiduciary duties and must treat all 
competing bidders equally when considering the extent of disclosure of information.212 
Moreover, the City Code only curtails those bid-frustrating actions which are undertaken 
when a takeover bid is imminent. In response to an unsolicited takeover bid, what the NFR 
effectively limits is just post-bid defensive board action.213 However, the board of a target 
company is still able to adopt defensive tactics in advance of any particular offer.214 In other 
words, the target board may seek to embed pre-bid defences in the company structure at any 
time when an offer is not in contemplation, so as to secure their position in the target 
company. 
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In order to prevent pre-bid defences, Article 11 of the Takeover Directive introduces so-
called ‘break-through’ provisions, which are optional for Member States to implement. The 
UK government decided not to implement the ‘break-through’ provisions but to allow 
companies with voting shares and trading on regulated markets to opt into these provisions if 
they wish to do so.215 The reason why the City Code does not have provisions governing pre-
bid defence is probably because ‘the takeover regulation regime in the UK has not always 
concerned itself with pre-bid defences’.216 
Although directors’ actions in employing pre-bid defences are not governed by the City 
Code, they are still subject to their fiduciary duties as directors. Hence, in deciding how to 
defend the company against a hostile takeover by adopting any type of pre-bid defensive 
measures, directors have to act in good faith, in the best interest of the company as a whole, 
and use their powers for proper purposes under Section 171 of the CA 2006. As Pudge has 
remarked, directors’ ability to effectively use pre-bid defences that will later frustrate a 
takeover are restricted by their fiduciary duties.217 Non-compliance with these fiduciary 
duties could bring about a derivative suit to force them to withdraw their defence and 
compensate the company for any loss it may have suffered.218  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the poison pill is unarguably the most famous pre-bid defence. 
In the UK, there is no law expressly prohibiting the adoption of poison pills. In practice, 
however, they have been used relatively infrequently.219 In the case of Criterion Properties 
Plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC,220 the court found that the implementation of poison 
pills was an improper exercise of directors’ power to frustrate a takeover bid and therefore 
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held that they were invalid. From a technical perspective, the adoption of poison pills by the 
target board is not allowed without shareholder approval. According to Section 551 of the 
CA 2006, the issue of equity shares or rights over equity shares requires shareholder 
approval by means of a general meeting. Thus, poison pills involving the issue of rights need 
shareholder approval to proceed. However, approving the adoption of poison pills in advance 
to thwart potential takeover bids seems to have little point to target shareholders, as they 
have already been given the power to decide on the outcome of takeover bids by law. 
Therefore, the common use of poison pills in the UK is unlikely.221  
In addition, the ‘staggered board’ provisions that can be used along with poison pills are 
generally not applicable as a defence in the UK. These provisions prevent the board from 
being replaced in a single action, which will largely reduce the chance of the poison pill 
being redeemed by the new board. However, under Section 168 of the CA 2006, the 
shareholders may, by ordinary resolution in a general meeting, remove a director before the 
expiration of his period of office, with or without cause.  
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Chapter 3 Takeover Regime in the United States 
The feature of a dual regime with both federal and state laws distinguishes the US legal 
system from the UK’s. This dual regime is the result of a system of federalism, where, 
under the US constitution, the federal government has limited powers while the states 
retain all powers except for those which are expressed as exclusive to the federal 
government. When both Congress and state legislatures enact laws to regulate the same 
activity, these laws coexist and both are applicable.222  
Similarly, there are no comprehensive nationwide federal rules to govern takeovers in the 
US. Takeovers are regulated at both the federal and state levels, although the federal laws 
and their state counterparts each have their own focus. Securities regulation, tender-offers 
rules and antitrust law are within the scope of federal law, while corporate law, such as 
corporate charters and bylaws, directors’ duties and takeover defence, is under the 
jurisdiction of the individual states. In particular, the rules governing the process of a 
tender offer and the disclosure of information to shareholders are regulated by federal 
laws and the target board’s response to the offer is governed primarily by state laws.  
1. Takeover Law at the Federal Level 
In the US, companies issuing their shares to public investors are regulated by federal 
securities law.223 The two most important securities laws are the Securities Act of 1933 
(SA 1933) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA 1934), passed in the period 
following the stock market crash and the depression in 1929, when so many companies 
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went bankrupt and the investors lost their investment.224 The overall objectives of these 
laws are to protect the investing public from securities market abuse and to assure an 
integral and fair capital market for all participants. In the context of takeovers, although 
these laws mainly regulate the issues of shares that may be less relevant, they do contain 
specific sections with regard to takeovers and mergers. By requiring prompt and full 
disclosure of relevant information, securities laws ensure certain filings with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) if a company engages in a control 
transaction above a certain size.  
1.1 SA 1933 and SEA 1934 
The SA 1933 was designed to deal primarily with new issues of securities by requiring 
disclosure of information on any public offerings of securities, with the aim of helping 
investors make more informed decisions upon the disclosed financial information to 
which they had little access before. Under this Act, all companies issuing new issues must 
register with SEC and include proper statements and documents. All parties involved in 
preparing these documents are liable for any misstatement of facts or omissions of vital 
information. As the SA 1933 is primarily responsible for recording information when a 
public company issues new securities as consideration to acquire a target company, this 
Act is significant in that the acquiring company must register those securities intended to 
finance the takeover by filing a disclosure form with the SEC.   
As mentioned above, the SA 1933 deals mainly with primary issues, whereas the SEA 
1934 deals mainly with secondary market. Being passed after the SA 1933, with the aim 
of improving the availability of information, the SEA 1934 requires that an 8K filing 
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must be made which 15 calendar days after the occurrence of certain specific events. 
Such events include the acquisition and disposal of a significant amount of assets. 
Acquisitions are considered to involve a significant amount of assets if the equity interest 
in the assets being acquired, or the amount paid or received in an acquisition or 
disposition, exceeds 10% of the total book assets of the registrant and its subsidiaries. 
One of this Act’s significant contributions was to establish a national governmental body, 
the SEC, to regulate securities market and administer the securities law, in particular 
empowering the SEC to revoke or suspend the registration of a security if the issuer has 
violated any provisions of the SEA 1934.225  
1.2 Williams Act of 1968 
The other significant contribution of SEA is that it provides the basis for the amendments 
that were applicable to takeover transactions and primarily governs the activities of tender 
offers. This major amendment to the SEA was the Williams Act of 1968 (Williams Act) 
which is the law dealing with takeovers at the federal level. The Williams Act was passed 
to protect target shareholders by preventing secret or inappropriately coercive tender 
offers, in common with the trend in the UK where the City Code took effect in the same 
year. The Williams Act contains detailed disclosure rules requiring bidders and target 
board to disclose information about the offer, as well as basic procedural requirements 
concerning how tender offers may proceed.  
The Williams Act is regarded as the key element of US federal securities legislation in 
connection with takeover bids.226 According to Romano, what is remarkable about the 
Williams Act is that, ‘despite the controversy swirling around takeovers over the past 
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thirty years in the United States, the Act itself has not been amended in any fundamental 
way’.227 Before proceeding to the tender offer rules, it is worth addressing the background 
of the Williams Act’s creation and its subsequent effect.  
1.2.1 Creation of the Williams Act  
Prior to the passage of the Williams Act in 1968, various bidding tactics had been 
deployed in the US. As Alcock has pointed out, ‘[A]lmost everything was possible. There 
was little constraint on creeping control or protection of minorities. Potential bidders 
could privately buy shares or publicly purchase them in street sweeps’.228 The takeover 
activities were conducted in an even aggressive way when a new takeover technique was 
discovered by the bidders. In the 1950s and early 1960s, it replaced the traditional 
takeover method of a proxy contest to acquire corporate control.229  
This new measure was tender offers, in which a premium over the market price was 
offered to the target shareholders directly by the bidder for sufficient shares to achieve a 
shift of control. It enjoyed a number of advantages, in particular the relatively higher 
speed with which the takeover could be completed and the ability to by-pass the target 
board and deal directly with target shareholders.230 These tender offers remained open for 
a very short period of time with substantially less public disclosure and could have any 
variety of consideration, such as cash, securities and even unquoted junk bonds.  
In an offer where shares of the bidding company were offered as consideration for shares 
of the target company, the disclosure requirement of the SA 1933 provided limited 
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regulation. The bidder first needed to register such securities with the SEC in accordance 
with the SA 1933 and wait until registration was declared effective by the SEC before 
sending tender offer documents to target shareholders. On some occasions, the SEC might 
make comments on the preliminary registration statement that had to be resolved before 
the statement could be considered effective. Once this registration requirement was met, 
the process proceeded in a similar way to a cash tender offer, in which the bidder initiated 
the takeover offer by disseminating offer documents to target shareholders. However, 
before the passage of the Williams Act, the cash tender was totally unregulated.  
Until 1968, the tender offers were often strategically used by the bidder to coerce the 
target’s shareholders. It was called a ‘Saturday Night Special’ – a tender offer was made 
over a weekend with little or no disclosure of information which could enable the target 
shareholders to make an informed and fair decision. Since the bidder was typically not an 
insider in the target company, no insider trading rules required any particular disclosure 
by the bidder.231 As a consequence, the bidder could make a tender offer without any 
disclosure other than the offering price and identification of a location to which shares 
should be tendered. 
Moreover, because these offers were often on a first-come, first-served basis, the 
shareholders were under severe time pressure to make a decision. Shareholders of the 
target company could therefore be compelled to make pressured and uninformed rapid 
decisions; otherwise, if other shareholders accepted the bidder’s premium and the offer 
succeeded, they might be left holding a minority interest in an ‘illiquid’ share controlled 
by the bidder and vulnerable to a ‘squeeze out’ merger at a lower price. 232 The difficulty 
for widely dispersed public shareholders to take collective action in response to a hostile 
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bid pushed target shareholders into tendering their shares to an unknown hostile bidder, 
even if the offer price was ‘unfairly’ low. In addition, the shortage of time available to 
respond prevented the target board from taking any defensive actions against the offer or 
advising their shareholders on whether to accept or reject the offer.233  
The Williams Act was proposed in response to the increasing use of this coercive cash 
tender offer operated by a secret hostile bidder as a means of acquiring a shift in the 
control of public companies. As Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey stressed, ‘all 
shareholders should have such information so that they can make informed investment 
decisions on the basis of the same facts known by persons making the tender’,234 in 
October 1965 he introduced legislation seeking to protect shareholders through full 
disclosure and timing provisions. His initial efforts failed, but his second effort, initiated 
in 1967, succeeded.  
The draft Williams Act was substantially modified during the Congressional hearings on 
the advice of the SEC. It became law on 29 July 1968 and was amended in 1970. The 
Williams Act was enacted as an amendment to the SEA 1934 by adding subsections (d) 
and (e) to Section 13 and subsections (d), (e) and (f) to Section 14. These amendments 
imposed important disclosure and procedural requirements upon tender offers with the 
aim of eliminating the coercion.  
1.2.2 Effect of the Williams Act 
The Williams Act established the basic procedural disclosure rules for tender offers in the 
US. The main objective of this legislation is to provide more opportunity for target 
shareholders to respond to the tender offer or consider other potential offers. According to 
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White, the focus of the Williams Act is on maximising the information and freedom of 
target shareholders faced with tender offers and enabling them to make the best decisions 
with regard to the value of their shares.235  
Under the Williams Act, a minimum period during which a tender offer must remain open 
it required. This gives target shareholders sufficient time to make decisions. However, 
‘sufficient’ time might not be enough for target shareholders, who may need further 
information to help them make more informed decisions. Thus, procedure and disclosure 
requirements during the takeover process are stipulated under which target shareholders 
can use the disclosed information to make more enlightened decisions. Especially in the 
context of tender offers in exchanging shares, disclosure of information enables target 
shareholders to gain more complete knowledge of the bidder company to which the target 
shareholders would belong.  
Although, the Williams Act governs the whole process of a tender offer, it displays a 
strong desire to preserve a fair balance in takeover contests so that all participants can 
fully address their rights. Because of the concerns that a statute would entrench 
incumbent and perhaps inefficient management, Congress adopted a neutral stance 
between the interests of incumbent managers and those of bidders,236 which is regarded as 
a key feature of the Williams Act by Tyson.237 Indeed, as Senator Harrison Williams 
himself stated, extreme care had been taken in writing the legislation to ‘avoid tipping the 
balance of regulation in favor of target management or in favor of the person making the 
takeover bid. [The Bill] is designed solely to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit 
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of the investors. The Bill will at the same time provide the offeror and management equal 
opportunity to present their case’.238  
The Williams Act is, therefore, designed to create a level playing field between target 
board and bidders, and to empower shareholders to make decisions without coercion, by a 
set of disclosure provisions, antifraud rules, and substantive rules governing the conduct 
of tender offers. As Ferrarini and Miller have argued, both bidders and target board are 
reasonably equally represented at the federal level under the Williams Act.239 However, it 
cannot be denied that the beneficiaries of the Williams Act are not only the target 
shareholders but also the target board when facing a tender offer.    
From the target board’s perspective, because of the obligations on bidders for full 
disclosure and keeping the tender offer open for a minimum period of time, the Williams 
Act not only gives target shareholders but also the target board sufficient information and 
time to respond to the offer. Moreover, it is primarily disclosure legislation and does not 
deal directly with matters in connection with the ‘substantive fairness of corporate 
takeovers or defensive tactics’.240 It is the state laws that govern the target board’s 
defensive actions. As a result, as Amour and Skeel have argued, target directors clearly 
benefited from the passage of the Williams Act since they now had enough time to adopt 
defensive measures against a hostile bidder.241 In this respect, the Williams Act has 
constrained bidders much more than the target board.  
From the bidders’ perspective, under the Williams Act bidders are prohibited from using 
their former tactics, and are subject to a set of obligations once a tender offer has been 
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launched. Even it were not the intention of the drafters of the Williams Act to promote an 
auction market in which bidders have to compete with other bidders to acquire control 
after announcing the offer, generally speaking the actual impact of the disclosure 
requirements under the Act could raise the offer price and make takeover more costly; 
bidders would make only insignificant gains on average, hence possibly reducing the 
number of tender offers in the future.242 Of course, it should be kept in mind that although 
the Williams Act does restrict the ability of the bidder to apply pressure on target 
shareholders to tender into the bid, it does not necessarily ‘limit the ability of a bidder to 
succeed in a tender offer if the offer is made at a fair price and on an even handed 
basis’.243 
1.3 Tender Offer Rules 
Under the Williams Act, Section 13(d) governs the substantial disclosure obligations 
which provide an early warning system for target board and shareholders, alerting them to 
the possibility of changes in corporate control. Regulation 13D, promulgated by the SEC 
in Section 13(d), set forth the format and disclosure requirements for statements made in 
Schedules 13D and 13G. Moreover, Sections 14(d) and (e) with Regulations 14D and 14E 
promulgated by the SEC contain the rules governing the procedure of tender offers and 
the format and provisions of tender-offer statements made in Schedule TO. The purpose 
of these tender-offer rules is to ensure that investors are given adequate information and 
appropriate substantive and procedural safeguards to prevent undue shareholder coercion 
in the face of a tender offer.244 
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1.3.1 Definition of Tender Offer 
Tender offers (known as takeover bids) first occurred in the UK in the early 1950s and in 
the US in the 1960s. In the UK, Section 971 of the Companies Act 2006 adopts the 
definition of ‘takeover bids’ directly from the Takeovers Directive:  
an offer make to the holders of the securities of a company to acquire all or part of 
such securities by payment in cash and/or in exchange for other securities. A bid 
may be either mandatory, if so provided by member states as a means to protect 
minority shareholders, or voluntary, - offeree company shall mean a company 
whose securities are the subject of a bid, - offerer shall mean any natural person or 
legal entity in public or private law making in bid in accordance with the legislation 
of the member state determined as provided for the Art. 4(2).245  
However, no definition of ‘takeover bid’ can be found in the City Code. Nevertheless, as 
Kenyon-Slade has argued, in the UK the lack of definition of ‘takeover bid’ does not 
generate the same chaos as the absence of definition of ‘tender offer’ in the US, because 
the City Code ‘adopts a “bright line” regulatory approach that looks to the percentage of 
the target’s shares that are being acquired instead of the method of acquisition in 
determining whether the provisions of the City Code apply’.246 A tender offer, in the UK, 
refers to an invitation sent from a potential purchaser to target shareholders to tender their 
shares for cash, in the hope of acquiring a non-controlling stake of less than 30% of the 
voting rights in the target company, which is not subject to the City Code.247 It is 
therefore important to clarify that the term ‘tender offer’ used in this thesis specifically 
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means a takeover bid with the aim of obtaining control of the target company, as is the 
position in the US.  
In US takeover law, there is no precise definition of the term ‘tender offer’. Although the 
Williams Act governs tender offers, no definition can be found in it. It was perhaps the 
intention of Congress to leave the definition of tender offer blank and give the Court 
flexibility to apply the Williams Act on a case by case basis. Consequently, the absence 
of a definition has generated a substantial number of cases brought before the courts in 
the US because the parties involved all chose to adopt the definition of tender offer most 
favourable to themselves.248 
In Kennecott Copper Corporation v Curtiss-Wright Corporation,249 the bidder purchased 
9.9% of the target shares by approaching approximately 60% of the target shareholders 
and the court held that open market purchases without a deadline and without a premium 
offered did not constitute a tender offer. However, in Wellman v Dickinson,250 the court 
set out eight factors, now called the Wellman factors, to identify the existence of a tender 
offer and therefore subject to the Williams Act. These eight factors are:  
1. there is an active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for shares of the 
target company; 
2. the solicitation is made for a substantial percentage of the target company’s shares; 
3. the offer to purchase is made at a premium over the existing market price; 
4. the terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiated; 
5. the offer is contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares and possibly 
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specifying a maximum number of shares; 
6. the offer is open for only a limited time period; 
7. the offeree is subject to pressure to sell shares; 
8. there are public announcements of a purchasing program that precede or are 
coincident with a rapid accumulation of large amounts of shares of the target 
company.251 
However, it can be argued that not all of these eight factors have to be met to determine 
whether any share purchase activity constitutes a tender offer, and the courts have not 
treated all eight factors equally but have added more tests to define the term.252 In Hanson 
Trust PLC v SCM Corp,253 although the Second Circuit recognised that the Wellman 
factors are relevant to determining whether certain actions by a bidder constitute a tender 
offer, the court refused to regard the eight factors test as a ‘mandatory litmus test’. In a 
district court’s opinion in S-G Securities, Inc. v Fuqua Investment Co,254 the court put 
forward more basic tests and held that a tender offer existed if a bidder publicly 
announced its intention to acquire a substantial block of a target’s shares for the purposes 
of acquiring control of the company; and there was a substantial accumulation of the 
target’s stock by the bidder through open market or privately negotiated purchases. 
1.3.2 Information Disclosure  
Schedules 13D and 13G Filings under Section 13(d) 
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Under the US securities law, any substantial acquisitions of shares by a bidder may 
trigger specific disclosure duties once a certain threshold is reached.255 The threshold is 
regarded as a signal of attempted shifting of corporate control, and certain information 
needs to be disclosed, such as the background and identity of the bidder, the source of the 
bidder’s funds used for the acquisition, and the purpose of the acquisition, including any 
future plan to liquidate the target company or make any other major change to its business. 
Schedule 13D 
Under Section 13(d), any person who, directly or indirectly, acquires 5% or more of a 
company’s equity security of any class, must publicly disclose such ownership by filing a 
Schedule 13D disclosure statement with SEC within 10 days of reaching the 5% threshold. 
This threshold level was first set as 10% but was later considered too high and changed to 
the more conservative 5%. Section 13d-3 provides that when two or more persons act as a 
partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring, 
their combined shareholdings are considered as a ‘person’ for the purpose of the filing 
requirements of Section 13(d). Certain parties are exempt from this filing requirement, 
such as a member of a national securities exchange holding securities on behalf of another 
person, a pledge of securities acting in the ordinary course of business without voting 
power, and underwriters who happen to acquire securities for 40 days from the date the 
underwriter acquired the securities.256 
Schedule 13G 
The SEC, on 17 February 1998, made special provisions by adopting an amendment to 
Regulation 13D for those investors, usually institutional investors, who have beneficially 
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held 5% or more of a company’s shares but less than 20% of those shares in the previous 
12 months and have not acquired or have no interest in changing or influencing the 
control of the company. In accordance with Rule 13d-1, such investors are required to file 
the much less detailed Schedule 13G instead of Schedule 13D.257 Rule 13d-1(b) requires 
that Schedule 13G must be filed within 45 days after the end of the calendar year in 
which the filing obligation occurs. However, in the case of the institutional investor’s 
beneficial ownership going over 10% of the class of equity securities, Rule 13-1(b)(2) 
requires that the initial Schedule 13G must be filed within 10 days of the end of any 
month in which it happens.  
If a person who has filed a Schedule 13G changes his mind and determines to hold the 
securities with the purpose or effect of changing or influencing the control of the target 
company, and if the shareholding is more than 5% of the relevant class of securities, the 
acquirer must file a Schedule 13D within 10 days of such change of intent.258 If the 
acquirer who has filed a Schedule 13G increases his shareholding to 20% or more of the 
relevant class of securities, a Schedule 13D must be filed immediately within 10 days 
after reaching the trigger holding.259 
Amendments to Schedules 13D and 13G under Section 13(d)(2) 
Rule 13d-2 requires a ‘prompt’ filing with the SEC and copies mailed by the acquirer to 
the issuer, when there has been a ‘material change’ in the facts that were set forth in 
Schedule 13D. It further specifies that an increase or decrease of 1% of beneficial 
ownership of a class of securities is considered material. As such, if a shareholder 
changes his intention to be a passive investor to influencing control of the issue, this 
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would be a material change and he should file an amendment to Schedule 13D. The 
material change is required to be filed promptly as amendments to Schedule 13D. 
Generally speaking, a filing within 10 days of the material change could be considered as 
prompt unless the change is so significant that a delayed filing is not acceptable.260  
Schedule TO under Section 14 (d)  
Originally under the Williams Act, when a bidder intended to make a tender offer, he had 
to file a Schedule 14D-1. If the issuer himself makes a tender offer, a similar schedule, 
Schedule 13E-4, must be filed. Since both schedules relate to tender offers, either by the 
issuer or a third party, the SEC decided to combine these two schedules into one filing 
and provide a single set of regulations relating to the disclosure requirements for tender 
offers. A new disclosure schedule, a Schedule TO, replaced the old disclosure forms and 
came into force on 24 January 2000.261  
Under Section 14(d), anyone intending to launch a tender offer must file with the SEC a 
‘Tender Offer Statement on Schedule TO’ disclosing this intent, and must provide target 
shareholders with relevant information about the tender offer. Schedule TO contains more 
information with the aim of enabling the target shareholders to evaluate a tender offer 
more sensibly and make informed decisions about whether or not to tender. As Gaughan 
has stressed, this information disclosure on a tender offer is especially important when the 
bidder gives securities as consideration of the offer.262 
A tender offer statement on Schedule TO must be filed with the SEC at the same time as 
the offer is made, and a copy must be hand-delivered to the executive offices of the target 
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company. A copy must also be hand-delivered to other bidders who have already filed a 
Schedule TO with the SEC with regard to any tender offer for the same securities, and to 
the securities exchanges on which the target company’s securities are traded. The bidder 
is then required to submit a press release to the media. Schedule TO can also be used to 
update information contained in the Schedule 13D filing and to satisfy the reporting 
requirements under Section 13(d).   
Target Board’s Disclosure Obligation 
The Williams Act originally imposed obligations to file a disclosure statement only on the 
bidder. In 1980, an amendment was added to the Act to require the target board to comply 
with disclosure requirements. Now, under Rule 14e-2 of Regulation 14E, it is required 
that the target’s board of directors should respond to the tender offer within 10 business 
days from the commencement date of the offer, by advising its shareholders whether it 
recommends acceptance or rejection of the offer or remains neutral with regards to the 
tender offer or is unable to take a position towards it.263 The target board must include 
their reasons for their position in respect to the tender offer. If there are material changes 
in the information previously supplied, the target board must disseminate to its 
shareholders amendments to the original recommendation statement.  
1.3.3 Procedural Requirements  
Duration of the tender offer 
Rule 14e-1 requires the bidder to keep the tender offer open for at least 20 US business 
days before completing the purchase of the shares.264 This requirement aims to give 
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sufficient time for target shareholders to fully evaluate the offer which has been sent to 
them directly. A modification of the offer is allowed during the entire period the offer 
remains open, but the length of the offer period then has to be extended. Under Rule 14e-
1(b), the 20-day period must be extended by at least 10 business days if the bidder 
increases or decreases by more than 2% either the class of securities being bid under the 
offer or the consideration offered under the tender offer. It also provides that in order to 
extend the tender offer, the bidder must issue a public notice of such extension not later 
than 9:00 a.m. Eastern Time on the next business day after the scheduled expiration of the 
offer. If there are other competing bids and the shareholders need extra time to evaluate 
all the offers together, the tender offer may be extended. Unlike the UK’s City Code, a 
tender offer in the US can be extended indefinitely without a time limit after which the 
tender offer must be closed. 
Commencement of the Tender Offer 
The date on which the offer is initially made is crucially important in a contested takeover 
battle because all the procedural and substantive disclosure provisions of the Williams 
Act and the requirement to file Schedule TO with the SEC are triggered upon the 
commencement of the tender offer.  According to Rule 14d-2, the tender offer will begin 
at 12:01 a.m. on the date when the bidder has first ‘published, sent or given’ the means to 
tender to the shareholders of the target company. ‘Means to tender’ specified by Rule 
14d-2(a) involves providing the letter of transmittal to the target shareholders or a 
statement informing them where the letter of transmittal may be obtained. 
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Shareholders’ Withdrawal Rights 
In the offer period the bidder must accept all shares that are tendered. However, under 
Section 14(d)(5), shareholders may decide not to tender their share to the bidder and 
withdraw the shares they tendered at any time during the first seven calendar days 
following the dissemination of the tender offer material by the bidder or at any time after 
60 days from the date of such dissemination. Moreover, the SEC has extended the 
withdrawal period under Rule 14d-7. It stipulates that target shareholders can withdraw 
their tender for the whole open period of the tender offer, including the first seven 
calendar days after the dissemination of the offer.  
Shareholders’ Equal Treatment Rules  
Rule 14d-10 provides that a tender offer must be open to all shareholders of the class of 
securities subject to the tender offer. The rule is designed to prohibit discriminatory 
tender offers with the intention of excluding certain shareholders. Furthermore, Section 
14(d)(7) and Rule 14d-10(a)(2) require that, if the bidder increases the consideration 
offered at any time during the offer period, the bidder must pay this increased 
consideration to all those who have already tendered their shares at the lower price. The 
goal of this section is to ensure that all tender shareholders are treated equally and are 
paid the highest price pursuant to the tender offer, regardless of the date within the offer 
period that they tendered their shares. As Carney has argued, these rules contribute to 
reducing the pressure on the shareholders to tender early and give them time to consider 
the offer properly.265 If a bidder only offers to buy part of the shares in the company and 
tender offers are oversubscribed, Rule 14d-8 requires the bidder to accept tendered shares 
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on a pro rata basis, according to the number of shares tendered by each shareholder 
during the period that the tender offer remains open, rather than purchasing first from the 
shareholders who tender first.   
2. Takeover Law at the State Level 
It should be kept in mind that, in the US, companies must follow the laws of the particular 
state in which they are incorporated.  They may also have to comply with the laws of 
other states where they do business. In the context of takeovers, the behaviour of a target 
board when facing a hostile takeover bid is regulated by the state in which the company is 
incorporated, on which the federal securities law is silent. As Magnuson has observed, the 
takeover regulations at the federal level contribute only a small part of the rules governing 
takeovers.266 It is the state law that retains the crucial task of governing defensive tactics 
and imposes fiduciary duties on the target directors during the offer period, which 
represent the main spirit of US takeover law.267  
In the beginning of the 1970s, individual states passed their own statutes with regard to 
takeovers. The major difference among these statutes is their anti-takeover laws. Not 
surprisingly, the takeover law at the state level are more target-friendly than at the federal 
level and give massive protection to target boards against hostile takeovers, because of 
the ‘large and non-diversified interests of local companies in attempting to use state 
legislation to defend themselves from hostile takeover’.268  
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2.1 State Anti-takeover Laws 
From 1982 to 1989, at least 34 states passed anti-takeover laws in response to intense 
lobbying by companies incorporated in the state, which claimed to be under the threat of 
takeovers and sought to adopt a protective statute. They threatened that if such a 
protective anti-takeover law was not passed, they would reincorporate in states that did 
have one.269 Political pressure has also played an important role in the state legislatures 
because of the fact that takeovers launched by a raider from outside the state will mean a 
significant loss of jobs in the company taken over, as well as the loss of community 
support by the local companies, such as charitable donations.270 Indiana, for example, 
enacted its first anti-takeover statute mainly aiming to protect Arvin Industries against the 
Belzberg family, which employed some 2000 employees in Indiana and provided 
substantial support to local schools. 
These anti-takeover laws may take various forms, but their purpose is the same: to help 
local companies fend off hostile takeovers and make themselves more difficult to be 
taken over, especially by those from other states.271 As White has observed, although 
there are variations among the states’ anti-takeover statutes, the standard for regulating 
and reviewing hostile takeover activity is largely uniform across the states.272 The state 
anti-takeover laws have gone through three generations of development, with different 
devices adopted by different states to protect their local companies and challenge hostile 
bidders.  
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2.1.1 First Generation  
Shortly after the passage of the Williams Act, a wave of state anti-takeover laws emerged 
to give the directors of target companies powers beyond those of the Williams Act to 
resist hostile bids. These statutes imposed certain procedural and substantive 
requirements on the bidders with the aim of creating substantial obstacles for takeover 
bids.273 The problem with these ‘first-generation’ state anti-takeover laws was that they 
gave state administrators the power to review offers on various grounds, such as 
substantive fairness and the adequacy of disclosures.274 By holding a hearing to review 
the offers, it largely imposed delay between when an offer was filed and when it became 
effective.275 Moreover, these statutes attempted to govern tender offers made for firms 
incorporated in other states and were argued to be unfair to bidding companies.276 Thus, 
these statutes ultimately led to a judicial review and they were declared by various federal 
courts to be unconstitutional on the grounds that they interfered either with interstate 
commerce or with the federal supremacy of the Williams Act.  
Edgar v MITE Corp. 
In the famous case of Edgar v MITE Corp,277 the US Supreme Court ruled that the Illinois 
Business Takeover Act was unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution. The Illinois law required bidders to notify the target company 
and the Illinois Secretary of State twenty days before the offer became effective, and 
permitted the Secretary to block a nationwide tender offer for a state-affiliated target 
corporation if the bidder failed to comply with the disclosure laws of Illinois. It also 
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required the Secretary to hold a hearing at the request of shareholders owning at least 
10% of the securities subject to the offer. The Supreme Court ruled that Illinois gave its 
resident shareholders ‘speculative protections’ and ‘had no legitimate interest in 
protecting non-resident shareholders’ or in ‘regulating the internal affairs of a foreign 
corporation’.278 
The challenge to the Illinois law made other states which had enacted similar anti-
takeover laws to question their constitutionality and revise their provisions. However, 
belief that hostile takeovers were not in the best interest of the states was unchanged, and 
in order to continuously impede hostile takeovers, they had to seek a different approach to 
avoid the constitutional problems in Edgar v MITE Corp.279 This paved the way for a 
second wave of state anti-takeover statutes.  
2.1.2 Second Generation  
The second generation state anti-takeover laws emerged in response to the lesson of first 
generation laws, and relatively narrowed their protection range. They tended to apply 
only to target companies that were incorporated within the state or that conducted a 
substantial part of their business activities within state boundaries. They were not directed 
at regulating disclosure in tender offers, as the first generation laws were. Instead, under 
the ‘internal affairs doctrine’, they focused on issues of corporate governance of 
companies incorporated in a specific state, which successfully avoided the constitutional 
conflict of the first generation because internal affairs traditionally are governed by the 
corporation law of the chartering state.  
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The primary objective of the second generation anti-takeover statutes was to protect target 
shareholders from coercive takeovers.280 These second generation statutes took several 
different forms. The earliest form is the so-called  ‘Fair Price’ statute, which typically 
required certain specified transactions (including back-end freezeout mergers and second-
step business combinations) with ‘interested shareholders’ (typically a shareholder 
holding more than 10 or 20%) to be approved by a supermajority of shareholder votes 
unless they all received the highest price paid by the offeror.281 In a later form, the 
‘Control Share Acquisition’ statutes provided that a bidder would not have voting rights 
upon reaching a certain controlling percentage of the target’s voting power (for example, 
20-33.3%, or 33.3-50%, or over 50%), unless this voting power was expressly conferred 
by the affirmative vote of a majority of the target ‘disinterested’ shareholders (of the 
shares not owned by the bidder).  
CTS Corps v Dynamics Corporation of America  
In the case of CTS Corps v Dynamics Corps of America, 282 the CTS Corporation fought 
off a takeover by the Dynamics Corporation based on the Indiana law which required the 
disinterested shareholders to determine in a shareholders’ meeting whether an acquirer 
owning more than 20% of outstanding shares would have voting rights to the shares he 
held. Dynamics challenged the Indiana law by contending that it was unconstitutional on 
the grounds that it was pre-empted by the Williams Act and violated the Commerce 
Clause. The court ruled that the Indiana anti-takeover law was constitutional by denying 
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the existence of ‘an interstate market for corporate control’ protected by the Commerce 
Clause.283  
The CTS decision, giving the Supreme Court’s approval to the second-generation state 
anti-takeover laws by holding that they were not pre-empted by federal law, was regarded 
as a sign of a less enthusiastic attitude towards the social benefits that a takeover could 
bring in the US.284  Within a short period of time after the CTS decision of 1987, more 
than 40 states enacted various types of anti-takeover law, attempting to take advantage of 
the new Supreme Court decision.285 As Armour et al have claimed, most hostile offers in 
the US are now potentially subject to regulation under the second generation anti-
takeover statutes.286  
2.1.3 Third Generation  
There then developed a third generation of anti-takeover laws, enacted from the end of 
the 1980s, intending to prohibit certain post-bid transactions. The best known are the 
‘Business Combination’ statutes which prohibit an ‘interested shareholder’ who has 
obtained a certain percentage of the target company’s voting right (such as 15% or more) 
from taking any post-acquisition ‘business combination’ transactions, such as back-end 
freezeout mergers in the case of a hostile takeover, for a specified period of time (such as 
five years) following the date on which such person becomes an interested shareholder, 
unless the business combination transaction was approved by the target board of directors 
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or a supermajority of disinterested shareholders, or met specified price and other 
conditions.287  
Amanda Acquisition Corporation v Universal Foods Corporation 
In Amanda Acquisition Corp v Universal Foods Corp, 288  the Amanda Acquisition 
Corporation, a subsidiary of the Boston-based High Voltage Engineering Corporation, 
launched a tender offer to acquire all the outstanding shares of Universal Foods, a 
Wisconsin corporation. It was prevented from proceeding by the Wisconsin Business 
Combination Act which requires a bidder who acquires 10% or more of a target 
company’s voting share to receive the approval of the target board of directors or wait 
three years to complete the merger. Amanda Acquisition claimed that the Wisconsin law 
was pre-empted by the Williams Act and inconsistent with the Commerce Clause. The 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied both arguments and upheld the constitutionality 
of the Wisconsin anti-takeover law. In November 1989, the Supreme Court refused to 
hear a challenge to the Wisconsin anti-takeover law, which further confirmed the legal 
viability of state anti-takeover laws. Business Combination statutes, regarded as the most 
sophisticated form of anti-takeover statute, have been enacted in most of the states 
today.289  
2.2 Directors’ Roles in Takeover Defences 
As described in Chapter 1, when facing a hostile takeover there is an inherent conflict of 
interest between target directors, who seek to maintain their jobs by deterring the offer, 
and their shareholders, who might benefit from the takeover by accepting the offer. 
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Ideally, the regulation of board conduct is to pursue a balance between improper use of 
defences to serve directors’ self-interests and proper use of defences to prevent that the 
tender offer is under-value.290  
2.2.1 Directors’ Fiduciary Duties  
In the US, the federal laws do not interfere with the power of a target’s board under its 
corporate charter. The state laws attempt to address this issue through a ‘single and 
homogeneously defined standard’ on the accountability of the target’s board, known as 
fiduciary duties.291 In the face of a hostile takeover, takeover defences are at the business 
discretion of the board of directors and can be widely adopted by the target board without 
shareholder approval. However, the adoption of these defensive measures by target 
directors must comply with their fiduciary duties to the company and its shareholders. 
As a general rule, directors’ fiduciary duties, beyond mere fairness and honesty, include 
the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Directors are required to make decisions on all 
reasonably available information by the duty of care and to make decision in the interests 
of the company and its shareholders, not out of self-interest, by the duty of loyalty.292. As 
Benjamin Cardozo held in Meinhard v Salmon, ‘[m]any forms of conduct permissible in a 
workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by 
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. 
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honour the most sensitive, is then the standard 
of behaviour’.293 
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The US courts generally apply a number of procedural and substantive standards to 
determine whether a board of directors properly exercises their fiduciary duties, which are 
often collectively referred to as the ‘Business Judgment Rule’.294 The Business Judgment 
Rule is based on the essential notion that the management and affairs of a corporation are 
entrusted to its board of directors, whose decisions are made based on sound business 
judgement with due care and in good faith.295 In Aronson v Lewis, the court defined the 
Business Judgment Rule as a ‘a presumption that in making a business decision that 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company’.296 
Under this rule, the board of directors are not liable for a mistake in business judgement if 
it is made in good faith and in what they believe to be the best interest of the company. It 
was addressed in AC Acquisitions Corp v Anderson, Clayton & Co.: when a court is 
required to review the propriety of business decisions by the board of directors, it will 
decline to evaluate the merits or wisdom of the decisions of board of directors who are 
elected by shareholders to manage the business of the company.297 In other words, as 
Lamb has argued, ‘the directors are afforded a presumption that they have fulfilled their 
fiduciary duties and in such circumstances the court will not substitute its judgement for 
that of the directors’.298 
2.2.2 Delaware Court’s Decisions  
As described previously, the Williams Act is primarily a disclosure statute and does not 
directly govern the conduct of target boards in responding to, particularly in resisting, a 
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hostile takeover bid. At the federal level, there seems to be no interest in regulating the 
takeover defences and instead, as Chancellor William Chandler stated: 
With minor exceptions, the United States Congress had shown no interest in 
adopting a statutory framework to regulate corporate decision-making. The [SEC] 
also expressed no interest in regulating takeover defences such as the poison pill. 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court had essentially sidelined federal 
judges and state legislatures with respect [to] such corporate governance matters. 
Almost by default, state courts were left to fill this void and create dependable 
ground rules governing when corporate boards…might employ takeover 
defences…to deter, thwart, slow down or even stifle an ever increasing wave of 
hostile acquisitions.299 
In addition, according to Alcock, it has never been open to the US federal authorities to 
establish nation-wide rules to regulate takeovers, because the corporation matter is within 
the jurisdiction of individual states and therefore the target’s board’s ability to employ 
takeover defences is not a matter for federal control.300 As a result, the issue regarding 
how and to what extent the takeover defences can be employed by the target board is 
regulated through state legislative and judicial decisions and subject to regulatory 
competition among the individual states. 301  
In this competitive context, the standards of target directors’ behaviour in facing a hostile 
takeover have been defined by a series of precedents in the State Delaware on a case by 
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case basis.302 Over almost 30 years, the behaviour standards produced by the Delaware 
courts to regulate defensive board actions of a Delaware corporation in response to hostile 
takeovers, have ‘completed the landscape of American tender offer regulation’. 303 
Delaware is arguably the only state which has established a well-developed case law on 
the use of takeover defences by the target board.304  
These cases play a particularly important role in regulating takeover defences, not only 
because Delaware was and continues to be the state where more US quoted corporations 
have chosen to incorporate than in any other state305, but also because of ‘the persuasive 
authority attributed to Delaware’s courts in corporate law issues’. 306  Delaware’s 
sophisticated court system has used very experienced and knowledgeable judges to decide 
corporate lawsuits. As a result, they have produced the most influential source of takeover 
law, and its rulings continue to influence other states. As Delahaye has observed, in states 
with less sophisticated takeover laws, practitioners frequently advise clients on the basis 
of Delaware law, and their jurisdictions are unlikely to be stricter than Delaware’s.307  
2.2.2.1 Unocal Duties – where the board intends to preserve the company’s 
independence 
In Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Corp,308 the Unocal board of directors launched a self-
tender offer for itself with the aim of impeding the unwanted tender offer initiated by 
Mesa Petroleum. However, this self-tender offer excluded Mesa Petroleum who already 
owned approximately 13% of the outstanding Unocal shares. The Delaware Chancery 
                                                
302 Dana M. Muir and Cindy A. Schipani, ‘New Standards of Director Loyalty and Care in the Post-Enron Era: Are 
Some Shareholders More Equal Than Others’ (2005) 8 Legislation and Public Policy 279, 354. 
303 Armour and Skeel, Jr. (n118) 1761. 
304  Berglöf and Burkart (n32) 188. 
305 General Motors, Exxon Mobil, Wal-Mart and DuPont are among over 300,000 companies that have incorporated in 
Delaware. One-half of all New York Stock Exchange companies are incorporated there, along with 60% of the Fortune 
500 companies. 
306 Ventoruzzo (n24) 187. 
307 Bernd Delahaye, ‘Still Alive: Poison Pills and Staggered Boards As Hostile Takeover Defences – the Battle for 
Airgas’ (2012) International Company and Commercial Law Review 211, 211. 
308 Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Corp 493 A 2d 946 (Del 1985).  
Chapter 3 Takeover Regime in the United States 
July 2013 105 
Court issued a preliminary injunction against the self-tender on the grounds that the 
company directors have a fiduciary duty to treat all shareholders fairly and that the self-
tender unfairly discriminated against Mesa Petroleum.309 However, a few days after the 
Chancery Court’s opinion, as Shepro and Herzel described ‘to the astonishment of most 
corporation lawyers’, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a defensive self-defender 
offer that discriminated against a hostile bidder who was also a major shareholder of 
Unocal was valid.310  
In reaching its decision, the court noted its concern that ‘a director may be acting 
primarily in his own interests rather than those of the corporation and its shareholder’ and 
adopted an ‘enhanced scrutiny’ standard that calls for ‘judicial examination at the 
threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred’.311 
When faced with hostile takeovers, the court modified the business judgement rule and 
required the board to meet the following two tests when trying to preserve the 
independence of the target company: 
• A Reasonableness test which is satisfied by a demonstration that directors have 
reasonable grounds to believe that danger to the pursuit of a corporate policy 
and effectiveness exists if the company is controlled by the hostile bidder, and  
• A Proportionality test which is satisfied by a demonstration that their defensive 
actions were ‘proportionate’ to the threat posed by the hostile bid and its effect 
on the company. 
The Unocal case was particularly significant, as Muir and Schipani have explained, 
because it showed that Delaware courts ‘are willing to scrutinize a decision to resist a 
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takeover attempt more closely than an ordinary business decision’. 312  The Unocal 
standard, also known as the ‘enhanced business judgment rule’, has frequently been used 
by Delaware courts as a standard for reviewing the conduct of target boards against 
hostile tender offers with the aim of preserving the company’s independence.313 It is 
argued that these are duties, along with the fiduciary duties governing almost all 
defensive measures taken by the target directors in response to a hostile takeover.314 Once 
the Unocal duties have been satisfied, the normal presumptions about directors’ behaviour 
under the business judgment rule apply.315 
2.2.2.2 Revlon Duties — where change of control of the company is inevitable 
In Revlon Inc v MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings Inc,316 Revlon had given a lockup 
option on its health divisions to Forstmann Little & Co in the face of a hostile takeover 
attempt by Pantry Pride. The Delaware Chancery Court enjoined the lockup by holding 
that ‘once the breakup of Revlon became inevitable… the board [had] to view its primary 
role as the promoter of bids, with price the dominant consideration.’317 The Delaware 
Supreme Court ruled on the obligation of a target board of directors to recommend the 
transaction that will maximise shareholder wealth if it is certain that its company is going 
to be sold. In this context, the court said, ‘[t]he directors’ role changed from defenders of 
the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the 
stockholders at a sale of the company’.318  
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The judgement in the case of Revlon continues to be cited in various cases and the rules 
introduced by the court came to be known as the Revlon Duties.319 Where the takeover 
will result in change of control or break-up of the company, as Lamb has pointed out, the 
nature of the board’s Unocal Duties changes.320  The fundamental role of directors is to 
maximise the gains for their shareholders rather than to preserve the independence of the 
company. Therefore, Revlon Duties come into play when it is clear that the sale or 
breakup of the company is inevitable. The Delaware Supreme Court has clarified this 
point by noting that the duty of the target board of directors to be an auctioneer arises 
only if it is ‘apparent’ that a sale of the company is ‘inevitable’, which is not the case 
when the board is determined to remain independent.321  
It is worth noting that although the lockup options were held to be invalid, the court did 
not go so far as to prohibit the use of the defences. If the defences are used to promote the 
auction process by favouring one bidder over another and thereby causing the offer price 
to rise, they could be consistent with the board’s Revlon duties. However, defences are 
used to hinder the auction process are not valid. In other words, the directors’ role 
changes from defender attempting to frustrate the sale to auctioneer seeking the highest 
price for shareholders.322  
2.2.2.3 Moran Case -- where the board intends to adopt poison pills  
Poison pills have been a common feature of US companies and more than half of them 
have adopted such plan in potential takeovers.323 Courts in the US have generally been 
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kind to the adoption of poison pills. In the case of Moran v Household International, 
Inc,324 the target board adopted a poison pill and refused to redeem it. The Delaware 
Supreme Court upheld the legality of poison pills by concluding that their adoption by a 
target board was consistent with Delaware Law, despite the fact that they cause 
discrimination between the tender offer bidder and other shareholders of the target 
company.325 The court based the validity of poison pills on the condition that an adoption 
of poison pills by the target board is subject to fiduciary duties and therefore open to 
judicial review, by noting that  
when the Household Board of Directors is faced with a tender offer and a request to 
redeem the rights, they will not be able to arbitrarily reject the offer. They will be 
held to the same fiduciary standards as any other board of directors would be held 
to in deciding to adopt a defensive mechanism, the same standard as they were held 
to in approving the Rights Plan.326 
In most cases, Delaware courts are reluctant to order the target board to redeem the pill 
because the existence of the poison pill can act as a powerful defensive mechanism to 
protect undervalued target companies from opportunistic acquirers. As a result, apart 
from negotiating directly with the target’s board and reaching a settlement before making 
any tender offer, if hostile bidders want to get over the barrier set up by the poison pill, 
they must first gain control of the target’s board and redeem the poison pill afterwards. 
Their solution is to combine a hostile tender offer with a proxy solicitation to remove the 
incumbent target directors and replace them with their own board candidates who would 
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redeem the poison pill after their election. Therefore, the arrangement of board elections 
became the critical factor influencing the target’s defensive prospects.327  
If the target company has a unitary board, where all members are elected at the annual 
meeting of shareholders, a bidder would have to wait for the next election to conduct a 
proxy contest. However, if the target company has staggered boards, this effectively 
prevents a bidder from obtaining control of the board in a single election. The bidder 
might have to wait even longer to replace the board. Correspondingly, the target board’s 
ability to impose delays on a bidder in gaining control of a company could serve as a 
significant deterrent to the making of a bid in the first place.328 It is therefore argued that 
when a poison pill is combined with a staggered board, it makes a hostile takeover 
difficult because the bidder cannot remove the poison pill by simply asking target 
shareholders to replace the board on one occasion. The Delaware Corporation Law allows 
boards to have two or three classes of directors. 329  
2.2.2.4 Subsequent Cases 
In Blasius Industries Inc v Atlas Corp,330 Atlas’s board amended the bylaws to expand its 
size by appointing two directors to fill the newly created board, in order to retain control 
of the incumbent board irrespective of the outcome of the proxy contest. Delaware Court 
of Chancery invalidated this defensive action by concluding that the action, intended to 
interfere with the shareholders’ power to appoint a majority of the board, will constitute 
an unintended violation of the duty of loyalty that directors owe to the shareholders, even 
if the board are sincerely acting in the best interest of the company and not merely to 
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entrench themselves; unless the board can demonstrate a ‘compelling justification’ for 
undertaking it on the ground that the shareholder vote that installs the directors into office 
is what legitimates the directors’ exercise of power. As Armour et al have stressed, the 
Blasius standard was ‘designed to reinforce that principle as a matter of fundamental 
corporate law policy’. 331  This ruling protects shareholders’ ability to respond to 
unsatisfactory management by exercising their voting rights or selling their shares to 
outsiders.  
When the adoption of poison pills was held to be valid in Moran, it coincided with and 
arguably caused the decline of hostile takeover bids in the 1980s. During the recession in 
the United Sates in the 1990s, the number of hostile takeovers continued to go down, 
largely because of the elimination of the major financing sources for hostile takeovers. In 
City Capital Associates v Interco,332 the Delaware Court of Chancery recognised that the 
board of directors would seriously harm shareholders’ interests by using a poison pill, and 
gave the shareholders the right to decide for themselves whether to accept a non-coercive 
offer. Chancellor Allen expressed some concerns about Unocal’s duties and ordered the 
redemption of a poison pill by saying that ‘in the setting of a non-coercive offer, absent 
unusual facts, there may come a time when a board’s fiduciary duty will require it to 
redeem the rights and to permit the shareholders to choose’.333 The court came to this 
conclusion on the grounds that a non-coercive takeover offer constitutes a relatively mild 
threat so that the board’s defences should be accordingly prohibited and shareholder 
choice should not be frustrated in relation to the threat posed. Any poison pills therefore 
had to be redeemed if used by the target board to resist a non-coercive tender, because 
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their use to defeat a non-coercive tender offer was not proportionate to any legitimate 
threat by the tender offer.  
However, one year later the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the balanced rule of 
Interco in Paramount Communications Inc v Time Inc,334 by describing it as a ‘narrow 
and rigid construction of Unocal’ and ‘reject[ed] such approach as not in keeping with a 
proper Unocal analysis’.335 The court suggested in the Paramount case that almost 
anything would be considered a legitimate threat justifying the use of a poison pill to 
reject any bid indefinitely. Time’s board’s self-serving conclusion of Paramount’s tender 
offer as ‘inadequate’ was found sufficient justification for denying their shareholders the 
opportunity to decide for themselves whether or not the offer was adequate.336  
Paramount also established the legitimacy of a set of defences, regarded as ‘just-say-no-
defences’ allowing the target board to ‘just say no’ to a premium bid that a majority of 
target shareholders preferred, on the grounds that it was aiming to protect the interests of 
employees and other constituents.337 As a result, Paramount gave the target board 
significant power to ‘just say no’ to any takeover bid regardless of the target shareholders’ 
preference, if it was justified by the long-term strategy that directors believe would 
eventually generate greater wealth for shareholders. Paramount, therefore, enables the 
target board to manoeuvre more freely in adopting takeover defences, even if the sale of 
the target company is inevitable.  
In the 1990s, there were two cases which clarified the directors’ duties in takeover 
defences; they were argued to imply the broadened scope of directors’ ability to adopt 
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defensive measures.338 First, in Paramount v QVC Network,339 the Delaware Supreme 
Court clarified the circumstances in which the Revlon duties apply and held that it would 
apply enhanced scrutiny of target board’s actions based on the Revlon doctrine, but only 
when the defensive action was taken after a change in corporate control or a break-up of 
the target company was inevitable. In other words, when the sale of the company is 
inevitable, the directors no long face threats to their company policy and effectiveness, 
and their main duty is to secure the best-value takeover offer reasonably available for the 
shareholders, discharging their fiduciary duties to the end.  
In the second case, Unitrin v American General,340 decided in 1995, the court allowed an 
independent board to approve takeover defences as long as they were not ‘draconian’ and 
were within a ‘range of reasonableness’. It was emphasised that the board should be 
allowed to take strong steps to oppose takeover bids by expanding the range of possible 
defensive actions that directors can adopt, from the ‘proportionality’ test set by Unocal to 
a less clearly defined ‘range of reasonableness’ in response to the perceived threat .341 
Unitrin is regarded as the leading case concerning the board’s ability to use takeover 
defences to thwart an unwanted takeover bid; it demonstrates the state law’s attitude 
towards takeover defences, which favours the primacy of the target board over 
shareholders’ choice.  
The existence of the precedents of the Delaware courts clearly demonstrates a regulatory 
response of widely extending the target board’s ability of employing takeover defences to 
resist a hostile takeover, as long as the board acts in good faith and satisfies reasonable 
investigation. As Smith has argued, after Unitrin resulted in modification of the Unocal 
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duties in 1995, it was hard to find a defensive measure that would be claimed invalid by 
the Delaware courts, particularly the Delaware Supreme Court, which routinely deferred 
to defensive actions by target boards.342 
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Chapter 4 Comparative Analysis of the Divergence between the UK and US 
Takeover Regimes 
1. Two Sets of Conflicts of Interest 
When looking at the legal questions raised by takeover activities to be resolved by the UK 
and US takeover laws, a distinction can be made between two types of conflicts of 
interest: the conflict between the target board and target shareholders, and the conflict 
between the bidder and target shareholders. It needs to be made clear that takeover rules, 
unlike for example, listing rules, are not intended to address the tension which arises 
between the shareholders of the bidder and its board in relation to the decision to acquire 
the target company. Therefore, this particular conflict of interest will not be discussed in 
this thesis.  
As can be seen from Chapters 2 and 3, although the UK and the US have relatively 
similar capital markets and corporate governance, each jurisdiction has adopted a 
strikingly different approach towards takeover regulation. In order to analyse the 
differences between the two systems, this comparison will focus on two issues: what 
defensive tactics can be employed affecting the relationship between the target board and 
target shareholders; and how the tender offer should be carried out affecting the 
relationship between the bidders and the target shareholders.  
2. Conflict between the Target Board and Target Shareholders 
In the UK and US, most publicly listed companies have dispersed ownership, and 
controlling shareholders are the exception. The consequence is that the board of directors 
is very powerful. As Hopt has observed, although the directors are agents of the company, 
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their interests are not ‘generally aligned with those of shareholders’.343 The rules laid 
down in takeover law in connection with director’ duties are attempting to seek a balance 
between freedom of action taken by the directors to manage the company and possible 
abuse of their power for their private interests.344  
In the context of a takeover, especially a hostile takeover, the conflict of interests between 
target directors and shareholders is severe, and the issue of directors’ duties is particularly 
complex.345 As Davies and Hopt have found, when facing a hostile takeover, there is a 
tension between the shareholders’ freedom to sell shares they hold in the target company 
and ‘a recognition that sales of shares sufficient to produce a control shift have 
consequences for the policies of the company which would normally call for a decision of 
the board’.346 Therefore, the critical question here is whether and to what extent the 
directors of the target company should be allowed to adopt defensive measures to resist 
the tender offer which shareholder may wish to accept. As Gilson has pointed out, in the 
regulation of board conduct, there is a sensitive balance between giving directors the 
freedom to employ takeover defences against an unwanted bid and restricting the 
defences to encourage a market for corporate control.347 
When a takeover bid is announced, it is broadly understood that the target board and 
shareholders have very different attitudes towards the bid. On the one hand, shareholders 
generally have a welcome attitude towards it because in a tender offer they are usually 
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given an immediate opportunity to sell their shares above market price.348 They might 
benefit from the takeover bid by selling their shares in the target for a premium, to 
maximise the current value of their shares. They might, however, tender their shares out 
of fear that, if they do not, then the bidder might still gain control, in which case the 
shareholder would be left with low-value minority shares in the acquired target.349 In 
addition, the possibility of a hostile bid helps to discipline the managers if a takeover does 
happen. Thus, shareholders normally have a good incentive to sell their shares when 
faced with a tender offer. 
On the other hand, target directors’ incentives are likely to diverge from those of the 
shareholders. As Bainbridge has argued, if the hostile bid is successful and a change of 
control takes place, the bidders who would be the majority shareholder would replace the 
board of directors and remove the existing managers in order to control the target 
company.350 As a result, when hostile takeovers occur, the target board may not be 
perfectly faithful to the shareholders and may be expected to pursue their own interests at 
the shareholders’ expense.351 They may seek to avoid losing their positions in the target 
company by adopting defensive measures to deter potential acquirers from the right to run 
the target company, although the defending board usually attempts to justify their 
resistance as being in the best interest of the shareholders.352 However, the defensive 
tactics they frequently use may fight off even a value-maximising takeover bid.  
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2.1 UK’s Response 
In accordance with the statutory duties introduced by the CA 2006, directors of UK 
registered companies have a duty to promote the success of the company and only take 
action for the purpose for which they were appointed. In the case of takeovers, the 
directors are subject to certain additional duties pursuant to the City Code. One of them is 
acting in the interest of the company as a whole, which stems from the Takeover 
Directive. More significantly, the legal regime for takeovers in the UK makes it clear that 
the decision on takeover defences belongs to shareholders, not directors, and generally 
holds that directors cannot use their powers to preclude the majority shareholders’ 
constitutional right to decide whether or not to accept a takeover bid. The target 
shareholders are therefore given maximum opportunity to decide whether to accept or 
reject the takeover bid and how to deal with their shares in face of a takeover.  
According to the City Code, once the target board is aware of the takeover offer, it is 
prohibited from taking any action to frustrate the takeover bid without the approval of the 
shareholders in general meeting.353 According to Dean, this prohibition has been a central 
rule of the UK City Code since its inception, and gives target shareholders the ultimate 
power to determine the success or failure of a hostile bid when balancing the powers 
between target board and shareholders.354 This prohibition is based on the common law 
view that directors’ powers should only be used ‘for their proper purpose’ and this does 
not include frustrating takeovers.355 But unlike the proper purpose doctrine, the City Code 
bans all actions which have the effect of frustrating a takeover offer without shareholder 
approval. As Seretakis has argued, the NFR makes the purpose of directors irrelevant 
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when considering the validity of the takeover defences.356 According to an empirical 
study over a five-year period, undertaken by Deakin and others, litigation is very rarely 
used by shareholders in the UK and the popularity of poison pills and other takeover 
defences is far below the level in the USA.357 
2.2 US’s Response 
By contrast, the US adopts a dramatically opposite regulatory approach towards a 
takeover defence to that taken by the UK in the City Code. In the US, the target 
shareholders do not have as much power to prevent the directors’ choice as in the UK. 
There is an entire body of tactical options for a target board which is seeking to defend 
itself against a takeover bid. As Miller has argued, the directors of US target companies 
play a central role in adopting defensive measures – most of which, such as the poison 
pills, can be implemented without shareholder approval.358 Through precedents along 
with the various anti-takeover statutes, a positive increase has been observed in the 
freedom of directors to adopt takeover defences in response to hostile takeovers.359 The 
board of directors in the target company is protected in a way that leaves shareholders 
little choice in this matter. The broadened power of the target board to resist a hostile 
takeover seems to be a move toward favouring freer use of takeover defences in the US. 
In practice, target boards have been granted far more freedom than in the UK to decide 
whether to accept or reject a takeover bid. 
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However, the board’s power to adopt defensive measures is not absolute. Although the 
target shareholders’ ability to gain premiums through takeovers is restricted by the fact 
that power to respond to takeovers lies with the target company’s board of directors, the 
action taken by the target board in employing defensive measures is subject to the 
common law fiduciary duties examined by enhanced business judgement rule on a case-
by-case basis.360 In this respect, the target directors are required to demonstrate a certain 
level of responsibility and good faith towards their shareholders. US courts design a series 
of tests to make sure that the target board’s defensive action is in the best interests of the 
company and its shareholders, and is reasonable in the light of the threat posed by the 
takeover bid to corporate policy or effectiveness.361  
3. Conflict between the Bidders and Target Shareholders 
Any system of takeover governance must decide on a policy concerning the potential for 
coercion which occurs when a person (bidder) attempts, through a tender offer directly to 
the target shareholders, to acquire shares in the target company, usually with the purpose 
of taking control of that company.362 If takeover regulation attempts to protect target 
shareholders against bidders’ coercive actions, there is often a negative impact on the 
likelihood of the takeovers. The rules, as equal treatment of shareholders and information 
disclosure are designed to protect shareholders’ interests, reduce bidders’ gains from 
acquiring the target and so lessen their incentives to launch a bid. 
It is therefore argued that the takeover rules determine how the gains from a takeover are 
shared between the bidders and target shareholders, and thereby the incentives to make 
                                                
360 See e.g., Moran v Household international Inc 490 A 2d 1059 (Del Ch 1985), 1070. 
361 See e.g., Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Corp 493 A 2d 946 (Del 1985). 
362 Armour and Skeel, Jr. (n118) 1745. 
Chapter 4 Comparative Analysis of the Divergence between the UK and US Takeover Regimes 
July 2013 120 
and accept a tender offer.363 The different regulatory responses may be due to different 
views on the tolerance of shareholder inequality and coercion in hostile takeovers. 
Considering the extent to which regulation designed to address the coercion and 
coordination costs of target shareholders has an impact on the incentives for potential 
bidders to launch a bid offer, as Thompson has suggested, the UK legislator has gone 
beyond the US to protect target shareholders’ interests from hostile takeovers by adopting 
the MBR.364 
3.1 UK’s Response 
In the UK, the City Code eliminates the most severe aspects of shareholder coercion and 
discrimination by strictly prohibiting partial and two-tier offers. The consideration which 
the bidder is prepared to pay for control of the target company should be shared equally 
among shareholders of the same class and proportionately among shareholders of 
different classes. Furthermore, those who accept an offer and those who sell to the bidder 
outside the offer process should be equally treated. Thus, if a bidder buys shares in the 
market during the offer period but at a higher price, it is required to raise the offer price to 
the level of the market purchase. 
Most importantly, that the City Code introduced MBR for fair procedure is for some 
observers a trademark rule of the Code. It imposes an obligation on a bidder who has 
obtained control of the target company to make a general offer for all the remaining 
shares from outstanding target shareholders whose shares have not been purchased, and to 
pay the same price to all shareholders willing to sell. As Slaughter has argued, this rule is 
aimed at guaranteeing an exit route for minority shareholders in the case of a change of 
                                                
363 Burkart and Panunzi (n82) 739. 
364 Robert B. Thompson, ‘Takeover Regulation After the ‘Convergence’ of Corporate Law’ (2002) 24 Sydney Law 
Review 323, 334. 
Chapter 4 Comparative Analysis of the Divergence between the UK and US Takeover Regimes 
July 2013 121 
control, and securing equal treatment of all shareholders in substance.365 Because of this 
rule, all bidders attempting to acquire corporate control must have sufficient funds 
prepared to purchase all the shares of the target company. 
3.2 US’s Response 
In order to achieve a level playing field for all investors, federal legislations governing 
securities make it clear that any purchase of securities reaching a certain shareholding 
will trigger an obligation of a prompt and full disclosure of relevant information. The 
Williams Act is aimed to deal with first-come, first-served tactics, used by bidders 
seeking to coerce shareholders to tender. Upon a sale of control, the laws provide the 
target shareholders with an equal opportunity to sell all their shares or on a pro rata basis 
on substantially the same terms. This right gives minority shareholders an opportunity to 
partially sell their shares on a pro rata basis with all other prospective sellers.366 
However, unlike the UK regime, the Williams Act does not go so far as to require a 
bidder acquiring a controlling stake by means of a block purchase to make a mandatory 
bid for all the remaining shares so as to give the minority a chance to totally exit the 
company. The bidders are allowed to purchase a controlling block of shares from a 
private agreement without making any offer to the remaining shareholders in the target 
company. As Clark has stated, ‘[t]he conventional answer given by the courts is that the 
sale of a control block of stock at such a premium price is not wrong per se’.367 Therefore, 
MBR cannot be found in the US federal regulation and there is no support for it in US 
case laws. In addition, partial bids or two-tier bids are not prohibited in the US, which is 
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the exact opposite of the MBR’s philosophy and allows bidders to launch a different 
subsequent offer to remaining shareholders at a lower price.368  
4. Explanation of the Divergence 
The discussion above has made it clear that the UK and the US have adopted different 
approaches to the activity of takeovers. The reasons for this divergence, however, are not 
obvious. In this section, an attempt is made to explain how the differences have arisen.  
4.1 Fundamental Principles  
A fundamental principle of UK takeover regulation under the City Code and common law 
is based on the assumption that the possibility of hostile takeovers is an important part of 
an open and efficient stock market. Thus, when considering the conflict of interest 
between the target board and shareholders, the UK has been open to hostile takeovers and 
given priority to shareholder choice and a market for corporate control.369 The legislators 
of UK takeover regulation insisted that there should be no interference with the free 
market; shareholders should be allowed to decide whether to sell their shares. Therefore, 
the basic spirit of takeover law in the UK is to protect shareholders’ interests without 
disrupting the autonomy of the market for corporate control.370  Accordingly, the rules 
governing takeovers are designed to avoid obstacles which would prevent hostile bids and 
to ensure that the right to decide whether to sell their shares when facing a takeover 
belongs to shareholders; the board cannot frustrate this right vested in the shareholders.371   
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Because the fundamental principle central to the UK’s takeover regulations is fairness and 
equality among the target shareholders, the City Code governs not only a particular 
takeover offer, but also pre-offer and post-offer share purchases. In seeking to promote 
shareholder equality, there are two rules stipulated by the City Code, namely NFR and 
MBR, serving the purpose of protecting the target shareholders against the bidder’s 
coercion and the target board’s exploitation.372 It is these two rules, as Johnston has 
pointed out, that provide the sharp contrast with US takeover regulations, by 
demonstrating a more conservative and traditional British attitude towards shareholders’ 
rights.373  
In the US, at the federal level, the legislators are only seeking to protect investors, while 
not inclined to protect the bidders, or the target board. The federal law is neither for nor 
against takeovers, but was intended to create a level playing field between the target 
board and bidders by enabling shareholders to make rational decisions based on full and 
complete information.374 The Williams Act is regarded as a purely procedural statute 
focusing on disclosure, with the aim of ensuring equal treatment of all shareholders with 
respect to information and procedure, so as to prevent an under-priced and coercive sale 
of shares.375  
However, at the states level, the design of takeover law is more protective of directors 
than it is of shareholders’ interests with regard to the distribution of corporate powers. It 
is argued that the theory behind this is the separate personality of the corporation which 
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has been historically stressed by US law makers.376 As a separate entity, the board has 
been given much greater power than in the UK. Thus, in the context of a hostile takeover, 
the target directors play a major role in the US by being allowed to employ defensive 
tactics without requiring the shareholder approval. The courts hold that questions 
regarding the exercise of the corporation’s power over its property, or with respect to its 
rights or obligations, are implicated.377 As a result, the power of implementing defensive 
tactics should belong to the directors who exercise their power to manage the business of 
the company. As Davies has summarised, the US rules are claimed to be less responsive 
to the conflict of interest between target board and its shareholders, but more responsive 
to the argument that the power to accept a takeover is regarded in the same way as other 
essential business decisions reserved for board rather than for the shareholders.378 
4.2 Effective Lobbying Power 
As examined previously, the regulatory framework for the conduct of takeovers in the UK 
established by the City Code has been developed to reflect the collective opinion of those 
professionally involved in the field of takeovers as to how fairness to shareholders, 
appropriate business standards and an orderly framework for takeovers can be 
achieved.379 During the post-war period, institutional investment has steadily developed 
in the UK equity market. According to a report written by Myners, equity ownership has 
massively shifted from individual investors to institutional investors since the early 1960s, 
with individual shareholder ownership shrinking from over 50% of the market to under 
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20%. 380  It is admitted that collective investments administered by specialist fund 
managers in choosing the best investment plan to some extent reduce the risk to 
individual investment. 381  However, the primary reason for the rapid emergence of 
institutional investors is perhaps the tax privileges for institutions. For example, the 
decision to make pension funds free of capital gains tax led to a huge amount of equity 
ownership flowing rapidly to institutional investors, because of the fact that contributions 
to such funds by their beneficiaries are taken out of pre-tax income. 382  
Therefore, by the time the City Code was drafted in 1968, institutional investors had 
already emerged as a significant power in the British business landscape.383 In the 
majority of UK companies, considerable shares are held by institutional investors. The 
strong presence of institutional investors in the UK required greater corporate governance 
controls and better protection of their shareholders’ interests. Thus, UK corporate 
governance is significantly influenced by institutional investors representing the interests 
of shareholders as a class. As Dey has stated, the UK takeover policy is dominated by an 
industrial strategy and seeks to protect the interests of the shareholders to the 
maximum.384  
Consequently, the takeover regulation-making process in the UK was not led by 
governmental bodies. The British government delegated it to a working group led by the 
Bank of England. This working group was dominated by representatives of institutional 
investors and investment banks, with few management representatives and no employee 
representatives at all. The institutional shareholders have therefore been given an 
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advantage over the representatives of management in the process of producing takeover 
rules via the City Code. As Bebchuk and Farrell have stated, UK regulation ‘is not 
imposed from the outside by a detached governmental body but rather by a group that has 
strong connections to the interested parties’ and that group ‘gave less weight to 
managerial interests because of the close connection at least some of them had with the 
interests of shareholders’.385 Accordingly the Takeover Panel, regarded as one of the most 
important arbiters of corporate disputes in the UK, was developed largely in accordance 
with the wishes of institutional shareholders.386 Indeed, it is not surprising to find that the 
requirement of equal treatment and other procedural protections for shareholders provide 
support for the claim that the City Code rules are imposed by the practitioners’ lobby.387 
Unlike the UK regime, because of the dual system and state competition, the US has 
failed to produce a national system of regulation governing takeovers to the extent 
achieved by the City Code. In the context of takeovers, federal laws generally govern the 
behaviour of the bidding company while the target company is generally subject to 
corporate law which falls under state jurisdiction and varies from state to state. As 
Bebchuk and Farrell have argued, there is ‘a broad array of inconsistent state laws 
existing across the United States’.388 In such cases, to regulate the takeover activities in 
the US, federal takeover laws tend to be directed at tender offer rules, whereas state laws 
govern board behaviour.  
The position of financial institutions in the US is significantly different from their 
position in the UK. The amount of equity that financial institutions, such as insurance 
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companies and banks, could hold has been largely limited. This is based on the 
philosophy that the power of financial institutions must be constrained because the 
American public historically feared that private concentrations of economic power would 
make the central government too powerful to control.389 As Roe has observed, the scale of 
financial institutions in the US was substantially confined by federal and state regulation, 
so that they are unable to hold a block of shareholdings in a listed company as in the 
UK.390  
The inability of the financial institutions to raise sufficient funds arguably promoted an 
even bigger and more developed securities market in the US in order to compensate for 
the relatively weak banks. 391  Consequently, there is much more retail investors 
participation in the US equities market compared to institutional investors. Moreover, as 
for institutional investors, their ability to influence the development of takeover law was 
restricted by their greater geographical dispersal in the US. Thus, the weakness of 
institutional investors did not lead to a law designed to protect shareholders’ interests as 
in the UK.  
On the contrary, the target board had more influence in the development of corporate 
rules in the US. As Bebchuk and Ferell have argued, ‘state competition produces a 
systematic tendency for states to protect incumbent management excessively from 
takeovers’.392 Since managers have the power to decide on the state in which to re-
incorporate the company, a state seeking to maximise the number of companies that are 
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incorporated there will care a ‘great deal about managerial preference’. 393  As a 
consequence, the states will adopt takeover rules which protect the target company from 
hostile takeovers so as to attract more companies to incorporate there, or prevent its 
companies from re-corporation in other states.394  
In reality, many state laws were passed in response to pressure by particular companies 
who found themselves the target by potential bidders. These firms petitioned the state 
legislature to pass an anti-takeover law or amend the current one to make it more difficult 
for a local company to be taken over. As Bebchuk and Cohen have shown, states that pass 
anti-takeover laws and offer more protection against takeovers are more likely to attract 
more companies to be incorporated there.395 From the management’s point of view, a 
company is more likely to incorporate in a state with satisfactory takeover rules, even if 
their shareholders’ interests are not well considered.396  
The enormous discretion given to target managers in Delaware is probably the main 
reason why this state is one of the favourite places for companies to incorporate. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the Interco case upheld target shareholders’ power to decide 
whether to accept a non-coercive takeover bid,397 but unfortunately this was short-lived 
mainly due to the pressure to reincorporate in other states coming from companies 
already incorporated in Delaware. One year later, the balanced Interco ruling was rejected 
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by the Delaware Supreme Court in the Paramount case,398 soon after Wachtell Lipton 
publicly advised clients to reincorporate outside Delaware if Interco remained good law.  
4.3 Functional Counterbalance  
As examined before, the interests of the UK target companies have been firmly linked to 
the priorities of its shareholders. Thus, according to Dean, in theory at least, managerial 
complacency will be prevented by shareholder primacy, along with the emphasis on the 
strength of institutional investors.399 Based on this view, UK takeover regulation will not 
give a free hand to allow the target board to employ defensive takeover measures that 
might compromise the interests of shareholders. 
When facing a takeover threat, the target board is only allowed to manoeuvre in the 
following three situations: 1) to persuade shareholders to exercise their rights in a 
particular way, for example, to reject the offer, by providing a detailed statement of the 
gains and losses to the company in the event of a takeover; 2) to appeal to the competition 
authorities to raise potential competition concerns to obstruct the bid; 3) to seek other 
takeover competitors (white knight). As Davies has argued, ‘in all three situations the 
directors of the target are thrown back on their powers of persuasion; in all three cases the 
final decision on the success of these defensive moves rests with others’.400 This makes 
the target board’s powers under the circumstance of a hostile takeover in the UK more 
restrictive than in the US. 
From the bidder’s perspective, its position is less restrictive, because it is possible to by-
pass the incumbent board to directly approach the target shareholders without 
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encountering the strong defence, as happens in the US. However, the MBR introduced by 
the City Code to diminish discriminatory treatment of target shareholders, restricts the 
bidder who holds over 30% of the target shareholding to launch a general bid to all the 
remaining target shareholders. 
The takeover regulation in the UK is therefore justified as not favouring the target board 
of directors or bidders, but protecting the interests of shareholders. As Moon has stressed, 
the City Code ‘comes down firmly on the shareholders’ side and will impinge on the 
freedom of boards and persons involved in takeovers and mergers’. 401  In seeking 
shareholder primacy, both target board and bidder have been restricted and, as a result, 
the power balance between these two parties has been successfully achieved. 
It can be concluded that a functional counterbalance of the effects between MBR and 
NFR can be found in the UK regime. The MBR has been argued to substantially raise the 
costs for a potential bidder as it forces the bidder to acquire more shares than he needs to 
gain control of the target company. This rule may stop certain desired purchases, as the 
potential purchaser may not have sufficient funds to offer for the whole company. The 
MBR, therefore, may be doing a favour to the target board to some extent, because it 
makes takeovers more costly and becomes a takeover defence from the target board’s 
point of view. However, these advantages are offset by the NFR as it restricts the power 
of the target board to employ any action frustrating the bid.402 The defensive tactics used 
by the target board normally substantially raise the costs for the bidder as they make the 
bid less likely to succeed. It is therefore argued that the NFR stipulated by the City Code 
potentially keeps the cost of a bid controllable for a potential bidder.403 Under the system 
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in the UK, with both MBR and NFR, there is a power balance between target board and 
bidder in the counterbalance between the high costs for a bidder caused by the MBR on 
the one hand and the strict NFR for the target board on the other. As Magnuson has 
observed, these rules together have substantially restricted both bidder and target board’s 
actions during takeover battles.404 
Figure 4-1 Situation in the UK 
 
In contrast, the Williams Act, one of the most important pieces of securities legislation in 
US takeover law, is primarily a disclosure statute, passed by Congress because of concern 
that tender offers were not governed by the disclosure requirements of the federal 
securities law. It was directed at the activities of companies seeking to pursue hostile 
deals, with the purpose of protecting target shareholders from secret and coercive 
takeovers. It is limited solely to governing tender offer procedures, for example by 
requiring bids to remain open for a certain length of time, and by respective information 
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disclosures from both the target board and the bidder regulating the content and timing of 
communications to the target shareholders. However, unlike the UK’s City Code which is 
concerned with ensuring fairness for shareholders across the entire takeover transaction 
by setting forth much stricter limitations on the substantive content and nature of the 
takeover bid, it does not directly address matters concerning the substantive fairness of 
corporate takeovers or defensive tactics.405 The Williams Act differs from the City Code 
in its silence about the target board’s role in takeover defences when facing a hostile 
takeover.  
Certain substantive provisions of the Williams Act reduce elements of coercion that 
disadvantage shareholders in tender offers, by banning first-come first-served offers and 
requiring the target shareholders to be treated equally. However, it should be kept in mind 
that partial and two-tier tender offers exist as legitimate takeover measures in the US, as 
do other sophisticated defensive measures and state anti-takeover laws.406 The bidder is 
allowed to launch two-tier offers for less than 100% of the target shares as long as 
accurate disclosure is made by the bidder. As Gaugh has argued, although the passing of 
the Williams Act initially slowed the growth of the takeover movement, hostile bidders 
have tried different ways to ‘thwart the requirements of the Williams Act’ and to regain 
the advantage.407   
In a two-tier bid, the bidders launch a hostile tender offer for the part of the outstanding 
target shares which is necessary to give them majority control, with an above-market 
tender offer premium to shareholders who tender into this first tier, shortly thereafter 
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merging-out any remaining minority interest that had failed to tender at a lower price. The 
effect of the two-tier bid is to coerce shareholders into tendering at the first stage rather 
than run the risk of getting the lower merger-out price.408 The bidder tells target 
shareholders in advance of the prices at which shares will be purchased in the merge-out. 
Even if it offers the same price for the second-stage merger, this amount may only be 
received much later, possibly in the form of debt securities of uncertain worth, and 
without interest to cover the intervening period. 
As a result, a target shareholder cannot afford to reject the first-stage offer unless he 
believes that a large enough number of other shareholders will do so to defeat the offer. 
However, as Coffee has stated, ‘[t]he heart of the dilemma is that, because no shareholder 
can rely on what other shareholders will do, they cannot coordinate their actions in order 
to reject the unsatisfactory offer and negotiate for a higher price’.409 Bebchuk called this 
situation the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’.410 A shareholder who would reject the offer, as he 
believes it is inadequate, has no means to communicate with and bind other shareholders. 
If he chooses to hold out, he will be in a worse position if the second-step merger is at a 
lower price after other shareholders have tendered and the tender offer was successful. 
Hence, in a setting where they would be better off from not tendering, it is very unlikely 
that shareholders who cannot coordinate with other shareholders will reject to tender.411 
As Baumol stated: 
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The individual investor, knowing that all can gain by the simultaneous exercise of 
rationality will no more be moved by this consideration than will the small farmer 
who knows that if he and every other farmer independently cuts his output by fifty 
percent, all of them will gain. Each, on rational grounds, will be motivated to 
behave in an “irrational” manner because he knows that others will, for the same 
reason, have rational ground to do so as well.412 
Taking poison pills, for example, was invented in the 1980s as a solution to tackle the 
emergence of the two-tier tender offer used by the bidders to coerce shareholders into 
tendering their shares at unfair prices. In the case of Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court 
upheld poison pills on the grounds that they can protect the target shareholders against a 
two-tier coercive offer by assuring that shareholders on the back-end of a tender offer are 
adequately compensated.413 Indeed, as Forstinger has observed, the continuing legality of 
coercive takeovers in the US provides a strong justification for increasing the adoption of 
defensive tactics by the target board.414 It can be seen from the waves of hostile takeovers 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s that numerous states started to permit more and more 
defensive tactics, as the threat to incumbent management from hostile takeovers became 
greater and greater. Courts have also increasingly expanded the number of cases under 
which target boards can use defensive tactics to impede a hostile bid. It is argued that the 
evolution of the law in Delaware on the use of defensive tactics is a reflection of this 
trend and has been followed by other states in the US.415 
Therefore, as Subramanian pointed out, although the US law does not prohibit coercive 
tender offers such as two-tier tender offers, the problem of compelling shareholders to 
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tender even if they do not want to do so has been resolved by providing the target board 
with the power to employ defensive measures against these coercive offers.416 In the US, 
it is the target board that has the power to decide whether a tender offer poses a threat to 
shareholders and, if so, what takeover defences can reasonably be used in relation to the 
threat posed, according to the enhanced business judgement rule. As Magnuson has 
argued, the US takeover regulation ‘has given a substantial amount of freedom to both 
acquiring and target corporations’.417 Simply, the bidders can make an offer to acquire 
any number of shares in the target company, and the target board can employ takeover 
defence against the offer which the bidder has sent directly to the shareholders.  
Moreover, empowering directors to a greater extent than in the UK has been regarded as 
‘a fence to shelter target minority shareholders against undesirable extraction of private 
benefits by the controllers’. 418 It could be argued that the MBR is not as necessary in the 
US as in the UK. The shareholders’ coordination problems can be solved by the target 
board’s ability to frustrate the takeover bid. In conclusion, the balance between target 
board and bidder has been equally well achieved in the US because both target board and 
bidder have been given a free hand to fight in the takeover battle. 
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Figure 4-2 Situation in the US 
 
5. Evaluation of the Different Approaches 
Recent theoretical debates in corporate governance have seen a sustained challenge to 
both UK and US takeover regulations.  
5.1 Theoretical Debates 
Some scholars have argued that the current regulation of takeovers in the US, where 
states have the power to restrict hostile takeovers through anti-takeover laws, fails to 
adequately protect target shareholders, as it does not assume that all shareholders should 
benefit equally from the corporate control transactions. Bebchuk and Ferrell have argued 
that the evolution of state takeover regulation does not take into account what 
shareholders themselves wanted, and therefore leaves them with little choice in the 
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matter.419 Some further criticise that empowering boards of directors to resist offers in the 
US is not only self-serving for the board at the cost of shareholders’ interests, but also 
inefficient for the economy as a whole.420 If shareholders do not want the defences 
adopted by the board, the only thing they can do is to remove the directors from their 
positions by running a proxy fight. As Klausner and Daines have found, not many US 
companies give their shareholders the ability to call a special meeting or to act by written 
consent.421 As a result, they have to wait until the shareholders’ meeting to exercise their 
voting rights. Moreover, the difficulty of widespread public shareholders taking collective 
action makes it even harder for unsatisfied shareholders to remove the defences adopted 
by the board. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Delaware cases in the 1990s engaged in a ‘pull-you game’ 
of scrutinising directors’ actions when they face a takeover bid.422 It can be argued that 
‘the dilution of restrictions’ on self-interested target boards by Delaware’s courts and 
legislature have resulted in failure to adequately protect shareholders.423 In other words, 
these cases might reveal a difficulty in developing clear rules to strike a balance between 
‘protecting against management’s self-interest’ and ‘allowing legitimate strategic 
management decision making’.424 US courts and commentators seem to struggle over the 
tension between a board’s ability to manage and control the company and the 
shareholders’ power to tender their own shares. They generally regard the UK City Code 
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as a very favourable takeover system because it ensures that shareholders, not directors, 
retain the right to decide on the success or failure of a takeover bid.425   
On the other hand, the UK system is not immune to criticism. For instance, Johnston has 
pointed out that the absolute prohibition on defensive tactics by the target board has had a 
‘deleterious effect, from an economic perspective, on companies’ relationships with key 
stakeholders, and their employees in particular’.426 Under the City Code, there is little 
consideration of employee interests, which may be adversely affected by takeovers.427 
Unlike in the US system, the board is permitted to take account of a range of interests, 
except for its effect on shareholder interests. In the meantime, there is an argument that 
the existence of the NFR, which leaves the shareholders’ meeting to decide on whether a 
takeover should proceed, raises another important agency problem, which is between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.428 Moreover, as Fischel has stated, 
the purpose of protecting shareholders under the UK regime often has a detrimental effect 
on the likelihood of takeovers.429 It is argued that the MBR’s requirement for the bidder 
to make a general offer may reduce his gains from acquiring the target company and 
therefore lessen his incentive to launch a bid at the first place.  
It should be borne in mind that the above arguments for or against the UK and US 
approaches do not imply a completely negative judgement on either takeover regulation. 
It is also true that, no matter how different the takeover approaches are in the UK and US, 
both systems of regulation have been accepted and work well in the respective countries. 
Among numerous rules in the takeover regulations, many are universal but some are still 
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controversial. Emerging from this comparison of the UK and US regimes are two 
controversial rules which distinguish the respective takeover regulations. In the following 
section, the effect of these two rules is analysed, in order to understand how well their 
respective takeover regimes work in the UK and US.  
5.2 Effect of Two Takeover Rules 
It is widely acknowledged that the UK and US have adopted different approaches to 
hostile takeovers. They are these two rules, MBR and NFR, which clearly expose the 
divergence between the two systems. These two rules are considered as innovations of the 
City Code in the UK, adopted by the European Union in its Takeover Directive. They 
apply to control transactions attempting to address conflicts of interest between the target 
board and shareholders and between the bidder and target shareholders, resulting from the 
effect of the allocation of decision making on the success or failure of the takeover offer, 
and the protection of minority target shareholders against opportunism by the bidder or 
the controlling shareholders.  
In particular, the NFR is intended to limit the use of takeover defences by the target board 
and constrain opportunistic behaviour. A prohibition on the target board’s use of takeover 
defences without the approval of the target shareholders makes takeover defence less 
likely to happen, with the effect of raising the number of hostile takeovers. A MBR 
provides the target minority shareholders with extra protection and the right to exit the 
company at a fair price. It is argued that providing exit opportunities for minority 
shareholders allocates more takeover surplus from the bidder to the target shareholders 
and hence reduces the number of hostile takeovers because bidders have less incentive to 
make a bid to acquire a poorly performing company and replace its inefficient 
management.  
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Therefore, the regulatory choices of these two rules have opposite effect on the efficiency 
of the market for corporate control. If a takeover regulation that focuses on the conflict of 
interest between target board and shareholders adopts NFR to restrict managerial 
decision-making power with respect to the use of takeover defence without shareholder 
approval, it will improve shareholder protection as it forces directors to satisfy the 
interests of the shareholders and also promote corporate control by making the takeovers 
more likely to happen.430 If a takeover regulation that responds to the conflict of interest 
between bidder and target shareholders introduces MBR and provides exit opportunities 
for minority shareholders by requiring a bidder to purchase the remaining shares in the 
target, then the protection of shareholders, in particular, minority shareholders, is 
similarly enhanced. However, an efficient market for corporate control is discouraged as 
the private gains to a bidder, which are often an incentive for a takeover bid, are reduced.  
However, in looking at the regulatory effect on the takeover market of adopting both or 
neither of these two rules, the conclusion can be different. As was found above, the UK 
adopts both two rules in order to provide extensive protection to shareholders by 
restricting the interests of both the bidder and the target board. The bidders are required to 
share the control premium with the minority shareholders and hence raise the cost of 
launching a bid. This rule therefore has a chilling effect on the takeover market. The 
target board is prevented from employing takeover defences against the takeover bid and 
obstacles from the target board are removed for the bidder. Hence, the impact on the 
takeover market of these two rules is offset.  
On the other hand, the US imposes neither of these two rules, giving both bidder and 
target board room to manoeuvre. From the bidder’s perspective, it is allowed to pay a 
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premium above the market price for control and launch a much less favourable term in 
the subsequent offer. Although this system mitigates the shareholders’ free-riding 
problem in a tender offer and hence stimulates the takeover market, it also forces 
shareholders to tender even if they believe the bid is inadequate. To solve this problem, 
the target board is given the discretion to resist the unwanted tender offer (including the 
coercive offer) by freely employing takeover defences.431 Without doubt, resistance from 
the target board will reduce the likelihood of a bidder’s success. Hence, it can also be 
argued that the impact of absence of these two rules on the takeover market is offset.  
Table 4-1 Effect of NFR and MBR 
Choice of 
Takeover Rules 
Effect on Market for 
Corporate Control 
Effect on Protections of Target Shareholders  
Only NFR Promoted Shareholders have the right to decide 
whether to accept the tender offer 
Only MBR Discouraged Shareholders have the right to share the 
premium and to exit the company 
NFR and MBR Balanced Shareholder protection is strengthened  
Neither NFR 
nor MBR 
Balanced Shareholders are coerced to tender but the 
coercion is reduced by the takeover defences 
It is widely accepted that the market for corporate control functions well in both the UK 
and the US. The effects of a combination of NFR and MBR as well as the absence of 
these two rules seem to balance their positive and negative impacts on the takeover 
market and achieve a similar level of corporate control. As Ventoruzzo has pointed out, 
although the UK and US have adopted different provisions and underlying philosophies 
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in their respective takeover regulation, when measured in terms of their economic effect, 
these two regimes are closer than at first appears and may have the same function of 
facilitating the market for corporate control and protecting minority shareholders.432
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Chapter 5 Takeover Regime in China 
1. Institutional Background  
The concept of corporate governance gained official attention in China only in the late 
1990s. The improvement of corporate governance has now become a priority of the 
Chinese government and an important issue in Chinese enterprise reform. It is widely 
acknowledged that there are two different corporate governance systems around the world: 
the market-based governance model, which is popular in the UK and US, and the control-
based model common in continental Europe. The market-based model has dispersed 
ownership, independent boards, transparent disclosures and active takeover markets. 
Conversely, concentrated ownership structures, management-friendly boards, inadequate 
disclosures and inactive takeover markets are found in the control-based model. 
Corporate governance in China can best be described as following the control-based 
model, in which the controlling shareholders have strong control over companies through 
a concentrated ownership structure.433 
In the past, there has been little opportunity for the development of a market for corporate 
control in China, because of the highly concentrated corporate ownership and the non-
tradeable nature of state shares of most companies listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. 
By acknowledging the disciplinary function of hostile takeovers, the Chinese government 
has been expecting takeovers to play an important role in promoting good corporate 
governance in Chinese listed companies.434 Therefore, substantial efforts have been 
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devoted to transforming Chinese state-owned enterprises and the ownership structure of 
Chinese listed companies in the process of opening up China’s markets. As Voβ and Xia 
have suggested, the development of corporate governance in China cannot be separated 
from the country’s economic reforms.435 This transformation has led to the development 
of a takeover market in China, which is regarded as an important external mechanism of 
corporate governance. Hence, no discussion of the takeover regime in China can be 
undertaken without understanding the background of this institutional transformation and 
its influence on corporate governance in China. 
1.1 Transformation of State-Owned Enterprises  
In 1978 the Chinese government adopted an Economic Reform Policy with the goal of 
transforming the planned economy into a market economy by introducing market 
mechanisms into Chinese enterprises. Before this time, Chinese enterprises were wholly 
owned by the state under the planned economy system, so called state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). SOEs were basically factories producing whatever the state instructed them to 
produce, regardless of market demand.436 Under such ownership arrangements, there was 
no existing corporate governance at all. The state was the sole investor and held all 
property ownership and managerial rights. Hence, political interference could distort and 
confuse the company’s goal of maximising its value. Managers were directly appointed 
by government authorities and had almost no decision-making power in business 
operations. More importantly, since there was no connection between production and 
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profitability, state ownership often induced a lack of managerial discipline and incentives 
to promote technological innovation, which resulted in low efficiency of SOEs.437  
The inefficiency of SOEs called for major changes in corporate governance and the 
introduction of modern managerial mechanisms. The Chinese government realised that it 
was inappropriate to act as a market player and a policy maker at the same time. In order 
to achieve greater economic efficiencies, it converted SOEs into partially privatised 
organisations, retaining only strategic levels of control in certain enterprises, such as 
those involved with national defence and energy.438 In some sectors, the government 
gradually reduced its stake and encouraged domestic private capital to become involved; 
in some sectors, the government opened the market and encouraged international leaders 
in the field to consolidate the SOEs into large integrated conglomerates. As a result, the 
Chinese state-controlled system underwent a transformation into one with a mixture of 
state and private enterprises elements.  
Out of concern that the reforms might lead to the loss of state assets, and result in massive 
unemployment and social unrest, instead of adopting the Russian model represented by a 
radical privatisation of SOEs, a more cautious and gradual approach was preferred in 
implementing the reform measures in China. It is noted that SOE reform focused on 
conferring greater autonomy on the management of SOEs and subjecting them to 
contractual market incentives and discipline.439 The goal of reform was to make SOEs 
responsible for their own gains and losses in the market. It was said, ‘SOEs should 
become legal persons that enjoy full management authority and full responsibility for 
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their own profits and losses’. 440  In October 1984, for the first time the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) publicly announced the ownership of collective enterprises and 
explicitly ordered the separation of government intervention and enterprise management.  
In the 9th Five-year State Plan (1996-2000), the CCP famously announced that the 
strategic way to restructure the SOEs was to ‘grasp the large and let the small go’. And in 
the 15th National Congress of CCP in 1997, it was formally recognised that private 
ownership was an important part of the Chinese socialist market economy, although the 
state was still to keep control of key and strategic sectors, including national security, 
monopolies, industries providing important public goods and services, and high and new 
technology industries. It was expected that SOEs would gradually be privatised in other 
sectors. In 1999, the Chinese government facilitated private ownership on the stock 
market by stipulating that while the state still maintained control, large and medium-sized 
SOEs could diversify their ownership structure and be transformed into joint-stock 
companies, with only a few SOEs remaining wholly state-owned. Non-state controlled 
enterprises were encouraged to participate in the process of reorganising, reforming and 
rebuilding SOEs by taking over controlling shares. 
The government’s continuing efforts to establish a modern enterprise system have led to 
the privatisation of small SOEs and the corporatisation of large SOEs which were 
subsequently publicly listed. It should be made clear that the enterprise corporatisation 
reform underwent a two-stage process. The enterprises were first incorporated into joint-
stock companies, and then listed on the stock markets. This reform was intended to 
separate the state from business management and to allow enterprises to achieve full 
autonomy; the new shareholders were given the power to monitor management, which 
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encouraged managers to perform well.441 The state and its agencies gradually reduced 
their stock participation in the capital market in order to optimise the operational 
efficiency of the listed SOEs. The SOEs were expected to be more efficient, with 
management being monitored by an effective board selected for professional expertise 
rather than through government appointment.442 
Following the incorporation process, the Chinese government established two national 
stock exchanges, namely the Shanghai Stock Exchange in December 1990 and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in December 1991, in order to raise funds for Chinese 
enterprises and improve corporate governance.443 As Yu has argued, the establishment of 
the stock exchanges in China was closely related to the transformation of the SOEs and 
mainly designed to improve the performance of inefficient SOEs through public listing.444 
By issuing shares to the public through the stock exchanges, listed SOEs would be 
disciplined by the securities markets into complying with the listing rules of the stock 
exchanges.445 More importantly, the external shareholders would play a positive role in 
monitoring the operation of the enterprises.  
The development of a securities market in China inevitably led to the establishment of a 
new force to regulate corporate activities and promote good corporate governance. A 
centralised stock market regulatory body, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), was created in 1992 as the major regulator of listed companies as well as of the 
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securities market. The CSRC is a ministry-level securities regulatory authority under the 
direct control of the State Council. It was not until 2001 that it was finally given sole 
responsibility for managing the stock exchanges.446 It is responsible for carrying out 
supervision and administration of the securities market and producing regulations relating 
to the issuance and trade of securities and the operation of the stock exchanges. It has 
jurisdiction and exclusive power of dispute resolution with respect to the takeover of 
listed companies. 
1.2 Transformation of Shareholding Structure  
The Chinese government made it clear that corporatisation must not challenge the 
dominance of state-owned companies. The state retains ultimate control of the partially 
privatised SOEs, to maintain an orderly and gradual process of privatisation that will not 
overwhelm the stock market. When a SOE is listed on a stock market, only a small 
proportion of its shares are sold to private investors in the Initial Public Offerings (IPO) 
process. Thus, although the listed companies have nominal autonomy, the state still 
controls the voting rights because of the peculiar structure of listed companies (owning 
non-tradeable shares comprising the majority of the share capital).447 This structure 
evolved when the state decided to make some SOEs public but to retain control. 
According to Clarke, with this structure, a large number of corporatised SOEs remain 
dominated by a single state shareholder that exercises control either through normal 
channels such as shareholder voting, or through traditional channels such as appointment 
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of key personnel. 448  Therefore, highly concentrated state ownership has become a 
distinctive feature of Chinese listed companies. 
1.2.1 Unique Shareholding Structure  
In addition to general classifications of common and preferred shares, which conform to 
Western standards, Chinese listed companies have multiple classes of shares which are 
distinguished by their ownership, the nationality of their shareholders and the location of 
the listing. According to Faccio and Lang, split-share structures are common around the 
world and typically offer different rights to the shareholders.449 However, the existence of 
non-tradeable shares seems to be peculiar to China and remains the most distinctive 
feature of its ownership structure.450 This study will focus on the regulations with respect 
to transactions in A shares, which are all tradeable now and can be subject to a tender 
offer; however, a full picture of the special arrangements in the shareholding structure of 
Chinese listed companies is presented first. 
A shares and B shares 
Depending on the nationality of eligible traders and the currency in which the shares are 
traded, there is a traditional division into two classes, namely A shares and B shares.451 A 
shares are denominated and traded in Chinese currency (known as the reminbi or RMB) 
and are limited to Chinese mainland investors, whilst B shares are designed for foreign 
investors including those from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. B shares carry the same 
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voting and other relevant rights as A shares. B shares are traded in foreign currency (US 
dollars for those listed in Shanghai, or Hong Kong dollars for those listed in Shenzhen) 
according to the exchange rates at the time of the transaction, but the principal and 
dividends are denominated in RMB.452 However, it has been suggested that the impact of 
B shares on the market is limited as they account for only a small proportion of the 
market in terms of market capitalisation and trading volume, due to lack of interest from 
the market participants and of the low quality of many companies.453 By February 2010, 
only 57 B shares were listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the same number on 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.454 As Art and Gu have pointed out, the prices of A and B 
shares for the same listed company can differ, sometimes to a great extent.455 A shares are 
generally traded at higher prices than B shares.  
The distinction between A and B shares was introduced largely because of the incomplete 
convertibility of RMB and the government’s restricted foreign currency policy. 456 
Following the economic reforms, the government has gradually tried to blur the 
distinction between them. In February 2001, B shares were opened to domestic investors 
to trade with legally-obtained foreign currency, and in December 2002 A shares became 
available to foreigners as Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII).457 Since then, 
the A shares and B shares markets have begun to merge, and once the RMB is fully 
convertible the distinction between A shares and B shares should disappear altogether.  
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Tradeable shares and non-tradeable shares 
More relevant to this research and the complex classification of shares in China is the 
distinction between tradeable and non-tradeable shares. A shares have been further 
divided into three sub-sets defined according to the type of shareholder: state shares, legal 
person shares and public individual shares. Only public individual shares may be freely 
traded on the stock market, as so-called tradeable shares. The non-tradeable shares are 
state shares and legal person shares, which are subject to severe trading restrictions and 
can only be transferred privately to other government agencies, legal entities or foreign 
investment companies, subject to state approval but not by tender offer. Non-tradeable 
shareholders enjoy the same cash flow rights and voting rights as holders of public 
individual shares except for the restriction on public trading. There is an implicit 
understanding between the state and investors that non-tradeable shares will never be 
traded in the stock market, in order to prevent any attempt to complete the privatisation 
process.458  
State shares are issued to and held by government agencies such as the State-Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), or organisations 
authorised to represent the state in making investments by using state-owned assets and 
equity interest. On the other hand, legal person shares are owned by state-controlled legal 
persons such as state-controlled enterprises with at least one non-state shareholder, or 
domestic institutions ranging from investment banks to non-banking financial institutions. 
Although these legal entities have a mixed ownership structure with both private and state 
stakes, they are usually indirectly controlled by central or local government. Hence, these 
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Tradable Share Reform in China’ (2011) ECB Working Paper No. 1339 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1837318> accessed 
11 December 2011, 11. 
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non-tradeable state shares and legal person shares are ultimately concentrated in the hands 
of the government, amounting at their peak to about two-thirds of the total shares 
outstanding in listed companies.459    
The existence of non-tradeable shares and their concentration in the hands of SOEs or 
other state-owned asset management agencies is a unique feature of Chinese stock 
exchanges. The company ownership structure in China was, by international standards, 
highly concentrated, and the largest shareholder usually had effective control over the 
firm; individual investors in tradeable shares only possessed a very small proportion of a 
company’s total issued shares.460 In the IPO process of SOEs, only a small proportion of 
equity is issued to private investors. In the listed SOEs, the state and parent SOEs still 
maintain sufficient shareholdings in the form of state shares or legal person shares.  
The rationale for the design of non-tradeable shares was to prevent state assets from 
falling into the hands of individuals and to avoid mishandling or reducing the value of 
state assets through depreciation or misappropriation.461 The government attempted to 
effectively control the transfer of state shares through the design of non-tradeable shares. 
As Wang has noted, the purpose of this distinction is to control the transferability of the 
different types of shares and maintain the government’s leading role in the economy.462 In 
addition, the prohibition on the free transfer of shares made it possible for the government 
to continue to influence management of the listed companies to achieve political and 
social goals that did not necessarily improve firms’ wealth.463  
                                                
459 Song and Meeks (n1) 6. 
460 Gongmeng Chen and others, ‘Control Transfers, Privatization, and Corporate Performance: Efficiency Gains in 
China’s Listed Companies’ (2008) 43 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 161, 176. 
461 Hehong Chen and others, Study on State-Owned Shares (China University of Political Science and Law Press 2000) 
324.  
462 Wang (n450) 15.  
463 Chen and Firth and Rui (n422) 89.  
Chapter 5 Takeover Regime in China 
July 2013 153 
1.2.2 Shareholding Structure Reform 
Although those non-tradeable shares provided the state or its representatives with 
effective control over listed companies and prevented uncontrolled sales of SOEs to the 
private sector, the Chinese government soon recognised the problems caused by the 
existence of non-tradeable shares. According to Li, illiquidity of the shares became 
obvious in the eyes of most policy makers.464 The segmented nature of the shares of listed 
companies has had a significantly negative effect on the restructuring of SOEs as well as 
on the market for corporate control. It not only reduced the liquidity of the stock market 
but also reduced the efficiency of SOEs.  
In theory, the owner of the SOEs was the government or the so-called ‘people as a whole’. 
However, the owner in practice was a central or local government organisation. As a 
collective body, the state played a less effective role as a majority shareholder than it 
should have done. The motivation of management remained political considerations or 
the private benefit of government officials rather than shareholder value. A further 
problem was enforcement against the improper conduct of managers, resulting from the 
state’s dual role of both regulator and controlling shareholder of many listed firms. In 
particular, a senior company manager might rank higher in the government than an 
official of the market regulatory body.465 
This unique divided share structure led to intensive conflict between tradeable and non-
tradeable shareholders, and has been recognised as the cause of many corporate 
governance problems in China.466 On the one hand, according to Hou and Howell, the 
non-tradeable shareholders with dominant positions have had an indifferent attitude 
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towards share price movements, due to the impossibility of trading their shares and 
because they could treat themselves preferentially at the expense of other shareholders 
and employees.467 On the other hand, the tradeable shareholders have had limited power 
to affect management decisions with their minority shareholding. Therefore it was not 
surprising to find that most individual investors in tradeable shares tend to be free riders 
with few incentives to exercise their voting right or attend shareholders’ meeting.468  
It thus became obvious that the side effects of this shareholding structure were to damage 
the original purpose of maintaining an orderly enterprise reform. Ironically, they became 
an obstacle to fulfilling the government’s intention for the state to play a less important 
role in the management of SOEs and to improve SOEs’ corporate governance. It can be 
argued that the high percentage of non-tradeable shares on the market artificially distorted 
the functioning of the capital market and created inefficiency in corporate governance.469 
As economic and political reforms in China progressed, the government gradually 
realised that state shares could maintain their value and perhaps even appreciate through 
transfer on to an open market. Meanwhile, the government began to feel more confident 
about allowing state shares to be freely traded in the market, as the stock market seemed 
to be functioning healthily and playing a more important role in the Chinese economy.470 
Hence, a series of reforms were carried out, allowing the controlling shareholders to 
reduce their voting control by selling off shares to private investors.  
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A. State Share Holding Reduction: 2001-2002 
In June 2001, the State Share Holding Reduction (known as Guoyougu Jianchi) was 
launched and the Chinese government started to reduce the proportion of state ownership 
by making non-tradeable shares fully tradeable on the stock exchanges. However, the 
trading constraints on these non-tradeable shares were terminated without consulting the 
tradeable shareholders. This measure caused share prices to drop by more than 30%, as 
investors feared the increased supply of tradeable shares would flood the market and 
dilute the price of the original tradeable shares.471 Because of the strong adverse reaction 
from tradeable shareholders, the government suddenly suspended this process in October 
2002, after only four months. This first attempt to make non-tradeable shares freely 
tradeable on the Chinese stock exchanges was thus considered unsuccessful.472 These 
failures, associated with chronic governance problems and lack of confidence in the listed 
companies, arguably contributed to the four-year bear market in China, during which the 
market lost about half of its value from its peak in 2001. Taking the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange for example, the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (SSECI) plunged 
from its peak of about 2245 points on 14 June 2001 to a dangerously low level of 998 
points on 6 June 2005.473 
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B. Split Share Structure Reform: 2005-2006 
Reviewing its previous commitments to improving corporate governance of SOEs, in 
2005 the government renewed its effort to reform the shareholding structure. In April of 
that year, the CRSC introduced a new shareholding structure called the Split Share 
Structure Reform (known as Guquan Fenzhi Gaige) to convert the state and legal person 
shares into tradeable shares through a new plan entitled ‘Notice of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission on the Pilot Shareholding Structure Reform of Listed 
Companies’, promulgated on 29th April 2005.  
Two official documents were issued to govern the operational procedures of the reform. 
On 23 August 2005, the CSRC, the SASAC, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the People’s 
Bank of China (PBC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) jointly issued an 
important document entitled ‘Guidance Notes on the Split Share Structure Reform of 
Listed Companies’ (Guiding Notes). This recognised that the then current shareholder 
structure had posed a huge problem during China’s transition into a market economy, the 
different disposal of shares having distorted the pricing mechanism of the capital market 
and restricted the effective allocation of resources. Article 10 of the document made clear 
that there would be no such differentiation as that between tradeable and non-tradeable 
shares for new IPOs in the market. Ten days after the issuance of the Guiding Notes, the 
CRSC promulgated ‘Administrative Measures on the Split Share Structure Reform of 
Listed Companies’ (Administrative Measures 2005), which set forth in detail the 
requirements and implementation procedure of the reform.  
The process of the reform was gradual. After successful initial experiments on the first 
and second pilot batches of a small number of firms it had selected in May and June 2005, 
in August the CSRC publicly announced an extension of the process to all companies 
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traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and set the end of 2006 as the 
deadline for every individual listed company to complete the reform by a vote at a 
shareholders’ meeting. To facilitate the reform and stabilise the stock market, in January 
2006 the government enacted a new law to facilitate the acquisition of stakes in listed 
companies by foreign investors. 474  It increased the scope for foreign investors to 
participate in the Chinese securities market and in the running of listed companies, not 
only by stipulating that the purchase of A shares was available to a small group of 
qualified investors (QFII) but also by extending this to all strategic investors who were 
willing to buy a minimum stake of 10% of the company and hold the shares for more than 
three years. 
Taking previous failures to heart, the new reform adopted a market-based approach rather 
a government-imposed measure. It decentralised decision making at the company level by 
allowing tradeable shareholders to freely bargain with non-tradeable shareholders over 
the method and terms of compensation. The holders of non-tradeable shares were forced 
to pay compensation to holders of tradeable shares in exchange for the possibility of 
freely trading their shares in the future. As Quan and Hu have suggested, by turning the 
non-tradeable shares into tradeable shares, a new and valuable trading privilege was 
conferred on the non-tradeable shareholders because their shares were purchased at a 
discount price and then became tradeable.475 Tradeable shareholders might lose in the 
short term because the extra supply of tradeable shares in the market might lead to a steep 
decline in the market price.476 Therefore, the non-tradeable shareholders needed to give 
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consideration to the tradeable shareholders, in exchange for the right to sell their shares in 
the future. 
The compensation plan was to be discussed during the period of trading suspension 
mutually agreed by the tradeable and non-tradeable shareholders.477 The trading in shares 
would restart once the plan was publicly announced. 478  After its announcement, 
shareholders’ meetings could be called at which the compensation plan had to be 
approved by a majority of two-thirds of the tradeable shareholders.479 Share trading was 
also suspended between the announcement of the shareholders’ meeting and the final 
vote.480 Trading would restart once the compensation was paid out after the final vote.481 
If the proposed compensation plan was not approved by the shareholders’ meeting, the 
non-tradeable shareholders had to propose a new plan and negotiate with the tradeable 
shareholders again.482 The compensation plans took various forms such as cash, warrants 
and stock splits, in most cases involving the non-tradeable shareholders giving shares to 
the tradeable shareholders.  
Moreover, a suspension of trading for a 12-month lock-up period for the non-tradeable 
shareholders was imposed to prevent a potentially dramatic stock price fluctuation caused 
by the sudden massive supply of shares on the market.483 It is argued that this 12-month 
lock-up period set up for the non-tradeable shareholders was a key feature of the 2005 
reform; it alleviated concern among public investors about dilution effect from the 
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conversion of the non-tradeable shares into tradeable shares.484 Furthermore, a holder of 
non-tradeable shares with more than 5% of the total shares of the listed company was 
further prohibited from trading on the stock exchange market more than 5% of the 
company’s total shares over 12 months (more than 10% over 24 months) after the expiry 
of the lock-up period.485 As a result, after the compensation had been paid, all trading 
constraints would be in force for three years. 
Unlike the market reaction to the State Share Holding Reduction in 2001, the Split Share 
Structure Reform of 2005 proceeded successfully, with positive reaction from the market. 
By the end of the announced deadline in 2006, the reform had largely been implemented, 
with the vast majority of non-tradeable shares being converted into tradeable shares. As a 
result of the reform, the Chinese stock market assumed a different landscape. In 1992, 
tradeable shares accounted for 30.75% of all the shares in terms of volume. By the end of 
2007, 1,254 firms, whose total market value accounted for over 97% of China’s stock 
market capitalisation, had implemented the reform, and by the end of the following year 
only 31 out of more than 1,500 listed companies remained to do so. 486 Eventually, all the 
non-tradeable shares were set free from the suspension of trading and obtained full 
liquidity in the market. 
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Figure 5-1 Shareholding Structure in China from 1992-2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on the data collected from official websites of Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges  
1.2.3 Impact on Takeover Market in China 
Before the shareholding structure reform, the distinction between tradeable and non-
tradeable shares meant that the former could be acquired by tender offer, whereas the 
latter could only be purchased by agreement. Since Chinese listed companies were under 
highly concentrated ownership at that time, in order to successfully gain control of a 
listed company, it was normal to purchase the non-tradeable shares by private agreement 
in a friendly manner. The acquirer negotiated with the controlling shareholder and entered 
into a share transfer agreement with that shareholder to purchase the non-tradeable shares, 
so as to gain a sufficient percentage of shares in the target listed company. There are three 
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reasons that explain why this method became the primary technique to gain control of a 
listed company. 
First, under the split share structure, about two-thirds of the Chinese stock market at its 
peak was composed of non-tradeable shares. It can be seen from Figure 5-1 that non-
tradeable shares comprised nearly 62% of all firms’ outstanding shares in 2005. Moreover, 
as one survey found out, in 88% of all listed companies non-tradeable shares accounted 
for at least 50% of their outstanding shares in the same year.487 It was virtually impossible 
to take over a company without purchasing some of those non-tradeable shares. Second, it 
was preferable for a purchaser to obtain a controlling block of non-tradeable shares, for 
security and in order to save time, even though the purchase of non-tradeable shares 
required governmental approval. Third, as mentioned above, the price of non-tradeable 
shares was inherently much lower than that of tradeable shares in the same company, 
because of the segregated equity structure. The non-tradeable shares could be transferred 
at prices linked to the book value, which was typically lower that the market value. In 
China, even a poorly performing company might have an unusually high share price by 
Western standards,488 so a buyer could obtain a controlling status by dealing more 
cheaply from the state owner than by open-market purchase.  
Consequently, as Cha has observed, it was not surprising to find that there was a very 
limited number of takeovers, particularly hostile takeovers, by offer in China before the 
split share structure reform.489 The first hostile takeover by open-market purchase took 
place in 1993 when Shenzhen Baoan Group, a legal person company listed on the 
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Shenzhen Stock Exchange, secretly acquired the publicly traded shares of Shanghai 
YanZhong Industry Co Ltd, a listed company on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
secured a holding of 17.07% when combined with the stakes held by two affiliated 
companies, Baoan Huayuang and Shenzhen Ronggang. Although Shanghai YanZhong 
protested against this takeover, it was held valid by the CSRC confirming that the 
takeover was a market behaviour. But Shenzhen Baoan Group was fined because of the 
breach of takeover disclosure rules and would only be allowed to complete its acquisition 
after a certain period of time. 490  There was no occurrence of takeovers of listed 
companies by an offer in the period 1997-2002. In 2003, the first takeover by offer was 
published by Nanjing Iron & Steel Co Ltd, a Nanjing-based iron and steel maker, to 
acquire 29.05% of outstanding shares in Nanjing Iron & Steel Joint Stock Co Ltd, which 
was listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. This first tender offer stirred up China’s 
securities market and initiated a brand new involvement option for the takeover 
participants.  
After the 2005 shareholding structure reform, it was expected that this situation would 
change. At least in theory, takeovers by offer would become a more feasible investment 
option than in the previous situation. Once the former non-tradeable shares had eventually 
been turned into shares tradeable on the open market, the problem of the segregated 
equity structure and the different prices for different shares would disappear. When all 
non-tradeable shares could be freely traded on the stock exchanges on expiry of the 
statutory lock-up periods, it was argued that the pace of the ongoing SOEs reform would 
accelerate.491 The scope of the capital markets would expand to develop a widely 
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dispersed pattern of share ownership,492 and takeover activities would pick up, improving 
the overall efficiency of the Chinese economy.493 
However, it should be borne in mind that the official objective of the shareholding 
structure reform was to eliminate non-tradeable shares and facilitate a long-term stable 
stock exchanges. The reform aimed at solving the technical problem regarding the future 
listing and trading of non-tradeable shares, rather than reducing state ownership. There 
was no suggestion that the state would raise funds by trading state shares on the capital 
market. This echoes what Chairman Shang of the CSRC said in June 2005: ‘Making all 
shares tradeable does not mean selling out all shares’.494 Any transfer of the state’s shares 
in listed companies are subject to decisions by the SASAC.495 The Securities Law also 
provides that when the takeover of a listed company involves shares held by an 
investment organisation of the state, the matter shall be subject to approval by the 
relevant department in charge in accordance with the regulations of the State Council.496 
As Mattlin has argued, Chinese government still retains tight control of its shares in 
Chinese listed companies.497 
1.3 Concentrated Ownership of Chinese Listed Companies 
Indeed, in China, the number of companies which have a controlling shareholder is very 
high, and on average the controlling shareholder holds a high percentage of the 
outstanding voting shares. As has Zhang argues, the concentration of ownership of 
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Chinese listed companies can be regarded as particularly high when compared with the 
widely dispersed ownership of the UK and US, where a proactive market of corporate 
control continues to function well.498 The topic of concentrated ownership in China has 
attracted enormous attention, and it is undeniable that many criticisms have been made of 
this ownership structure. However, it should be kept in mind that any discussion of the 
corporate ownership structure in a particular country should be based on careful 
consideration of its evolution and its goals for the future. 
According to statistical data provided by empirical researchers, both capital structure and 
corporate ownership in listed companies have undergone significant changes following 
the Chinese economic reforms of the last 30 years. As shown in the study by Liu et al, the 
largest shareholder ownership declined from approximately 45% in 2000, to 40% in 2005 
and about 36% in 2010.499 In the statistics collected from the CSMAR database, shown in 
Table 5-1, the declining trend in the largest and second largest shareholder ownership 
from 2004 to 2012 is clearly visible.500 Moreover, Figure 5-2 shows that the average gap 
between the first and second largest shareholders decreased from about 32% in 2004 to 
26% in 2012. However, there was very little change in the overall percentage of largest 
and second largest shareholdings from 2006 to 2012. The single largest shareholder 
averaged 36% of shares in all listed companies, while the second largest typically owns 
around 9% of shares. 
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Table 5-1 The Largest and Second Largest Shareholder Ownership from 2004-2012 
Year Largest Shareholder  Second Largest Shareholder  
2004 41.99% 9.74% 
2005 40.47% 9.80% 
2006 36.27% 9.19% 
2007 35.86% 8.88% 
2008 36.09% 8.65% 
2009 36.16% 8.62% 
2010 36.18% 9.20% 
2011 35.71% 9.50% 
2012 36.54% 9.64% 
            Source: Calculations based on CSMAR Database.  
Figure 5-2 The Difference between the Largest and Second Largest Shareholders  
from 2004-2012 
 
Source: CSMAR Database 
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According to data collected by Deng from 1,571 Chinese listed companies in 2008, 
20.8% of the sample companies reported their largest shareholder as having more than 
50% shareholding, 64.9% as from 20% to 50%, and 14.3% as less than 20%.501 In 2002, 
Lin had undertaken a similar analysis on the ownership structure of 1,059 Chinese listed 
companies and found out that the three ratios were 40%, 52.6% and 7.4% respectively.502 
It can be seen that the number of listed companies with a controlling shareholder holding 
more than half of the shares dropped from 40% in 2002 to 20.8% in 2008; the figure for 
holdings of 20-50% showed an increase from 52.6% to 64.9%. Voβ and Xia undertook a 
similar comparison and found that the percentage of listed companies with the largest 
shareholder holding more than 50% shares significantly decreased from 33% in March 
2005 to 19% in Feb 2007.503 From these statistics, it is clear that there is a dramatic 
decline in the number of listed companies with a single shareholders having absolute 
control, although the number of companies with a controlling shareholder having actual 
control over the listed company is steadily growing.  
Based on these data, it can be argued that the ownership structure of Chinese listed 
companies has become wider. As mentioned previously, in accordance with 
Administrative Measures 2005, non-tradeable shareholders were required to pay 
compensation to tradeable shareholders in exchange for converting their shares into 
tradeable ones. It was observed that the majority of non-tradeable shareholders offered 
free bonus shares as compensation.504 This issue of free bonus shares relatively reduced 
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the percentage ownership of controlling shareholders. In this respect, it can be argued that 
the split share structure reform contributed to this change. 
However, it cannot be denied that concentrated ownership remains at a relatively high 
level, as the state still accounts for a high percentage of ownership in most listed 
companies.505 According to Zhao, in China ‘listed company’ normally means listed SOE; 
and the largest shareholder normally refers to the state, which has controlling 
shareholdings in listed companies.506 As empirical studies have indicated, 81.6% of 
Chinese companies are directly or indirectly controlled by the state 507 and 80% of 
companies’ largest shareholder is the state.508  
Looking at two types of listed companies in China, state-owned and privately-held, the 
type with the state as a major or controlling shareholder has declined. In 2001, 82% of all 
companies were under the ultimate control of the state, but the figure dropped to 71% in 
2005, 60% in 2007 and 21% in 2010.509 However, it is not true that there has been a 
fundamental shift from state ownership to non-state private control. According to Allen 
and Shen, in June 2010, the largest ten SOEs accounted for 39.5% of the total market 
capitalization of Shanghai Stock Exchange. 510  Although the number of privately 
controlled companies has grown over recent years, SOEs still dominate the trading on the 
Chinese capital market.511 Regardless of the controlling shareholder’s nature, state-owner 
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or not, it is safe to conclude that although the largest shareholders’ holding and 
accordingly ownership concentration, has been in relative decline, the existence of a 
largest shareholder still dominates the Chinese listed companies, and concentrated 
corporate ownership has not changed significantly over the last few years.  
1.3.1 Path Dependent Theory 
The above facts imply that after all the outstanding non-tradeable shares were allowed to 
freely trade on the stock markets, the concentrated ownership of the listed company has 
been dispersed only to a slight degree.512 Controlling shareholders still retain their power, 
and the concentrated ownership structure is still a distinct feature of Chinese corporate 
governance.513 The controlling situation of the state in listed companies still persists. In 
order to explain why this is so, it is worth considering path dependence theory. In other 
words, as part of corporate governance within one nation’s economic and social system, 
the development of the ownership structure has its source in path dependence.  
According to Hathaway’s definition, path dependence means some phenomena are 
influenced in a specific way by historical events.514 Roe’s winding road theory is also a 
good way to explain what path dependence is: today’s road is determined by what path 
was taken in the past. The existence of today’s winding road, which diverges from the 
potential straight road, is influenced by the early fur trader’s decision to avoid the wolves’ 
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den.515 Similarly, the concentrated ownership structure in China is path dependent as a 
result of historical accidents and China’s economic and political reforms.  
As Bebchuk and Roe have argued, differences in ownership structure between different 
countries persist even if their economies have developed towards a similar form.516 They 
emphasise the direct effect of the initial ownership on the subsequent ownership 
structure.517 The Chinese government introduced market mechanisms to improve SOEs’ 
performance on the one hand, and retain substantial state ownership in the listed 
companies on the other.518 The SOEs have been given the opportunity of accessing 
external finance through being listed on the stock exchange, and thus have to accept 
market supervision and implement good corporate governance. However, the persistence 
of a high proportion of state ownership can be an obstacle to Chinese listed companies, 
that prevents them from operating as efficiently as expected.  
A dispersed shareholding structure has been adopted by more and more jurisdictions and 
functions well. With the integration of global financial markets, in the long term, 
concentrated corporate ownership should move towards dispersed ownership, by 
introducing a corporate governance strategy of dispersed control. However, it should be 
emphasised that this will be a naturally evolving process, and any sudden actions to 
change it will have detrimental effects.519 Despite the inefficiency caused by concentrated 
ownership, the structure might persist because of the current underdeveloped Chinese 
securities market and weak shareholder protection, which cannot afford an immediate 
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radical change. As Roe has argued, each path dependent ownership system has costs, and 
the costs of change might outweigh the benefits.520  
Bebchuk and Roe further suggested a concept of ‘rent seeking’, a source of path 
dependence, to explain why one country developed a certain ownership structure in the 
first place, eventually leading to an inefficient ownership structure. They have argued that 
those who have a controlling position in companies may exert pressure to enact a law to 
prevent changes which might improve corporate efficiency, but which would reduce the 
private benefits they receive through exercising their controlling power.521 That is, ‘rent-
protection’ consideration which enable controllers to extract large private benefits might 
lead to the persistence of concentrated ownership. 522  It can be argued that the 
development of a corporate governance structure is path dependent on the existing 
controlling parties who adopt rules to protect their private interests. 
As Liu has observed, in China almost every corporate governance practice is rooted more 
or less in rent-seeking incentives of a politician or a businessman connected to a 
politician.523 Although Chinese enterprise reform has attempted to diversify the SOEs 
ownership structure and improve efficiency, in most companies there is a single dominant 
shareholder whose controlling shareholding provides power and influence over the 
company’s operation. It is hard to separate business and politics.524 In China, nearly every 
aspect of corporate governance and the stock market is heavily regulated by the 
government authorities, from central to local levels. The state’s continuing control over 
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most aspects of the Chinese economy is path dependent and therefore leads corporate 
ownership along the path of concentration.525  
Since the late 1970s, the Chinese government has made enormous efforts to transform the 
economy from a centrally planned system to a more market-oriented one. Although a 
series of reforms were implemented to increase autonomy for SOEs, introduce private 
businesses and develop stock market, the state continues to be a dominant player in the 
Chinese economy.526 Wang has suggested that the concentrated ownership structure of 
state-controlled listed companies cannot be substantially dispersed, simply because the 
Chinese government is unlikely to give up control of these companies, at least in the short 
term.527 According to the path dependence theory, which suggests continuing systematic 
persistence, it is predicted that the concentration of the capital structure of the current 
Chinese equity market, which includes the state as a majority shareholder, is likely to 
continue for a long time.  
1.3.2 Impact on Takeover Market in China 
In accordance with China’s Securities Law, there are two methods of takeover of a listed 
company: takeover by offer (tender offer) and takeover by agreement.528 As described 
above, the tender offer is widely used in countries with dispersed ownership of listed 
companies, like the UK and US. However, this is not true of China, where firms with 
widely held shareholders are unusual. The majority of listed companies in China are still 
under the control of the state or quasi-state controlling shareholders. This has significant 
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implications for Chinese corporate governance in general, and for the takeovers market in 
particular. This pattern of ownership and control means that the main agency problem in 
Chinese corporate governance is not between target directors and shareholders, but 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
It is, therefore, nearly impossible for an acquirer to accumulate control through 
purchasing shares on any stock exchange. As Zhang has clearly pointed out, the almost 
total absence of takeover by offer results in the non-existence of an active hostile takeover 
market in China.529 To acquire a sufficient percentage of shareholding in a target listed 
company, the acquirer must instead negotiate the purchase plan with the controlling 
shareholder in the target company and enter into a share transfer agreement with that 
shareholder. Takeover by agreement is therefore still the preferred method in China.  
The numbers in Table 5-2 shows that the vast majority of takeovers in China from 2005-
2010 have been completed by agreement. The takeover by offer is still not the most 
frequently used takeover approach in China. The reason why I collected the data starting 
from 2005 is because that before the shareholding structure reform in 2005, the 
distinction between tradeable and non-tradeable shares and the high percentage of non-
tradeable shares in the Chinese listed companies made the takeovers by offer a very rare 
phenomenon in the Chinese takeover market. After the 2005 shareholding structure 
reform, it was expected that this situation would change and takeovers by offer, at least in 
theory, would become a more feasible investment option than in the previous situation. 
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Table 5-2 Takeovers of Chinese Listed Companies by Agreement and by Offer 
from 2005-2011 
 
Year 
Takeover by Agreement Takeover by Offer 
Announced Succeeded Announced Succeeded 
2005 332 193 0 0 
2006 430 148 9 1 
2007 388 192 0 0 
2008 163 62 1 1 
2009 1154 548 4 1 
2010 1526 558 4 3 
2011 1648 660 1 0 
2012 1829 529 3 1 
Source: Chinese Enterprises Merges and Acquisitions Year Book530 and CSMAR Database 
From the above table, it is not surprising to see the remarkably less number of takeovers 
by offer against the takeovers by agreement of Chinese listed companies. The under-
development of hostile takeovers persisted due to the concentrated ownership of Chinese 
listed companies. However, it cannot be denied that the Chinese government’s continuing 
efforts to transform the SOEs have far-reaching implications for takeover activities. With 
the completion of split share structure reform, listed SOEs should have become 
independent enterprises with relatively diverse ownership structures. Although a single or 
several large shareholders with substantial blocks of shares still retain control of Chinese 
listed companies, change is seen in that the rest of the shares can be widely dispersed. In 
order to take over a company with controlling shareholders, a bidder may obtain a block 
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of shares through a friendly sale agreement with incumbent controlling shareholders, or 
by accumulating a substantial block of previously dispersed shares more or less against 
the desire of the incumbent controlling shareholders. Although a private negotiation to 
purchase controlling shares will remain a common method of gaining corporate control 
for some time to come, hostile takeovers can be a valid and workable option for 
consideration, and it is expected that more and more Chinese listed companies will 
become vulnerable to hostile takeovers and thus subject to relevant takeover regulations.  
2. Overview of China’s Takeover Regime  
As noted above, until the shareholding structure reform, China was insulated from the 
market for corporate control. Takeover activity has recently become more common and is 
gradually being recognised as an important feature of the Chinese corporate landscape.531 
China has attempted to create a clearer roadmap for the takeover players, and over the last 
two decades has developed a coherent and stable regulatory framework for takeover 
transactions, particularly for those looking at listed companies in the Chinese securities 
market. The Chinese government has issued a series of takeover regulations stipulating 
the conditions and legal procedures for takeovers to protect shareholders’ interests and 
impose a fiduciary duty on directors to avoid their abuse of power at the cost of the 
shareholders. As Guo and Rizzi have argued, China’s takeover regime has been greatly 
enhanced in terms of transparency and operational feasibility, which will undoubtedly 
increase the opportunity of permissible takeover transactions.532 
It is widely acknowledged that China belongs to the family of continental law countries, 
also called civil law jurisdictions, where statutes are the main source of law and 
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precedents have no binding power. In China, the word ‘law’ generally has a relatively 
wide meaning, depending largely on the context. Chinese law is divided into three tiers at 
the central level. National laws are ranked at the top, promulgated by the national 
legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC) or its Standing Committee. The middle 
tier comprises administrative regulations issued by the State Council, and the last tier is 
composed of departmental rules announced by various functional departments under the 
State Council, such as ministries, commissions and agencies.  
It is worth noting that although most laws governing takeover transactions in China are 
departmental rules enacted and issued by the competent functional departments under the 
State Council, these departmental rules must be formulated in accordance with the 
relevant national laws promulgated by the NPC or its Standing Committee. As Li has 
stressed, the national basic law serves as the fundamental legal basis for all administrative 
regulations and departmental rules.533 Discussion of the major takeover-related national 
laws, administrative regulations and departmental rules follows.  
2.1 Shaping the Takeover Framework -- Company Law and Securities Law 
The Chinese takeover regime has experienced a step-by-step evolution, along with the 
development of the economy and capital market, starting with a law on Industrial 
Enterprises Owned by the Whole People534 to a Company Law535 and a Securities Law536. 
A year before the Company Law was adopted in 1993, the State Economic Restructuring 
Commission issued ‘Opinions on the Standardization of Joint Stock Companies’ to 
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facilitate the conversion of SOEs to joint stock companies. In 1993, the State Council also 
promulgated the ‘Tentative Regulation on the Administration of the Issuing and Trading 
of Shares’ (Tentative Regulation 1993) which was the first influential regulation 
containing takeover provisions, and which created the early takeover regime in China.537 
With the new Company Law and Securities Law which came into force in 2006, these 
two pieces of legislation have contributed to shaping the legal framework governing 
takeovers of listed companies in China.  
The Company Law was amended in 2005 and the new version took effect on 1 January 
2006. The New Company Law, which replaces the Old Company Law enacted in 1993, is 
a complete revision of the old law; some 90% of its provisions were not covered by the 
old law.538 Although there are no provisions directly relevant to takeover transactions, 
there are several important terms which may be used frequently during a takeover 
transaction.  
• There are two types of company under the Company Law: the limited liability 
company (youxian zeren gongsi) and the joint stock limited company (gufen 
youxian gongsi).539 The former is regarded as a private company closely held by a 
much smaller and connected group of investors, while the latter has widely held 
shares and can be listed on a stock exchange as a listed company.540 Although 
joint stock limited companies do not have to be listed on a stock exchange, all 
listed companies in China take this form in accordance with both the Company 
Law and the Securities Law.  
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• ‘Controlling shareholder’ refers to a shareholder whose capital contribution 
amounts to 50% or more of the total capital of a limited liability company, or 
whose shares exceed 50% of the total equity shares of a joint stock limited 
company, or whose capital contribution or proportion of shares is less than 50% 
but according to his capital contribution, or the shareholding he enjoys a voting 
right which is large enough to have a significant impact upon resolutions of the 
shareholder’s meeting.541  
• ‘De facto controller’ refers to anyone who is not a shareholder but is able to hold 
actual control of the acts of the company by means of investment relations, 
agreements or any other arrangement.542  
• ‘Connect relationship’ refers to the relationship between the controlling 
shareholder, the de facto controller, director, supervisor, or senior manager of a 
company and the enterprise directly or indirectly controlled thereby, and any other 
relationship that may lead to the assignment of any interests of the company.543  
The Securities Law is the basic law regulating the issuance and trading of shares on the 
stock exchanges in China, protecting the lawful rights and interests of investors. It has 
introduced a new takeover regime by including a whole section (Chapter 4) which 
specifically regulates takeovers of listed companies. This chapter stipulates general 
requirements that an acquirer must meet when conducting the takeover, including basic 
forms of takeover, disclosure, and condition for mandatory bid rule. However, according 
to Huang, the Securities Law only provides general requirements for takeovers and 
establishes a broad framework that seems to be incapable of meeting the need to regulate 
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takeovers.544 In short, the Securities Law does not contain a comprehensive set of rules to 
regulate takeovers of listed companies. As a result, in order to establish a sound takeover 
regime in China, many other departmental rules and administrative regulations which are 
more specific and detailed for the purpose of implementation have been adopted.545 Most 
of these were issued by the watchdog of the stock market, the CSRC. The rules with 
regard to takeovers of listed companies will be discussed in more detail.  
2.2 Forming the New Regime for Takeover of Listed Company – Takeover Measures 
2002 and 2006  
In 2002, Chinese legislators issued regulations specifically governing takeovers of listed 
companies for the first time. They are the ‘Measures for Regulating Takeovers of Listed 
Companies’ (Takeover Measures 2002)546 and the ‘Measures for Regulating Information 
Disclosure of the Changes in Shareholdings of Listed Companies，547 issued by the 
CSRC to ‘close the legislative loophole’.548 These two regulations contain detailed 
provisions with respect to takeover activities and fill most of the legal gaps in the 
previous regulations. They have substantially improved the efficacy of the takeover law 
and are expected to promote the ‘sustained and healthy’ development of takeover 
activities.549 However, due to the SOEs’ dominant status in the capital market, the 
development of a takeover market has been slow and few takeover cases have been 
initiated since the promulgation of these two laws.  
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Led by the objectives of improving the efficiency of SOEs and promoting an active 
takeover market to facilitate the reallocation of productive resources, in 2006 the CSRC 
promulgated a new regulation governing takeovers, the ‘Measures for Regulating 
Takeovers of Listed Companies’ (Takeover Measures 2006) 550 to replace the two laws 
issued in 2002. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Takeover Measures 2006 stated that 
the takeover law revision was to suit the new environment, whereby the national economy 
was facing strategic restructuring and the shareholding structure of listed companies was 
undergoing a radical transformation.551 Indeed, the Takeover Measures 2006 came into 
force at a time when the six-year transition period of China’s WTO membership was 
about to lapse and Chinese capital market was being transformed under the ongoing 
shareholding structure reform.  
The Takeover Measures 2006 have provided China with a comprehensive legal 
framework for takeovers of Chinese listed companies and a sound basis for the 
development of takeover activities.552 As Cai has suggested, it was not until 2006 that a 
well-established takeover regime governing the takeover of listed companies was set up 
to help restructure the national economy and optimise the allocation of resources.553 It is 
argued that the rules under the new Takeover Measures make the takeover framework 
more concrete and easier to apply, with the effect of simplifying takeover processes, 
cutting down costs and boosting transactional efficiency.554 These new measures not only 
represent the continuous commitment of the Chinese government to develop a 
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modernised regulatory takeover market but also, to some extent, bring China’s takeover 
law more closely into line with those of other more developed countries.  
The Takeover Measures 2006 have made a number of important substantial changes to 
fill the gaps in the Takeover Measures 2002, such as permission for partial bids, more 
methods of payment and more efficient systems of information disclosure. The measures 
were developed in accordance with relevant takeover provisions of the Company Law, 
the Securities Law and several other administrative regulations and departmental rules. 
Those provisions, which were previously spread through numerous regulations, have been 
unified under a single piece of legislation. This has significantly expanded the takeover 
provisions of Chapter 4 in the Securities Law, and thus covered a wide range of possible 
situations in various takeover transactions. The focus here is on the Takeover Measures 
2006, with a brief introduction to the relevant provisions of Chapter 4 of the Securities 
Law to Chinese takeover regulations. The discussion of the Takeover Measures 2006 
centres on the substantial changes it made to the new takeover regime in China. 
In order to ensure that the takeover activities of listed companies are well regulated, a 
special internal committee known as the Takeover Committee was established by the 
CSRC. It is composed of professionals and experts in the takeover area to provide 
consultancy opinions about takeover regulation at the request of the functional 
department of the CSRC.555 The opinions are mainly about whether or not the takeover 
for a listed company is constitutional, whether or not there is any circumstance under 
which a listed company may not be taken over, and other relevant matters.556 It should be 
noted that the Takeover Committee, unlike the case in the UK, was not established as an 
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independent body, but was established under the jurisdiction of the CSRC, leaving the 
CSRC as the ultimate enforcement agent to make the final decision.  
As discussed previously, takeover by agreement will still be the main method to gain 
control of a listed company for the foreseeable future in China. However, following the 
shareholding structure reform of 2005, a more diverse shareholding structure for Chinese 
listed companies has begun to emerge, resulting in an increasing number of takeovers by 
offer to acquire shares in the listed company. The commitment of Chinese policy makers 
to a functional takeover regulation is the response to this trend. The Takeover Measures 
2006 set up a new takeover regime which puts a clear emphasis on takeovers by ‘tender 
offer’ and introduces a whole chapter on how to conduct a tender offer. When discussing 
the tender offer rules, it is presupposed that the target company has a widely distributed 
shareholding structure and that its shares are freely transferable without takeover barriers. 
This is central to an understanding of the tender offer process and illustrates the 
fundamental conflict between target management and shareholders.557  
3. Shareholder Protection Rules 
In line with the principles of openness, fairness and equality set out in the Takeover 
Measures 2006,558 there is a set of provisions in Chapters 2 and 3 of the Measures on how 
the takeover of listed companies should be conducted. Without any doubt, the protection 
of equal opportunities for shareholders is a central part of these provisions. 
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3.1 Sufficient Information to the Market 
It is generally recognised that an investor is required to make an adequate and timely 
disclosure of his interests in a listed target company, to provide the market with an early 
warning of possible takeovers. Accordingly, the Takeover Measures 2006 enacted a series 
of provisions requiring information, sufficient for the target shareholders to make an 
informed decision, to be available.  
3.1.1  Disclosure of Substantial Shareholdings 
Information disclosure about the ownership of listed companies, also called disclosure of 
substantial shareholdings, can be found in the takeover laws of most jurisdictions, 
including the UK and US. In China, the CSRC has promulgated the disclosure rules under 
Chapter 2 of the Takeover Measures 2006, in accordance with Article 86 of the Securities 
Law, by requiring acquirers to disclose certain information when they increase their stake 
in the company. The Measures provide detailed rules to implement Article 86 of the 
Securities Law.  
According to Article 86 of the Securities Law, when an investor increases his 
shareholding in a listed company to 5%, by open-market purchase or private agreement, a 
disclosure is required. The investor must disclose his position by submitting a written 
report to the CSRC and the stock exchange, and notify the listed company and the public, 
within three business days from the date when such shareholding arises. During this 
period of time, the investor is prohibited from purchasing or selling shares of the listed 
company until the market is informed.559 Furthermore, if the subsequent shareholding 
increases or decreases to reach 5%, this must be disclosed each time in the same manner; 
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the investor is not allowed to trade the relevant shares within the disclosure period or 
within two days thereafter.560 As a result, the investor must stop his purchase and fulfil 
the disclosure obligation when his shareholding in the target company reaches 5%, 10%, 
15%, 20%, 25% and 30%. When the 30% threshold is triggered, a MBR will apply. (This 
rule will be discussed in detail below.) 
3.1.2 Tender Offer Report 
In addition, under Article 28 of the Takeover Measures 2006, the CSRC requires a bidder 
to disclose certain information before an offer on the takeover of a listed company is 
actually launched. The information needing to be fully disclosed is stipulated in Article 
29; it includes all the information vital for target shareholders to make a decision, and 
other items required by the CSRC, such as the purpose of the takeover, the number of 
shares to be acquired, the period open for the takeover bid, the offer price and the 
payment arrangements. Bidders intending or required by law to launch an offer must 
submit a tender offer report to the CSRC.  
This report will ultimately serve as the basis on which the CSRC decides whether to 
allow the bidder to launch the offer, as prescribed by the Takeover Measures 2006. The 
bidder may announce its offer only if the CSRC has ‘expressed no objection’ within 15 
days of submission of the report.561 During this period, the CSRC will notify the bidder if 
it finds that the report does not comply with the provisions of the relevant laws and 
administrative regulations, or presents a threat to national security or the public 
interest.562 Article 41 further requires that if there is a significant change in the basic facts 
disclosed in the tender offer report, the bidder should submit another written report to the 
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CSRC and make an announcement within two working days of the occurrence of the 
significant change.  
3.2 Equal Treatment of Shareholders 
As in the UK and US, there is a set of rules in the Takeover Measures 2006 to ensure that 
all shareholders are treated equally in the process of takeovers. Under Article 37, the offer 
shall be kept open for no less than thirty days and no more than sixty days after the offer 
is launched (except where there is a contested offer) to avoid shareholders making a hasty 
decision. It further provides that during the acceptance period prescribed in the offer, the 
purchaser cannot cancel the offer. If the purchaser wants to change the terms of the offer, 
the approval of the CSRC is required563 and variation cannot occur within the fifteen days 
prior to the expiration of the bid unless the offer is contested.564 In addition, the target 
shareholders can withdraw their acceptance up to three days before the expiration of the 
bid.565 During the acceptance period, the bidder is also prohibited from purchasing or 
selling any shares in the target company through any means or under other terms not 
specified in its offer.566  
3.2.1 Bid Prices and Methods of Payment 
Previously, under the Takeover Measures 2002, the offer prices for non-tradeable and 
tradeable shares had to be set differently. Holders of tradeable shares usually purchased 
the company’s shares at a much higher price than holders of non-tradeable shares.567 The 
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offer price for non-tradeable shares was determined with reference to the most recent 
audited book net asset value per share of the target company, while tradeable shares were 
bought and sold on the stock exchange with a premium to the net asset value.568 The 
reason for these regulations was to try to avoid any loss in value of state-owned assets 
during the takeover period. However, if shares did not trade at their market value, this 
could distort the takeover market if market value exceeded book value; the existing 
owners of tradeable shares would lose out because new buyers of non-tradeable shares 
would effectively obtain their shares at a discount. In the case of Hengtong Investment 
Ltd’s acquisition of Shanghai Lingguang Ltd in 2004, the transfer price of non-tradeable 
shares was 4.3 RMB while the individual shares traded on the stock exchange were 
around 13 RMB.569 
In light of the 2005 shareholding structure reform, the Takeover Measures 2006 adopted a 
uniform rule for price setting by requiring that the proposed price for the shares could not 
be lower than the highest price paid by the bidder for the target company’s shares in the 
six months preceding the date on which the bidder published the tender offer report.570 
This would actually raise the offer price of what were originally non-tradeable shares 
converted into tradeable ones, as on average market value consistently and significantly 
exceeded book value on the Chinese stock market.  
Moreover, the Takeover Measures 2006 extended the consideration that could be offered 
in the takeover of a listed company from the previous cash only to securities (shares or 
debentures), a combination of cash and securities, or any other lawful method, and the 
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financial advisor responsible for this transaction should claim that the purchaser had the 
financial ability to make the offer.571 However, it should be noted that the payment had to 
be made in cash if the purchaser launched a general offer with the purpose of delisting a 
listed company,572 or launched a general offer because the CSRC had rejected his 
application for waiver; also, if the consideration was paid in legally transferable securities, 
the acquirer should provide the target shareholders with the opportunity to choose cash 
instead of securities.573  
3.2.2 General Offer and Partial Offer  
A general offer is an offer made to all shareholders of the listed target company for all the 
shares, while a partial offer is defined as an offer made to all target shareholders for less 
than the whole of the target listed company’s issued shares. Under the Takeover Measures 
2002, the takeover bid had to be a full bid. In 2005, with a view to providing potential 
acquirers with greater flexibility and reducing the costs associated with takeover 
transactions, the Securities Law introduced the concept of the partial bid.574 According to 
Huang, the partial offer serves an economic function by benefiting bidders, because it 
allows a bidder to obtain corporate control with a considerably smaller funds than would 
be the case with a general offer.575 The adoption of partial offers also confirms the 
Chinese government’s ongoing commitment to accelerating the control shifts and 
promoting a more active takeover market to solve the corporate governance problems. 
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In conformity with the Securities Law, the Takeover Measures 2006 set out detailed 
provisions on how to conduct a partial takeover by stipulating that if an investor was 
voluntarily to acquire the shares of a listed company by means of an offer, it could issue 
to all shareholders of the target company an offer to acquire all of the shares held by them 
or an offer to acquire only some of the shares held by them.576 This means that bidders are 
allowed to choose between a general or partial offer as a strategy to acquire a listed 
company. It is further required that if a bidder receives acceptances for a greater number 
of shares than specified in the offer of the partial bid, each acceptance should be 
redeemed on a pro rata basis.577  
In order to avoid abuse, the Takeover Measures 2006 requires that in any event, if a 
purchaser acquires the shares of a listed company by means of a partial offer, the 
proportion of shares that are planned to be purchased shall be more than 5% of the issued 
shares of the target listed company.578 This requirement is to prevent the use of partial 
bids to commit market manipulation or insider trading, because the threshold of 5% 
relates to the significant information disclosure obligation.579 
3.2.3 Mandatory Bid Rule 
The MBR which is central to the City Code in the UK has also been adopted in China, 
although it does not exist in the US. The MBR requires a bidder who acquires a large 
block of target shares to make a general offer for all shares of the target company.  
Under Article 88 of the Securities Law, it stipulates: 
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Through securities trading at a stock exchange, an investor holds or holds with 
any other person by means of agreement or any other arrangement 30% of the 
shares issued by a listed company and if the purchase is continued, he shall issue a 
tender offer to all the shareholders of the said listed company to purchase all of or 
part of the shares of the listed company. 
The CSRC set up more detailed provisions to implement the MBR in the Takeover 
Measures 2006. No matter whether the takeover is conducted by means of offer or 
agreement, all the methods of acquiring more than 30% of the shares in a target listed 
company may trigger the MBR. However, under the context of takeover by agreement, 
the obligation to launch a mandatory bid can be waived under certain circumstances 
subject to CSRC approval. Article 96 of the Securities Law gives the CSRC discretion to 
decide when and how to exempt a bidder from the MBR. The Takeover Measures 2006 
restate that if, by means of agreement, the 30% threshold is reached, any further 
acquisition must be made by general or partial tender offer unless an exemption is 
obtained from the CSRC.580  
Article 47 of the Takeover Measures 2006 deals with the MBR in the case of takeover by 
agreement in two separation situations. If acquisitions result in holding 30% of the target 
company’s issued shares and the acquirer continues to acquire shares, it should put a 
general offer or partial offer to all the shareholders of the target company, unless an 
exemption is obtained from the CSRC. If an acquirer who intends to acquire more than 
30% of the target company’s shares by agreement shall acquire the portion that exceeds 
30% by way of an offer, unless an exemption is issued by the CSRC. If the acquirer fails 
to obtain the exemption but intends to execute the takeover agreement or the acquirer 
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does not apply for an exemption, a general offer must be made before implementation of 
the takeover agreement.581 
Pursuant to the Takeover Measures 2006, exemption is normally granted upon grounds 
mainly related to the following circumstances: the transfer will not cause a change in the 
de facto controlling person of the listed company; the listed company faces great financial 
difficulties, the rescue plan proposed by the acquirer has been approved by the company’s 
shareholders, and the acquirer undertakes not to transfer the shares for a minimum three-
year period; a private placement of shares with the acquirer causes his or her shareholding 
to exceed 30% of the company’s issued share, the acquirer promises not to transfer the 
shares for a three-year period and the shareholders support the exemption application.582  
The CSRC sets up two ways of applying for exemption. Other than the normal process 
where the matter is complicated (the decision should be rendered within 20 days of 
receiving the application)583, the Takeover Measures 2006 provide a simple procedure to 
allow quicker processing (the CSRC must render a decision within five days of 
application) where crossing the 30% threshold appears to be technically caused by non-
takeover activities such as repurchase of shares, inheritance, underwriting arrangements 
and other circumstances deemed by the CSRC as necessary.584 If the bidder fails to be 
granted the simple procedure, it should either reapply for exemption through normal 
procedure or fulfil the mandatory bid obligation. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the Takeover Measures 2006, the MBR also applies to 
indirect takeovers, which refers to the situation where although an investor does not itself 
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take over a listed company by directly acquiring its shares, it gains the control by other 
means, such as private agreement, investment relationship or any other arrangement.585 
For instance, an investor can indirectly take over a target company by acquiring control of 
a controlling shareholder of the target company. In addition, the concept of control is 
clarified by defining that an investor controls a listed company if he has more than a 50% 
shareholding, can exercise 30% of voting rights, or otherwise has the capacity to 
determine the election of more than half of the directors or the outcome of decisions of a 
shareholders’ meeting.586 
4. Directors’ Duties and Takeover Defences 
When facing a hostile takeover, the target board is more likely to employ a takeover 
defence against the unwanted bid regardless of whether the offer is beneficial to the 
shareholders. As a result, nearly all the takeover regulations impose duties on the 
directors to avoid the abuse of their power at the cost of shareholders’ interests. With 
regard to the controversial issue raised between the UK and US takeover laws, namely, 
whether the power to accept or reject a takeover bid is in hands of shareholders or 
directors, the Chinese legislation has adopted rules similar to those of the UK’s City Code.  
4.1 Directors’ Fiduciary Duties  
In spite of the fact that China does not belong to the common law system, Chinese 
legislators did codify and adopt the fiduciary duty, an important notion from Western 
countries, not only in company law but also in securities law, bankruptcy law and other 
related measures. The general fiduciary duty of directors is stipulated in Article 148 of the 
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Company Law by stating that the directors shall bear the obligations of loyalty and 
diligence to the company. The specific actions which are prohibited against duty of 
loyalty are set forth in Article 149(1) - (8) of the Company Law. 
In the context of takeovers, Article 8 of the Takeover Measures 2006 also contains 
fiduciary standards that govern the behaviour of the target board by requiring that the 
directors, supervisors and senior managers of the target company have to meet their duties 
of loyalty and diligence to the company and shall treat fairly all the acquirers who intend 
to take over the company.587 It further requires that the target board’s adoption of any 
decisions and measures with regard to takeovers should be beneficial to the interests of 
the company and its shareholders. In particular, there are three actions which are clearly 
prohibited: posing any improper obstacles to the attempted takeovers by abuse of power; 
providing any forms of financial aid to the acquirers by using the resources of the target 
company; and damaging the lawful rights and interests of the target company and its 
shareholders. 
4.2 Directors’ Role in Takeover Defences  
Pursuant to the Takeover Measures 2002, the takeover defences used by the target board 
may not damage the legal rights and interests of the target company and its shareholders. 
After a public announcement of intention to take over a target company, Article 33 
specifically prohibited the target directors from taking six commonly used defensive 
actions, such as issuing new shares and convertible bonds, buying back its own shares, or 
amending the company’s articles of association, under any circumstance. 588  This 
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provision had been strongly criticised as both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.589 It 
cannot be right to simply conclude that the six listed defences would damage the interests 
of the target company and its shareholders in any circumstance. It left no room to assess 
whether employed defences were appropriate in specific circumstances. On the other 
hand, it was even harder to argue that, other than these six listed defences, the directors 
could be allowed to use any defence when facing a hostile takeover. As Huang has argued, 
the legislator’s intention to prohibit the target board from abusing takeover defences 
cannot be fulfilled because it is still able to employ other non-prohibited defensive 
measures to deter the proposed offer.590  
In response to this rigid provision, the Takeover Measures 2006 made some significant 
changes by stipulating that, after the bidders announce the offer and until the offer expires 
or is completed, the target company may only continuously engage in normal business 
operations and implement the resolutions made by the shareholders’ meeting. Specifically, 
without the approval of the shareholders’ meeting, the target company’s directors are not 
permitted to take measures such as disposing of the company’s assets, making outward 
investment or changing the main business activities, providing guarantees or loans, to 
make a significant impact on the assets, liabilities, rights and interests or business 
outcome of the company.591 Also, no director of the target company is allowed to resign 
during the course of the takeover offer. 592  
Moreover, the law does not require the target board to be passive towards shareholders 
when facing a takeover bid. Article 32 of Takeover Measures 2006 requires that the target 
board shall take the following actions when facing a takeover bid: making investigation 
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into the capacity, credit status and purpose of takeover of the acquirer, analysing the 
conditions for tender offer, bringing forward advice on whether or not the shareholders 
should accept the offer, and employing an independent financial consultant to issue a 
professional opinion. If the acquirer makes any major changes to the conditions of his 
offer, the target board should accordingly give its supplementary opinions within three 
working days. 593 
Although the Takeover Measures 2006 prohibit the target board from using any defensive 
measures without the shareholder approval during the period of takeover offer, there is no 
provision governing the defences intended to impede the takeover bid in advance. 
Theoretically speaking, these pre-bid defences, such as poison pill, staggered board, gold 
parachute and voting rights restrictions, can be added to a listed company’s articles of 
association. The only condition is that they are approved by the shareholders’ meeting, 
because only the shareholders have the right to amend the articles of association under the 
Company Law. However, even before being presented to a shareholders’ meeting for 
approval, some of the defences are not allowed under the Company Law regime. 
A dual-class share structure with different voting rights attached to each class may not be 
used as a takeover defence under the Company Law because Article 104 provides that a 
shareholder shall have one voting right for each share he holds. With regard to the 
structure of the board, Articles 46 and 109 of the Company Law provide that the terms of 
the board of directors shall be provided in the articles of association, but each term shall 
not exceed three years. Under the Company Law, there is no provision governing the 
staggered structure of the board. To conform with the 2005 new Company Law, the 
CSRC issued amended ‘Guidance for the Articles of Association of Listed Companies’ 
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(the 2006 Guidance) on 16th of March 2006. Article 96 of the 2006 Guidance provides 
that a director’s term starts on the date when he takes up the position and ends on the date 
when the term of the current board of directors expires.594 It implies that different expiry 
dates for the current board of directors are not allowed, and the entire board of directors 
will be re-elected at the same shareholders’ meeting after its term expires. The staggered 
board, therefore, is not legally accepted as a takeover defence in the Chinese context. In 
the meantime, Article 96 of Guidelines also prohibits the removal of a director by a 
shareholders’ meeting for no cause before expiry of the term of the current board. The 
bidder, therefore, who obtains sufficient shareholding to amend the articles of association, 
still has to wait to the end of the board’s term to elect new directors and gain control of 
the target board.  
It is argued that after the amended Company Law took effect in 2006, preloading anti-
takeover provisions can be more feasible, as it gives more autonomy to the articles of 
association.595 However, pre-bid defences are still not common in practice, and the 
validity of some of them is still in question. As Guo and Rizzi have explained, the reason 
why the validity of pre-offer defences has not yet been challenged in court is largely 
because the hostile takeover is still a fairly rare phenomenon in China.596 In a famous 
takeover case in 2005, the leading portal operator Sina Corp has employed a poison pill to 
fight off a potential hostile takeover by a leading internet game operator Shanda 
Interactive Entertainment Ltd, by announcing that new shares would be issued to 
shareholders at half price in the event of anyone holding more than 10% of its shares by 
an acquisition. In addition, Sina established a staggered board over a three-year term. It 
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595 Guo and Rizzi (n454) 16. 
596 ibid 17.  
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will be interesting to see whether Shanda will challenge the legitimacy of the staggered 
board set up by Sina and how the court will rule on it. However, Shanda did not take any 
legal action against Sina’s defensive measures, but sell out all its shareholding in Sina to  
three buyers from 2006 to 2007. 
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1. Literature Review – who decides to accept or reject a takeover bid? 
Over recent decades, takeovers have unarguably been one of corporate activities which 
have caught widespread public attention. An important aspect of takeovers is the so-
called takeover defences which are employed by target directors to resist a takeover bid. 
Takeover defences, on the one hand, protect undervalued target companies from being 
controlled by an opportunistic bidder, and on the other hand prevent target shareholders 
from tendering their shares to obtain a premium. Most of the doctrinal and scholarly 
debates focus on the division of power between target directors and target shareholders in 
deciding whether to accept or reject an offer from a hostile bidder. Bainbridge posed the 
question that lies at the heart of corporate takeover jurisprudence:  who ultimately has the 
right to allow a takeover to proceed? Is it the board, which monitors the daily business of 
the company, or the shareholders who actually own the company?597  
As in the case of mergers or asset sales, the board will be approached first to discuss the 
possibility of a takeover. If the board rejects a proposed merger or asset sale, the 
shareholders will not be invited to, nor entitled to, make decisions.598 However, the 
situation in the hostile takeover context is more complicated. In contrast to mergers, it is 
achieved by making a tender offer directly to the shareholders of the target company, and 
thus bypasses the incumbent management’s approval.599 In addition to the MBR, which 
was adopted by the UK’s City Code to provide further protection for shareholders, the 
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extent to which the target boards can adopt defensive measures in the face of a hostile 
takeover is regarded as another significant distinction between the UK and US takeover 
law.600   
It has been argued by Ribstein that the regulation of board defences against a takeover bid 
involves a ‘sensitive balance’ between restricting takeover defences to encourage ‘a 
viable market for corporation control as a constraint on agency costs’ and ‘giv[ing] the 
board ultimate say on a takeover for legitimate ends’.601 As argued above, following the 
development of defensive tactics in the 1970s, the board’s discretion was extended to the 
tender offers. This development prompted wide-ranging debate over takeover defences 
amongst scholars, practitioners and businessmen in the1980s. 
Some commentators were in favour of prohibiting defensive tactics employed by a target 
board without the consent of its shareholders, so that the target shareholders would be the 
ones who had the right to decide whether to accept the bid.602 Other commentators 
favoured allowing directors to use defensive tactics to impede an unwanted takeover. 
They argued that the target board should at least be given some scope to slow down a 
hostile bid.603 In this section, the literature on the arguments concerning this long-
standing debate are reviewed and the different schools are described in more detail. 
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1.1 Two Schools of Thought  
The publishing of Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom by Lipton in 1979 instigated 
an intense debate on who should enjoy the ultimate authority to decide whether or not the 
company would be sold at a premium over market price. Shareholder primacy and 
director primacy are both the subject of strong arguments.  
1.1.1 Shareholder Primacy 
There is a large body of literature which opposes empowering target directors to resist 
takeovers by adopting defensive tactics, and proposes rules to constrain target company 
directors’ actions when confronted by a tender offer.604 This school of thought, supporting 
‘shareholder primacy’, has assumed that tender offers are beneficial to the shareholders 
and should be encouraged. They believe that maximisation of shareholder wealth is the 
central criterion for evaluating the appropriateness of adoption of defensive measures by 
the target company. Shareholder primacy contends not only that ‘shareholders are the 
principals on whose behalf corporate governance is organized’, but also that ‘shareholders 
do (and should) exercise ultimate control of the corporate enterprise’.605 
According to Easterbrook and Fischel, takeover defences against tender offers reduce the 
gains to the shareholders and increase the agency costs, hence causing a general reduction 
in social welfare.606 Gordon also believes that giving target company directors unlimited 
power to reject a hostile bid is highly undesirable because ‘the potential for a hostile 
control transaction not only exposes management directly to the capital market but also it 
energizes and backstops other forms of managerial monitoring…’607 Therefore, it is for 
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shareholders to have the final word on how to dispose of a tender offer to the company. 
The UK takeover rules have always been inclined to this theory, giving the shareholders 
opportunity to decide on the merits of the takeover bid. 
1.1.2 Director Primacy 
The current US policy of ‘director primacy’, supported by many corporate scholars, 
allows directors to use defensive measures by positing that the decision whether or not to 
accept a tender offer is primarily for the board of directors.608 Lipton, for example, in his 
classic essay, left the target company’s board of directors with wide discretion when 
responding to a hostile tender offer, subject only to judicial review under the modest 
restraints of the business judgement rule, arguing that granting directors in the target 
company ultimate power to decide whether or not to sell the firm was beneficial for the 
company and its shareholders in the long term.609  
Supporters of director primacy agreed with Lipton that it is short sighted to impose a 
prohibition on directors from employing defensive measures and allowing shareholders to 
sell whenever a substantial premium is available, as depriving boards of the ability to 
reject a hostile takeover would encourage management to focus on short-term 
performance rather than on potentially more profitable performance under a long-term 
strategy. Therefore, directors should have the power to use defensive tactics to resist the 
offer if they can justify that the company could be sold in the future for a higher price, or 
that the future market value of the company plus the interim dividends would mean a 
greater value to the shareholders than the present offer price.610 It was believed that the 
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board of the target company was ‘more appropriate than its shareholders to make the 
decision on a hostile bid and its potential change of business strategy’.611  
1.2 Debate about Corporate Models  
Different views on the nature and purpose of the corporation may explain the ongoing 
debate over who should have primacy to decide whether to accept or reject the tender 
offer.  
1.2.1 Property Model 
The property model suggests that the corporation is the property of shareholders, who 
hire directors to act as agents on their behalf to monitor the company’s business. 
Shareholders themselves must be permitted to accept or reject a tender offer as the 
purpose of the corporation is the maximisation of their wealth.612 As Easterbrook and 
Fischel have pointed out, shareholders are the ‘sole residual claimants’ in the company, 
entitled to the profit left over after the firm’s contractual obligations have been met.613 
Apart from the directors’ intention to keep their positions at the shareholders’ expense, 
allowing the target board to freely employ defence against takeovers deprives 
shareholders of the fundamental rights attached to their investment in the company, and 
possibly of significant financial gains from tendering their shares.614  
Thus, when faced with a hostile bid, shareholders, as the ultimate owners of the 
company, should have an opportunity to express their opinion on whether to sell their 
shares at a premium above the current market price, or to keep faith with the incumbent 
management by rejecting the offer. However, it is not within the directors’ capacity to 
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make decisions as agents of the shareholders, as it is argued that the board is hired to 
run the business but not to make ownership decisions.615 In response, Bebchuk has 
submitted that the directors should only have the power to seek out a better offer with 
greater value in the interests of shareholders, or to warn the shareholders that there will 
be an immediate loss if they tender their shares.616  
1.2.2 Entity Model 
The entity model holds the contrary opinion, viewing the corporation as a societal 
institution whose purpose is broader than simply maximising the shareholders’ wealth. 
Scholars favouring the entity model see directors’ decision making as fundamental, 
asserting that they must be permitted to employ defences on the shareholders’ behalf, 
because creating value solely for shareholders in takeovers can be at the expense of other 
constituencies, particularly employees and creditors.617 It is believed that corporate wealth 
is generated not solely for shareholders but also for these other constituencies. According 
to Gulati et al, as an economic term, the corporation is defined as ‘an unique vehicle by 
which large groups of individuals, each offering a different factor of production, privately 
order their relationships so as to collectively produce marketable goods or services’.618 
That is, the company is a legal entity representing a complex set of contractual 
relationships.619 As a result, shareholders do not own the company, as the company in fact 
is not something that is capable of being owned by anybody. 
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This school of thought believes that corporate success cannot be achieved without 
decades of investment from all the constituencies, including employees, creditors and 
communities. They are important to the efficient functioning of the corporation and thus 
their interests are entitled to be considered by boards of directors. The incentives for them 
to make a contribution to the company will be significantly reduced if their contributions 
are likely to be expropriated unfairly when the shareholders sell the company at a 
premium.620 As Lipton has stated, allowing shareholders to decide whether or not a 
company should be sold ‘would have a fundamental impact on the way in which 
corporations operate’.621  
The entity model proposes that directors, serving as a mediating body, are acting as 
faithful trustees who can balance the interests of all parties according to the company’s 
overall interests and generate the most benefit for all concerned.622 In the face of a hostile 
takeover, it is wise to let the directors make decisions based on consideration of the 
interests of the constituencies. As Davies has argued, the protection of the position of the 
incumbent management is regarded as ‘a proxy for the protection of non-shareholder 
interests affected by the takeover’.623 It is therefore suggested that the directors, having a 
duty not only to the shareholders but also to other constituencies, should exercise an 
independent power and need not bend to the demands of the shareholders as long as the 
directors believe that the corporation’s best interests are served.624  
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1.3 Debate about Directors’ Role 
Even among those who advocate curtailment of the target directors’ power to use 
defensive measures, there are divergent views on the role directors should play when 
faced with a hostile bid. In allowing target shareholders to decide whether to accept or 
reject a hostile takeover, it is contended that the target board could just be passive or 
could actively launch an auction in response to a hostile bid.  
1.3.1 Passive Role 
This view not only opposes the adoption of takeover defences by the directors, but also 
advocates a purely passive role for target company directors when confronted by a hostile 
takeover; the use of any forms of defence hinders shareholder wealth maximisation.625 
Easterbrook and Fischel have supported the passive role by stating that ‘any strategy 
designed to prevent tender offers reduces welfare’ because ‘shareholders lose whatever 
premium market value the bidder offered or would have offered, but for the resistance or 
the prospect of resistance.’626  
The basic rationale for this view is that allowing directors to auction the company will 
have the effect of discouraging takeovers and will reduce the benefits from takeovers in 
the long term. The bidders who generally initiate the tender offer have substantial search 
costs in identifying targets. As Easterbrook and Fischel have argued, ‘if there is no first 
bidder there will be no later bidders and no tender premium’.627 Forcing bidders to 
compete in an auction will make subsequent bidders take a free ride on the first bidder’s 
search efforts and diminish their gain from the takeover, because no bidder is willing to 
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acquire a target company by paying a price almost as high as the shares would be worth 
under the best management.628  
Consequently, instigating an auction will reduce the bidders’ incentive to search for 
poorly managed targets and engage in takeover transactions, because the process of 
monitoring and bidding becomes less profitable.629 The decreased probability that a 
hostile takeover will be made, thus increases agency costs and reduces social welfare in 
general.630 It is also suggested that ‘the whole process of defending takeovers even to 
pursue a higher premium is socially wasteful, including the amount the target directors 
spend in adopting defensive tactics and the amount the bidders spend to overcome the 
resistance’.631 The supporters of this view simply prefer to let the initial bidders buy the 
target company at the premium they intend to pay and avoid competition with other 
subsequent bidders. 
1.3.2 Auctioneering Role 
This view similarly prohibits the power of the target directors to use takeover defences, 
except to the extent that competing bidding is achieved. It rejects a totally passive role for 
directors and favours a rule of auctioneering by allowing the directors to take action to 
trigger a competitive bid and increase the premium paid to the target shareholders.632 The 
basic rationale for this view is based on the assumption that the bidder’s offer price is 
inadequate compared to the ‘true’ value of the company, and the target directors believe 
that they are likely to obtain a higher offer for its shareholders in the future.633 As a result, 
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if the target board is allowed to find a white knight to enter a competing bid, target 
shareholders will have an opportunity to receive a price as close to the true value of their 
shares as possible. Without the possibility of an auction, although shareholders have a 
common goal in pursuing the highest price to trade their shares, they do not have the 
mechanism to carry this out.  
Supporters of this rule also believe that auctioneering by the target board to seek a 
competing bidder can solve the problem of coercion associated with two-tier bids.634 If a 
target board is able to seek a white knight to enter a bidding competition, the initial bidder 
cannot easily acquire a blocking position in the target company by threatening the 
shareholders with the plan of a subsequent squeeze-out merger. As Bebchuk has argued, 
by instigating the competition, each bidder will be forced to offer a premium reflecting 
his best capacity to use the target company’s resources, which is closest to the real value 
of the target shares.635 As a result, the target shareholders will have an opportunity to 
receive a higher price for their shares without being coerced into tendering, even if they 
think the offer price is inadequate. 
The advocates of the auctioneering rule acknowledge the risk that the initial bidder will 
lose the takeover to a higher bidder if the initial bidder is outbid, but assert that they can 
still obtain some gains by purchasing a substantial amount of shares in the target company 
prior to announcing its takeover intentions, and simply tendering their pre-offer purchases 
of the target company’s shares to their competitor or to the market at a profit.636 
According to Gilson, ‘the possible welfare losses from reduced incentives to make the 
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initial offer are offset by the efficiency gains that are realised when the target is allocated 
to the investor that values it most highly’.637 
1.4 Empirical Studes 
Takeover bids have been known to affect the value of the target company before and after 
the bid is completed, whether it is successful or not. Many empirical studies have been 
carried out to assess the effects of takeovers themselves and of takeover defences on the 
wealth of target shareholders.  
1.4.1 Expected returns to target shareholders from takeovers 
A few empirical researchers have suggested that target shareholders do obtain 
significantly positive returns from a successful takeover bid.638 In the US, Jensen and 
Ruback reviewed 13 studies that looked at returns after takeovers were announced and 
reported an average excess return of 30% to target shareholders in successful tender 
offers from 1958-1981; Jarrell and Poulson found 28.9% from 1963-1986; Andrade, 
Mitchell and Stafford suggested 23.3% from 1973-1998.639 In the UK, Franks and Harris 
found 25.8% from 1955-1985; Limmack suggested 33% from 1977-1986; and George 
and Renneboog 29.3% from 1993-2000.640  
                                                
637 Gilson (n87) 871. 
638 See e.g., Peter Dodd, ‘Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and Stockholder Wealth’ (1980) 8 Journal of 
Financial Economics 105; Peter Dodd and Richard Ruback, ‘Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns: An Empirical 
Analysis’ (1977) 5 Journal of Financial Economics 351. 
639 Michael C. Jensen and Richard Ruback, ‘The Market for Corporate Control: the Scientific Evidence’ (1983) 11 
Journal of Financial Economics 5, 10; Gregg A. Jarrell and Annette B. Poulsen, ‘The Returns to Acquiring Firms in 
Tender Offers: Evidence from Three Decades’ (1989) 18(3) Journal of the Financial Management Association 12, 16; 
Gregor Andrade and Mark Mitchell and Erik Stafford, ‘New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers’ (2001) 15(2) 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 103,110. 
640 Julian R. Franks and Robert S. Harris, ‘Shareholder Wealth Effects of Corporate Takeovers: The U.K. Experience 
1955-1985’ (1989) 23 Journal of Financial Economics 225, 232-3; Robin L. Limmack, ‘Corporate Mergers and 
Shareholder Wealth Effects’ (1991) 21 Accountant and Business Research 239, 245; Marc Goergen and Luc 
Renneboog, ‘Shareholders Wealth Effects of European Domestic and Cross –Border Takeover Bids’ (2004) 10 
European Financial Management 9, 23.  
Chapter 6 Promotion of Takeovers and Non-Frustration Rule 
July 2013 207 
Empirical research, though far from conclusive, also suggests that takeover defences 
which are not subject to shareholder approval are more likely to be harmful to shareholder 
wealth than those which require shareholder approval. Indeed, this view that takeover 
defences reduce the wealth of target shareholders has gained support from legal 
scholars.641 A study by Bebchuk et al, which is frequently cited, analysed a five-year 
sample of hostile takeover bids and found the defences adopted by target boards made 
hostile bids significantly less likely to succeed; the average returns of target company 
shareholders in the nine months following a hostile bid were reduced by 8-10% compared 
with the returns to shareholders in target companies without these defences. 642 
Easterbrook and Jarrell examined the evidence from financial economics and concluded 
that successful takeover defences deprived target shareholders of appreciation gains of 
15% to 52% of the value of target shares.643  
Mikkelson and Partch found evidence that corporate turnover significantly declined from 
33% in frequent hostile takeover periods to 17% in times of infrequent hostile takeovers. 
Even more important, the decline in the turnover rate was significantly more notable in 
poorly performing firms.644 Research by Jarrell et al concluded that the returns to 
shareholders from takeover transactions greatly outweighed the costs to other 
constituencies.645 From the other perspective, Bradley, Desai and Kim examined 112 
unsuccessful tender offers between 1963 and 1980 and reported that cumulative abnormal 
returns were lower for targets that remained independent than for those that were later 
                                                
641 See e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, ‘The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers’ (2002) 69 University of 
Chicago Law Review 973; John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian, ‘A Buy-Side Mode of Lockups: Theory and 
Evidence’ (2000) 53 Stanford Law Review 307; Robert B. Thompson and D. Gordon Smith, ‘Toward A New Theory of 
the Shareholder Role: ‘Sacred Space’ in Corporate Takeovers’ (2001) 80 Texas Law Review 261. 
642 Bebchuk and Coates IV and Subramanian (n52) 887. 
643 Frank H. Easterbrook and Gregg A. Jarrell, ‘Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers’ (1984) 59 New York 
University Law Review 277, 292. 
644 Wayne H. Mikkelson and M. Megan Partch, ‘The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Managerial 
Turnover’(1977)  44 Journal of Financial Economics 205, 205-207. 
645 Gregg A. Jarrell and James A. Brickley and Jeffiry M. Netter, ‘The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical 
Evidence Since 1980’ (1988) 2 Journal of Economic Perspectives 49, 54-58. 
Chapter 6 Promotion of Takeovers and Non-Frustration Rule 
July 2013 208 
sold.646 The empirical evidence provided by Subramanian also showed that takeover 
defences do not necessarily lead to higher premiums, considering the costs and 
asymmetric information in hostile bids.647 
1.4.2 Expected returns to target shareholders from takeover defence 
In favouring the argument that takeovers may not create value for shareholders, a number 
of empirical studies have examined the economic benefits to target shareholders as a 
result of the defeat of a takeover bid. Using a sample of 36 hostile takeover targets from 
1973 to 1979, Lipton found that the shares of more than 50% of the target companies 
which defeated hostile takeovers had a higher market price than the offer price after the 
successful defence.648 Bradley’s and Dodd and Ruback’s studies indicated that the target 
shareholders earned positive returns in those cases in which a tender offer was 
unsuccessful.649 Berkovitch and Khanna found that certain defensive strategies, such as 
crown jewel sales, lock-up options or litigation, which make the target company 
undesirable for bidders, do improve the target company shareholder’s wealth.650 Although 
it is often argued that the target board may use takeover defences to extract protection or 
compensation for themselves by deterring a proposed takeover, Coates’s studies indicated 
that these defences significantly increased the premium the target shareholders received 
in the event that the takeovers were completed successfully.651  
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1.4.3 Concluding Remarks 
Shareholder primacy generally contends that shareholders are the principals on whose 
behalf corporate governance is organised, and that they exercise ultimate control of the 
corporation.652 The property model argues that shareholders are the owners of the 
corporations and that maximising shareholder wealth is the best way to maximise the 
value of the firm as a whole. Thus, managers should be passive and let shareholders 
decide whether to tender. In the director primacy model, the board of directors is not a 
mere agent of the shareholders, and centralised decision making is regarded as an 
essential attribute of efficient corporate governance.653 Entity modellers also take the 
view that the company is serving not only the interests of shareholders but also of the 
company’s constituencies, including employees, suppliers, creditors, customers, and even 
the interests of the local community. Thus, it is claimed that the target board of directors 
and not the shareholders should have the power to make the final decision on a takeover 
bid. 
The contestants in this debate were unable to reach any middle ground, not only because 
of ideological differences between the two sides of the arguments, but also because of 
generally satisfactory results achieved by both the City Code in the UK and the current 
Delaware laws in the US.654 The UK has adopted a notable approach to regulating 
takeovers, favouring shareholder primacy. In the US, shareholder primacy has been far 
more successful in theoretical debates than in actual practice, and the Delaware courts 
hold that the company is under the control of its directors.  
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Looking at the vast amount of empirical investigation, there is ample evidence to indicate 
the positive and negative effects of takeover defences on shareholders’ returns. This 
empirical data has been used by each individual school of thought to support its own side 
of the debate. On the one hand, curtailment of directors’ ability to resist a takeover bid 
would have an adverse effect on long-term development of the company and therefore 
damage the economy. On the other hand, allowing directors to employ defensive tactics 
could have a detrimental effect on managerial entrenchment and destruction of 
shareholder value. It is difficult to conclude which result is more convincing than the 
other.  
It can be argued that these empirical studies have failed to resolve the problem of whether 
the takeover regulations should curtail directors’ ability to resist takeover bids by 
employing defensive tactics without consulting the shareholders. As Coates has stated, 
‘[n]ot a single strong finding has been confirmed in other studies. Little or no consensus 
exists on why [takeover defences] are adopted or what effects they have’.655 However, the 
dividing line between placing the decision for the success or failure of a takeover bid in 
the hands of the target managers or the shareholders seems to be a major fault-line in the 
design of takeover regulations.656 It is entirely the legislator’s choice to meet its own 
legislative purpose, in the face of the enormous amount of academic literature trying to 
convince legislators one way or the other.  
2. Responses to the Arguments  
Before assessing the appropriateness of the Chinese approach to takeover defences, it is 
necessary to respond to the arguments summarised in the literature review and answer the 
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question of whether a target board should be allowed to employ takeover defences 
without the shareholders’ consent. 
2.1 Takeovers as a Corporate Governance Mechanism 
When deciding whether or not to allow a target board to freely use takeover defences, an 
important issue needing to be clarified is whether the hostile takeover is good or bad in 
general, and what are the functions it serves in terms of corporate governance. Takeovers, 
especially hostile takeovers, have long been ‘interpreted as the critical corporate 
governance mechanism … without which managerial discretion cannot be effectively 
controlled’.657 An efficient takeover market enhances corporate governance in two ways, 
summarised by Amour and Skeel as the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ benefits of hostile 
takeovers.658 
Firstly, hostile takeovers are regarded as a mechanism to improve the allocation of social 
resources for the benefit of society as a whole, by ensuring that these resources are 
operated by the most capable person and thus maximise economic returns.659 A successful 
bidder can improve the target company’s performance by bringing better management 
after the bid is completed. Thus, corporate control is transferred to those who are capable 
of managing the assets of the target more efficiently and profitably. As Burkart and 
Panunzi have argued, when the incumbent management loses its comparative advantage 
in running the company, takeovers ‘remove the inefficient managers against their will and 
exploit synergies between firms’.660 
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Secondly, hostile takeovers are viewed as a disciplinary mechanism for incumbent 
management by giving them a stronger incentive to perform well and focus on returns to 
shareholders. Under the threat that the company will be acquired and that the managers 
will lose their jobs, target management is forced to manage the company more efficiently 
and thus create more value for its shareholders. As Manne has noted, the threat of a 
potential takeover disciplines management to serve the interests of shareholders in order 
to keep both their ‘power and protection commensurate with their interest in corporate 
affairs’.661 In other words, a company will be run in a manner closer to that of a 
successful bidder and will do as much as possible in order to reduce the chance of being 
taken over by outsiders. As a result, shareholders in general benefit from takeovers even 
if their company never becomes the subject of a takeover bid.662 
2.2 Consideration of Interests of Stakeholders  
Those who support abandoning the exclusive consideration of shareholders’ interests and 
giving equal consideration to a wide range of interests of other constituencies, criticise 
placing the decision on takeover offers with the target shareholders and not giving 
substantial recognition to the interests of other stakeholders.663  
It may be true that the fair treatment of other constituencies is instrumentally important in 
creating company wealth and that their interests need to be considered in a company’s 
business plan, but it cannot be justified that establishment of the business is only to 
benefit other constituencies. Other constituencies should expect to be protected through 
contract with the corporation and specific aspects of statutory law, such as workplace 
safety, unemployment insurance and fraudulent conveyance law. Given such contractual 
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and statutory protection, the main goal of the company is to operate to create a profit and 
maximise the returns for the owners of the company’s equity, the shareholders.  
From the potential equity investors’ point of view, if they do not have the assurance that 
their interests will be given priority, less capital is likely to be invested in the markets. 
Consequently, in the long term, it is arguable that ‘the social costs occasioned by the 
reduced incentives for investment would far outweigh any social costs incurred by other 
constituencies affected by takeovers.664 As Roe has argued, ‘if the company is operated 
based on a belief that shareholders are the only residual beneficiary, other constituencies 
will be overall better off and their fairness will be maximized, otherwise leaving too 
much discretion to management so as to protection stakeholder interests might in the end 
maximize neither shareholder, nor stakeholder but only management their own’.665 
2.3 Target Board’s Situation in Takeovers  
It is argued that the rules of fiduciary duties and especially the duty of loyalty effectively 
restrict directors’ ability to use their authority in their own interests. However, when a 
company is subject to a hostile takeover, the situation is totally different. The target board 
is exposed to a significant conflict of interest, loss of their jobs and the accompanying 
private benefits that they enjoy from their positions, against maximising the value of the 
company for its shareholders. Target boards may therefore have strong incentives to 
frustrate bids. As Strout has pointed out, the temptation which directors face is ‘harder to 
control through classic loyalty rules’ because it is not to ‘steal from their firms’, but to 
‘neglect shareholders’ interests in order to keep their own jobs’.666 Indeed, Clark has 
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explained this extremely difficult situation which directors face when their company is 
the target of a takeover bid:  
we could well conclude that in no other context is the conflict of interest as serious 
as in the takeover situation. Often the managers’ jobs are at stake. The temptation 
to find that what is best for oneself is also best for the corporation and shareholders 
(for example, to assert that company’s stock is “undervalued” and that 
shareholders will eventually do better if the pending offer fails), the temptation to 
spend corporate resources extravagantly in the attempt to fend offer the raider (it’s 
always easier to spend other people’s money), and the temptation to sacrifice the 
shareholders’ interests (as by paying exorbitant amounts of greenmail) must be 
overwhelming. No human being can be expected to resist such temptations. Nor 
does it matter much if a majority of directors are outside directors. They still have 
a social bond with the inside directors and officers, not with the diffuse public 
shareholders, and they may care about the status and perquisites that go along with 
being a director.667 
Likewise, even if a hostile bid is the result of poor management in the target company, the 
use of takeover defences would enable the directors to retain control or at least to extract 
a favourable deal for themselves.668 Similarly, it is argued that no matter how attractive 
the price offered by the bidder, for the same reasons, the target board will usually reject 
the offer and justify their actions on all sorts of high-sounding grounds.669 Therefore, 
when facing a hostile takeover, if the target board is given power to employ defensive 
measures, it would be more likely to judge the offer based on the likelihood of keeping 
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their positions in the target company, than on the best interests of the company and its 
shareholders.  
Although supporters of takeover defences argue that target shareholders will obtain a 
higher offer price in the end if the target board is free to employ defensive tactics when 
confronted with a hostile takeover, there is no evidence to show that if the target board is 
given the power to fend off a takeover bid which they do not want, they will use this 
power to raise the premium for shareholders rather than to extract private benefits. As 
Hartzell et al reported, in takeover transactions the board may negotiate a lower premium 
for their shareholders if they receive private benefits in the takeovers.670 Thus, the agency 
costs in a takeover situation are unlikely to be exceeded by any positive benefits to the 
takeover premium which may result from takeover defences.  
Moreover, those who support the US approach (director primacy) claim that the board is 
in a better position than its shareholders to make a decision on a hostile bid, as they are 
well trained professionals. It is argued that the board has been delegated the authority to 
manage the business of the company and thus has better information than shareholders 
about the target’s business and the bidder’s prospects for the company. The response to a 
takeover bid for the target company is therefore regarded as part of ordinary business 
decision making, which belongs to directors.  
This is not, however, persuasive. The decision on a takeover bid which is directly 
presented to the shareholders is not as a normal business decision allocated to the board to 
run the company. It is an investment decision for shareholders to make, on whether or not 
to sell their shares in a particular company. This decision affects core shareholder rights, 
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the right of voting one’s shares. Although the board may be more competent in making 
ordinary business decisions, it has no advantage over the shareholders in deciding this 
issue. As Davies has stated, shareholders may be just as expert in taking this kind of 
decision as directors. 671  Thus, allowing the board to make the decision on the 
shareholders’ behalf is not appropriate. Shareholders should be sufficiently well informed 
to make their own decision based on their own investment judgment.  
Furthermore, in the face of a hostile takeover offer, shareholders may make cross-purpose 
decisions on whether or not to sell their shares. As Weiss has pointed out, in response to a 
takeover bid there inevitably exists a conflict of interest between shareholders who are 
willing to sell their shares in order to capture the immediate premium and shareholders 
who plan to keep their shares in the company, either through loyalty to current 
management or belief in the company’s long-term economic performance.672 These two 
groups of shareholders present different attitudes toward the board’s interference. For the 
shareholders who wish to tender, any resistance from the target board is unwelcome, 
while those who intend to retain their shareholdings in the target company will be in 
favour of takeover defences. Hence, it is inappropriate to let the board decide on the 
shareholders’ behalf. The correct way is to leave shareholders to decide whether to sell 
their shares, without the board’s interference.  
2.4 Regulatory Choice on Power Allocation 
Shareholders, as the primary recipients of an offer, should have the right to determine the 
outcome of the proposed offer. Whether or not the target directors’ act for proper purpose 
or in good faith or for the best interest of the company in their long-term strategies is 
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irrelevant: shareholders should have the opportunity to tender their shares to bidders who 
offer a premium for the transfer of control. The power to accept or reject a takeover bid 
should be in the hands of shareholders not only because they are the holders of the rights 
to residual profits and assets of the company, but also because they bear a higher risk than 
any other party engaged in the business.673 
Moreover, in promoting the active market for corporate control, the bidders should also 
be free to put offers to the shareholders without resistance from the target board. As 
Davies and Hopt have noted, the takeover regulation must provide not only exit rules for 
shareholders but also entry rules for bidders.674 If takeovers are beneficial to both 
shareholders and society in general, any measure designed to prevent bidders from 
launching a bid is undesirable as it reduces welfare.675 Similarly, Kershaw has argued that 
takeover defences should be prohibited as they can deter ‘efficient combinations that 
generate synergies and reduce the cost of production’.676   
When facing a takeover bid, the target board has to be neutral and does not have the right 
to obstruct the bid by ‘making acts of extraordinary administration just to create 
obstacles’.677 If the decision were left to the target directors, their interest in keeping their 
own jobs and retaining the benefits associated with control would more likely outweigh 
their duty to act in the best interests of the shareholders.678 This would not only decrease 
management’s incentive to maximise the interests of shareholders but also prohibit 
shareholders from trading their shares freely.  
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In order to prevent directors from using their power for self-serving purposes, the safe 
solution is to give the final decision on whether to accept or reject a takeover bid to 
shareholders themselves. This ensures a well-functioning system of corporate governance 
and an active market for corporate control which reduces the possibility of target board 
acting out of self-interest, and facilitates the replacement of inefficient or incompetent 
management.679 Therefore, it can be concluded that the legal rules, in one respect, should 
restrict the target board’s ability to resist a takeover bid in order to self-interestedly 
entrench itself; in another, they should allow the board to act as a negotiator and possibly 
auctioneer to get a higher premium for shareholders. 
Allowing the target board to put the target company up for auction is argued to be 
beneficial to the shareholders as it increases their wealth.680 Davies and Hopt have also 
suggested that this event seems unproblematic as it does not constrain the shareholders’ 
choices but enlarges them.681 Although the shareholders have a right to accept or reject a 
takeover bid, the target board should be allowed to search for a white knight for the 
shareholders. The target company will be allocated to the bidder who is best able to use 
the target assets efficiently.682 Bidders who are willing to pay for the shift in control will 
gain the most added value and synergy from the takeover bids. As Gilson has argued, 
‘allocating resources among competing claimants by price is desirable because it places 
resources with the most efficient users’.683 The target company will therefore ultimately 
gain from the bidding competition by being acquired by the bidder who values the 
company most highly. 
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3. Chinese Approach Comparing with the UK and US’s 
As mentioned previously, a hostile takeover raises a conflict of interest between the 
incumbent controllers of the target and its shareholders. In the UK and US, this is 
between the target directors and shareholders. When a takeover bid is imminent, these 
two countries apply totally different rules to address this conflict of interest. 
In the US, the target management is given greater flexibility to act against potentially 
undesired bids by using takeover defences. The main weight of the ruling is on the 
general fiduciary duties owed by the target board to the shareholders as defined in 
Delaware case law.684 Delaware courts apply an enhanced judicial scrutiny to target 
directors’ actions in responding to a hostile takeover offer.685 However, criticism of the 
US principle that the target board enjoys the freedom to deploy takeover defences without 
shareholders’ consent continues. In a recent case, Air Productions and Chemicals, Inc. v 
Airgas, Inc., in re Airgas Inc. Shareholder Litigation,686 the court confirmed that the 
target board’s use of a poison pill in combination with a staggered board to thwart a 
tender offer was valid. Given the effect which the Airgas case may have on hostile 
takeovers, institutional investors, proxy advisors and shareholder representatives, seeking 
to achieve a healthier allocation of power between the target board and the shareholders 
in a hostile takeover offer, strongly suggested a court-controlled expiry date for poison 
pills when used in conjunction with a staggered board to fend off the tender offer.687 They 
recognised the unfairness of the situation where a tender offer fails only because of the 
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defensive tactics used by the board, even though a majority of target shareholders want to 
tender. However, the US has not gone as far as the UK in adopting NFR.   
In the UK, the City Code imposes NFR to prevent the board of directors from taking any 
actions that may frustrate a potential bid without the approval of its shareholders, giving 
complete power as to the acceptance of a bid to the target shareholders. Johnston has 
argues that the NFR introduced by the City Code to restrict boards’ power to employ 
defences is extremely important.688 General Principle 3 of the City Code requires the 
board of the target company to ‘act in the interests of the company as a whole and not 
deny the shareholders the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid’. During the offer 
period, the City Code also requires the target board to avoid taking any action to frustrate 
the bid or deny shareholders the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid689 and to 
communicate their opinion on the offer to their shareholders.690 
As a result, in the UK post-bid defences are forbidden without shareholder approval when 
a takeover bid is imminent. In using pre-bid defences, the target board is not governed by 
the City Code, but directors are still subject to their fiduciary duties in the common law 
and codified duties in the CA 2006. Moreover, the City Code insists it is the duty of the 
board to provide shareholders with sufficient and accurate information relating to the 
takeover bid and to offer advice. Imposing this duty on directors ensures that shareholders 
are able to make a properly informed decision on the offer for their shares. 
Moreover, although the target board is prohibited from defending the company against a 
takeover bid without shareholder approval, it is allowed to seek a competing bid, a white 
knight, without authorisation from the general meeting of shareholders. In the US, when 
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the target directors intend to sell to a white knight, the Delaware Supreme Court held that 
the directors’ duty is no longer the preservation of the independence of the company but 
the maximisation of the company’s value.691 In such a situation, both the UK and US 
require that the directors should not favour one bidder over the others but must maintain a 
level playing field for all bidders by treating them equally. 
Figure 6-1 Directors’ Role in the UK 
         
In China, the problem of corporate governance is particularly serious due to the lack of 
efficient supervision of management.692 Hence, as the former Chairman of the CSRC, 
Xiaochuan Zhou, commented on the development of the new Chinese takeover regime, 
‘through takeovers and restructurings, China’s capital market will play an active role in 
better integrating the nation into the world economy and ensuring smoother economic 
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transition and structural adjustment’.693 In China, theoretically speaking, a regime like the 
City Code is therefore preferable as it prohibits the target board from using takeover 
defences to deter the tender offer without shareholder approval. In reality, the Chinese 
legislators have followed UK experience rather than the Delaware takeover regime on the 
target directors’ role when facing a hostile takeover.  
In order to promote the market for corporate control, the Takeover Measures 2006 also 
restrict the target board’s ability to use defences without the shareholder approval. 
Chinese legislators clearly recognised that empowering board of directors to resist offers 
interferes with the market discipline of corporate governance which is being promoted by 
the government. Through an active market for corporate control, Chinese companies are 
expected to be managed more efficiently because of the threat of hostile takeovers. As Yu 
has stressed, restricting directors’ ability to use takeover defences has a satisfactory 
outcome in general, and sends out a positive signal in the sense of achieving the primary 
goal of improving the efficiency of a large number of state-owned listed companies.694 
Moreover, as in the UK’s approach, Chinese takeover law does not impose a passive role 
on the target board, which should make a recommendation to shareholders on whether to 
accept the offer and hire financial consultants to give an expert opinion.695 Moreover, the 
law does not prohibit directors from seeking a white knight to enter a competing bid to 
enlarge the shareholders’ choice.  
At the same time, the Chinese approach mandates Delaware-like fiduciary duties of 
directors in the context of takeover. Although directors in the UK are also subject to 
fiduciary duties, the more restricted NFR means that they are rarely enforced. However, 
                                                
693 Xiao Zhang, ‘New Rules to encourage M&As’ China Daily (Beijing, 9 October 2002) 2. 
694 Guanghua Yu, ‘Takeovers in china: The Case Against Uniformity in Corporate Governance’ (2005) 34 Common 
Law World Review 169, 189. 
695 Takeover Measures 2006, art 32. 
Chapter 6 Promotion of Takeovers and Non-Frustration Rule 
July 2013 223 
the Chinese legislators have explicitly written the fiduciary duties of directors not only 
into the Company Law but also into the takeover rules. This provides that when facing a 
takeover bid, the board of a target company have to meet their duties of loyalty and 
diligence to the company and make sure that decisions and defensive measures are 
beneficial to the interests of the target company and its shareholders. If there is a bid 
competition, the target board is not allowed to favour one bidder over others and must 
treat fairly all the acquirers who intend to take over the company.696 
Figure 6-2 Directors’ Role in China 
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Chapter 7 Protection of Shareholders and Mandatory Bid Rule 
1. Costs of Shareholder Protection Rules 
In addition to the promotion of an active takeover market, ensuring fairness and justice 
for shareholders is a main goal of takeover regulation. Thus, the rules designed to protect 
the interests of shareholders and ensure equal treatment of minority shareholders are easy 
to justify and widely accepted in the majority of countries’ takeover regulations. Nearly 
the whole process of the tender offer is governed by rules intended to protect the equal 
opportunity of shareholders, which is mainly achieved by requiring adequate information 
disclosure and specifying certain tender offer rules.697 Similar shareholder protection 
rules can be found in the takeover law in the UK, US and China. 
These rules include, for example, that the takeover bid should be made to all holders of 
the same type of shares; if the number of shares that bidders offer to purchase is less than 
the number of shares for which the offer is accepted, the shares should be bought on a pro 
rata basis; the offer should be open for a certain length of time and offerors should not be 
allowed to withdraw their takeover offer during the offer period; shareholders should 
have the right to withdraw their acceptance if they change their mind during the offer 
period; and shareholders are entitled to have access to adequate information to make 
informed decisions on whether to tender or not. All the above rules are designed to ensure 
that target shareholders are not coerced into a tender offer which they think is inadequate. 
Rules such as requiring a bid to be made to all the shareholders in the target company on 
a pro rata basis, and kept open for a certain period of time, significantly reduce the 
possibility that the target shareholders are tendering simply because of their concern that 
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other shareholders will tender before them and they will be left as a minority in the 
acquired company.698 
However, it needs to be stressed that all the rules designed to protect shareholders’ 
interests have costs. They may have the effect of facilitating potential competing takeover 
offers and even effectively deterring takeovers that otherwise would have been 
launched.699 As Huang has argued, ‘the objective of shareholder protection, however, 
may conflict with the economic objectives of efficiency in resource allocation to the 
extent that the rule would render the hostile takeover more difficult and thus diminish the 
contestability of takeovers’.700 A good example to illustrate this cost is the rule requiring 
the bid to be open for a certain period of time, which may give a potential competitor time 
to enter a competing bid. As Romano has remarked, ‘any regulation that delays the 
consummation of a hostile [even a friendly] bid … increases the likelihood of an auction 
by providing time for another bidder to enter the fray, upon the target’s solicitation or 
otherwise’.701  
1.1 Information Disclosure Rules 
In order to protect the interests of target shareholders, the takeover regulations of almost 
all jurisdictions require bidders to disclose to the market information about any 
substantial holdings above a certain size in the target company, in order to help target 
shareholders make a well-informed investment judgement and reduce the gains from low 
and steady ‘creeping control’ purchased in the open market, without alerting market 
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participants or other potential bidders.702 One of the leading supporters of disclosure rules 
has argued that requiring the disclosure of material information to shareholders, such as 
the purpose of holding shares and the future plans of the offeror, is necessary because 
public investors are to stand on ‘equal footing’ with the acquiring person in assessing the 
future of the company and the value of its shares.703 
The information disclosure rules, which have attracted a wide range of practical and 
academic attention, show a similar concern. It is noted that imposing a disclosure duty on 
bidders does not recognise their research costs, and increases both the cost and the risk of 
takeovers by lowering the bidder’s expected return. This may make the initial bid less 
profitable and thus greatly reduce bidders’ incentives to make a takeover bid in the first 
instance.704 Specifically, these rules impose a heavy obstacle to hostile takeovers through 
the purchase of shares via the stock exchanges after every change of 5% in shareholdings. 
The disclosed information may prematurely inform the market and give a potential 
competitor advance warning that a particular target company is undervalued and an offer 
for it is likely to be forthcoming. More importantly, subsequent bidders may take 
advantage of the information produced and disclosed by a first bidder. Furthermore, it 
may induce public investors to buy shares in the particular target company and hence 
boost the target share price. As Black has observed, ‘the competitive character of the 
takeover market washes away all gains for the bidder once it loses the benefit of 
secrecy’.705 
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By requiring the bidders to disclose information, the threshold of substantial 
shareholdings and the time for disclosure have a significant influence on the contestability 
of the takeover.706 The lower the threshold, the more protection the target shareholders 
will obtain; however, the likelihood of a takeover bid being made will be less. Generally 
speaking, the bidder needs to accumulate a certain number of shares before initiating a 
takeover bid. If the takeover rules require the bidders to disclose their holdings in the 
target company too early, the market could react to raise the share price, and hence the 
takeover bid would turn out to be more costly for bidders.707 As Liu and Pißler have 
pointed out, ‘it is very likely that after the first announcement the share price rises to a 
level that makes the bidder’s endeavour to further increase his holdings in the target 
virtually impossible’.708 Therefore, when choosing an appropriate disclosure threshold, a 
regulator faces a trade-off between the promotion of corporate control and the protection 
of shareholders.709 In China, the 1993 Tentative Regulation on the Administration of the 
Issuing and Trading of Shares requires a substantial shareholder to disclose a change in its 
holding of at least 2% of the outstanding shares.710 In order to reduce its effect on the 
takeovers, this threshold was raised to 5% in the Securities Law of 2005. 
When discussing takeover regulation, although we cannot ignore the above costs 
associated with the shareholder protection rules, there seems to be general consensus on 
the need for extensive disclosure information by bidders, and to address shareholders’ 
coordination difficulties through equal treatment rules.711 Thus, it is not surprising to find 
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that the shareholder protection rules occupy a central part of all takeover regulation. It is 
common to see rules requiring the disclosure of information for the benefit of the target 
shareholders and equal treatment of the shareholders, especially minority shareholders. 
Although these rules have an adverse effect on the market for corporate control, it is true 
that shareholders do need to be well protected and will be better off with a regulated 
bidding procedure and information disclosure.712 
1.2 Regulatory Response in China 
As noted in Chapter 6, hostile takeovers play an important role in realising the wealth 
generated by exploiting synergies between the acquiring and the target company, as well 
as by disciplining target management to act in the best interests of its shareholders. 
Chinese legislators intend to maximise the desirable effect of hostile takeovers and ensure 
the efficient allocation of productive resources and management monitoring by regulating 
the takeover activities. Meanwhile, shareholder protection cannot be ignored. It is also 
crucial to the development of the Chinese takeover market.713 The takeover regulation in 
China provide a safeguard for target shareholders, ensuring sufficient information to 
consider the tender offer and equal opportunity to participate. In recent years, the CSRC 
has been primarily concerned with protecting the rights of individuals and less 
sophisticated investors, trying to ensure that individual investors receive fair, full and 
accurate disclosures of potential transactions, for them to make informed decisions. 
For this reason, China intends to ensure a well-functioning market for corporate control 
and to protect shareholders’ interests at the same time. As the CSRC clearly stipulates in 
Article 1 of the 2006 Takeover Measures, according to Company Law, Securities Law 
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and other laws and relevant administrative regulations, this measure was enacted in order 
to standardise the takeover activities of listed companies, stimulate the optimisation of the 
resource allocation on the stock market, protect the lawful rights and interests of investors, 
and safeguard the normal order of the stock market. Hence, the discussion of the 
appropriateness of Chinese takeover regulation in this chapter will concentrate on the 
balance between these two fundamental objectives of takeover regulation: promotion of 
an active takeover market and protection of shareholders. The focus will be on whether 
the current takeover regulation has solved the policy dilemmas between these two 
principles, within China’s own political and economic environment.  
2. Mandatory Bid Rule  
The equality rules designed to provide protection to shareholders seem to be recognised 
in all jurisdictions. However, there is no universal acceptance of rules to implement the 
equality principle between those in control and those left as minority shareholders, by 
providing the right of exit for the minority shareholders. Whether or not to require the 
acquirer to make a general offer to the remaining shareholders once it has acquired 
sufficient shares to obtain control of the target becomes one of the most controversial 
expressions of the equality principle.714  
This rule, the MBR, which requires the bidder to make a tender offer to all the 
outstanding shares when a specified controlling threshold is met, was introduced by the 
UK’s City Code and later spread to many other countries and regions. China’s takeover 
law also adopts the MBR in order to ensure equality of treatment of minority shareholders. 
However, the US is not one of these countries, and there is no such consensus in the US’s 
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takeover law. Two-tier offers, which violate the principle of MBR, do not violate the 
provisions of the Williams Act in the US.715  
2.1 Rationale for MBR 
When considering the applicability of the MBR, whether or not there is a controlling 
shareholder in the target company is a crucial issue. Where there are no controlling 
shareholders in the target company, the control of the company is passed from the hands 
of the target board to the bidder, despite that the ownership of control is transferred from 
target shareholders to the bidder. As Davies and Hopt have suggested, ‘there is a 
disjunction between the parties to the dealing which bring about the transfer of control 
(acquirer and target shareholders) and the parties to the control shift itself (acquirer and 
target board)’.716 Therefore, the main agency problem is between the target board and the 
target shareholders. The fundamental concern that takeover regulation needs to address is 
management’s opportunism at the cost of shareholders.  
Figure 7-1 Companies without Controlling Shareholders 
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On the other hand, where there is an existing controlling block of shares held by one or a 
small number of shareholders in the target company, the successful corporate control shift 
is not from the target board, but from those controlling shareholders to the bidder who 
intends to obtain control. In this situation, agency problems occur between controlling 
shareholders and non-controlling shareholders. The main problem that takeover law tends 
to address is how to protect non-controlling (minority) shareholders’ interests against 
controlling shareholders’ opportunism.717 
Figure 7-2 Companies with Controlling Shareholders 
                            
When there are controlling shareholders in the target company, the bidder is more likely 
to come to a purchase agreement with them at a premium price and then decide whether 
or on what terms to make a subsequent offer to the non-controlling shareholders. The 
controlling shareholders may sell control of the company to a bidder who will be less 
respectful of the interests of non-controlling shareholders in exchange for a high selling 
price. The takeover regulation seeks to address this problem by adopting MBR to require 
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bidders to extend the same terms of purchase to the non-controlling shareholders in the 
target company.718 MBR can be justified on the following three bases. 
Firstly, since the shift of control usually involves a premium over the market price paid to 
the incumbent controller, it is argued that the remaining shareholders should have the 
opportunity to share the premium which the bidder is paying for receiving control. This 
controlling premium is referred to as the difference between the market price for an 
individual share and the price of a share that includes controlling benefit in the target 
company.719 In the absence of an obligation to make a mandatory bid, controlling 
shareholders who own a higher percentage of shares in the target company can sell their 
block shareholding outside the market at any price that a bidder is willing to pay for the 
control shift, without involving minority shareholders in the deal. Hence, the sale of a 
block to transfer control can take place whenever it is mutually beneficial for the bidder 
and the controlling shareholders.720 The rationale behind the MBR is to provide equal 
treatment to minority shareholders by effectively preventing creeping transfer of control 
and ensuring that all shareholders share equally in the control of the premium. 
Secondly, when control of a company passes to a new controller, it is argued that the 
remaining shareholders should have the opportunity to sell their shares at the highest 
price paid by the new controller. When the incumbent controlling shareholders sell 
control of the company for a high premium, to a bidder who will loot the target company 
by expropriating the private benefits of corporate control, the minority shareholders will 
be locked in the looted company.721 They will then be forced to deal with the new 
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controlling shareholder who is intent on looting the company, only to find their shares 
have declined in value. In this respect, the MBR is set to deal with the conflict between 
new controlling shareholders and minority shareholders after the completion of the 
control shift. In the event of an undesirable change of control by the controlling 
shareholder, it provides the minority shareholders with an opportunity to exit the 
company at a fair price and with equal treatment of all shareholders in substance.722  
Finally, the minority shareholders need extra protection when a bidder launches a tender 
offer in a coercive way by stating that he will make a lower offer once he has obtained 
control of the company.723 In the absence of MBR, the minority shareholders may be 
under pressure to make the choice of tendering their shares during the control acquisition 
process, because if they do not tender their shares to bidders, they will lose the immediate 
benefit of the offer and have to take a lower price for their shares after the deal is sealed. 
In this way, the bidders can coerce the target shareholders to tender at a price even below 
what they consider its value.724 Under these circumstances, MBR is used to remove 
pressure to tender from the non-controlling shareholders. In addition, where the bid is 
value-increasing, it can be argued that providing non-accepting shareholders with an exit 
right is not necessary because the value of minority shareholders’ shares will be higher 
after the control shift than before. However, as Burkhart and Panuzi has argued, the non-
controlling shareholders’ interest may not be guaranteed in a value-increasing company, 
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as there is still a risk that the new controller may attempt to exploit the private benefits of 
control at the expense of their interest.725  
2.2 Adverse Effect of MBR 
Some scholars observed that even though the MBR could provide more protection for 
shareholders by ensuring that the control premium is shared by all shareholders, and that 
minority shareholders have a right to exit the company, the rule almost inevitably 
increases the cost of acquiring the control of target companies and consequently may 
reduce the number of takeover bids by making the target company more expensive to 
acquire.726 As Burkart and Panunzi have pointed out, ‘the mandatory bid rule never 
simultaneously secures a bid premium and provides effective protection’.727  
The MBR not only makes bidders pay more in terms of the takeover offer price, but also 
makes them buy a greater number of shares than they intended.728 Bidders are required to 
purchase not only the number of shares sufficient to obtain control of the target, but also 
an additional amount of shares at a price which can exceed the market price. As a result, 
the MBR may fend off potential takeover bidders from the takeover market and weaken 
the disciplinary function of the market for corporate control. This is because of the 
requirement of a general offer for all the outstanding shares in the target company, 
intended to provide shareholders with the exit opportunity at an attractive price; this is 
something they rarely have, but it may put a bid in a situation where the bidders are 
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discouraged by the burden of the MBR and give up the intention of purchasing corporate 
control in the first place.729  
From the perspective of controlling shareholders, they will be reluctant to sell their block 
by being required to share the control premium with the non-controlling shareholders 
when the MBR is triggered, because the greater takeover cost forces the bidder to lower 
the consideration in the offer for obtaining control shift.730 The controlling shareholders 
have to give up some control premium to share with other shareholders when the 
threshold is triggered. Hence, even if the control transfer will improve the efficiency and 
create value for the target company, it is unlikely to happen due to the controlling 
shareholders’ resistance to the sale. Similarly, non-controlling shareholders are also worse 
off because of the lower offer price. As McCahery and Vermeulen have observed,  
Under the assumption that the blockholder has access to private benefits of control, 
the majority shareholder enjoys a disproportionately large segment of the 
company’s stand alone value to transfer control, the incumbent blockholder will 
demand compensation for the loss of private benefits. If all shareholders must be 
treated alike, the blockholder’s share will be proportionate to the value in the 
takeover. For the incumbent controlling shareholder, the proportionate value of 
takeover can be less than the disproportionate share of the stand-alone firm 
value.731  
Although the costs of the MBR exist for companies with dispersed holdings of shares, 
where the bidder can build up a controlling block by acquiring shares from dispersed non-
                                                
729 Davies and Hopt (n5) 253. 
730 Reinier Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford 
University Press 2009) 258. 
731 Joseph A. McCahery and Erik P. M. Vermeulen, ‘Does the Takeover Bids Directive Need Revision?’ (2010) TILEC 
Discussion Paper No 2010-006 < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1547861> accessed 21 September 2012, 8. 
Chapter 7 Protection of Shareholders and Mandatory Bid Rule 
July 2013 236 
controlling shareholders, they are particularly high in the target company with controlling 
shareholders.732 In the latter case, a bidder not only needs to pay for the private benefits of 
control to purchase the controlling block from the controlling shareholders, but also needs 
to extend it to the remaining shareholders. Therefore, the MBR, requiring that the 
subsequent general offer be made to the remaining shareholders at the same price paid 
outside the market or prior to the bid, makes the cost of control shift much higher than 
purchase of the controlling block. As Coffee has noted, ‘if private benefits of control are 
high, the disincentive effect of a MBR will be significant’.733  
From the bidder’s perspective, an MBR can act similarly to a takeover defence in which 
the target management gains an advantage because they can be protected from removal in 
the target company. 734  As Ventoruzzo has noted, ‘in systems where controlling 
shareholders possess, on average, a threshold of shares over 30%, the compulsory tender 
offer might represent something akin to a statutory defensive measure’.735 All in all, an 
MBR that provides equal treatment for minority shareholders reduces the private benefits 
of control that a bidder expects from the takeover transaction. This discourages bidders 
from launching a takeover bid, which means there will be fewer takeover bids and 
therefore fewer changes in corporate control.736 Consequently, the MBR is detrimental to 
takeover opportunities and causes corporate control to remain in the hands of inefficient 
controlling shareholders. As Bebchuk has argued, in companies with controlling 
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shareholders, the MBR eliminates unfair treatment to non-controlling shareholders at the 
cost of reducing more efficient control transfer.737  
2.3 Modification of MBR  
As the triggering threshold and the bid price set in the rule could greatly influence the 
practical outcome of the rule, it is argued that the costs of MBR can be reduced by 
increasing the threshold above which the bidder has to make a mandatory offer, or by 
lowering the price in the tender offer below the highest price paid for any of the shares 
previously accumulated.738 For instance, Swiss law permits shareholders, by provisions in 
the company’s constitution, to raise the triggering percentage from one third (the default 
setting) to up to 49%, and requires only that the offer should be at not less than the market 
price when the mandatory offer is made, or at 75% of the highest price paid for the shares 
by the acquirer over the previous 12 months.739 Extending the list of exceptions to the rule 
is also one way to reduce the costs associated with the MBR.  
The legislators in China have also recognised the costs of adopting MBR and have tried 
to modify it to mitigate its disincentive effect in various ways. For example, the 
Provisional Regulations for the Administration of Stock Issuance and Transaction 
(Provisional Regulations), which was promulgated in 1993, provides that the bid price is 
the greater of either the highest price paid by the offeror in the twelve months preceding 
disclosure of the bid, or the average market price during a thirty-day trading period prior 
to the bid.740 The Takeovers Measures 2006 try to reduce the bid price by stipulating that 
it must be not less than the highest price that the bidder has paid for the shares during the 
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six months preceding the date of the bid.741 Moreover, in accordance with the Takeover 
Measure 2002, the bidder has to launch a general offer if his shareholding reaches the 
threshold. In order to reduce the cost of applying the mandatory bid with a general offer, 
the Takeover Measures 2006 permit the acquirer to launch a partial bid for shares of the 
target company once the threshold is reached.  
3. Evaluation MBR’s Effect in China 
When considering the appropriateness of the imported English-style MBR, it should be 
remembered that the effect of MBR cannot be assessed separately from the local 
economic situation and capital market development. The commitment of the legislators in 
China to modify the MBR has to some extent indicated its negative effect on the Chinese 
takeover market. The arguments supporting the imposition of MBR may make more 
sense in theory than in practice in the Chinese context.  
3.1 Costs Outweigh the Benefits 
In the UK, where MBR was invented, the shareholding structure of listed companies is 
very wide, with no takeover barriers and the free transfer of shares and their voting rights. 
The control threshold is defined as 30% in the City Code, in the belief that acquiring 
interests in shares carrying 30% or more of the voting rights of a target company will 
enable the bidder to obtain effective control, irrespective of whether such interest or 
interests give actual control. This implies that a bidder can acquire up to 29.9% of the 
target company’s voting rights by private negotiation or partial offer, without any 
intervention from the Takeover Panel and without triggering a mandatory bid obligation 
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under Rule 9 of the City Code, because it is assumed that that these activities do not 
involve a shift of corporate control. 
The dispersed shareholding structure with no single large shareholder who can exercise 
influential control over the company means that the control of most of the listed 
companies can be transferred without triggering a mandatory bid. As Cheffins has pointed 
out, acquisition of control outside the market resulting in a private shift of control is less 
likely to happen in a system of widespread ownership.742 MBR only becomes necessary 
in exceptional circumstances, where the controlling shareholder is particularly strong and 
there is a risk that controlling interests might be transferred outside the market. In this 
context, it can be argued that MBR is intended less to protect minority shareholders from 
any change in control, and more to deal with changes in control by the action of a large 
blockholder.743 The dispersed structure in the UK may contribute to explaining why the 
MBR is completely accepted throughout the UK and has worked well and fairly. As Lee 
has argued, there is no evidence that the MBR potentially inhibits the likelihood of hostile 
takeovers in the UK.744 
However, unlike the situation in the UK, under the concentrated ownership structure in 
China, most listed companies have a controlling shareholder who probably holds more 
shares than the triggering threshold of MBR. According to the data collected from the 
CSMAR database, the single largest shareholder often owns more than 50% of the 
company’s shares. The corporate ownership in China is thus in sharp contrast to the UK 
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and US, with their dispersed shareholding structures and low concentrations, and where it 
is rare for investors to hold more than 10% of shares in the listed company.745 
Table 7-1 Listed Companies with the Largest Shareholder Ownership over 30% 
Year Listed Company Over 30% Percentage 
2004 1258 817 64.94% 
2005 1256 788 62.74% 
2006 1322 761 57.56% 
2007 1413 825 58.39% 
2008 1464 872 59.56% 
2009 1600 944 59.00% 
2010 1924 1143 59.41% 
2011 2124 1249 58.80% 
                 Source: CSMAR Database  
As Yu has observed, similar legal rules adopted in different countries may lead to 
different adaption and outcomes.746 In the Chinese situation, the practical effect of MBR 
is such that it is more likely that whoever intends to obtain control must have sufficient 
funds to buy all the outstanding shares in order to obtain control over a Chinese listed 
company, whether in a friendly or a hostile way. MBR is therefore acting more like a 
potentially powerful weapon for incumbent management to resist a hostile bid.747  
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It is widely acknowledged that there are significant numbers of inefficient SOEs in China. 
The Chinese government has viewed takeover activity as a key driver to accelerate the 
privatisation process and to reduce agency costs of SOEs. It intends to make SOEs more 
efficient and better able to compete with international entities operating in China, through 
the takeover market.748 However, China’s current takeover regulation adopting MBR to 
empowering the minority to share the control premium not only fail to protect 
shareholders’ interests as a whole in the long term, but also undermine the discipline 
function of the takeover market.749 The costs of adopting the MBR therefore outweigh its 
benefits.750 As a result, it is far from clear that the MBR is still effective in China. 
Firstly, the MBR requires the bidder to offer non-controlling shareholders the same per 
share price as he paid the existing controlling shareholder for the controlling block. In 
such case, a control shift only takes place when the bidder has sufficient capital to pay the 
control premium to the minority shareholders. Leveraging and borrowing between private 
companies is prohibited under Chinese law,751 and it is usually difficult for private 
companies to obtain funds from financial institutions. This is because in China, the 
financial institutions are more willing to finance SOE projects, as the SOEs are believed 
to have stronger repayment capability and, more importantly, the government will bail 
them out if they are in financial difficulties.752 As a result, private companies are less 
likely to obtain sufficient capital to buy all the remaining shares required by the MBR. 
Consequently, the existence of MBR makes takeovers by private companies nearly 
impossible in China. 
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Secondly, there has been a wide gap between MBR and its operation in practice. The 
need for an active takeover market to facilitate SOEs reform has forced the CSRC to 
grant exemptions, otherwise the high cost of applying the MBR would largely reduce 
incentives for potential bidders to take over Chinese listed companies.753 As a result, the 
market regulator, the CSRC, has been given broad discretion to waive the MBR on a 
case-by-case basis. It is argued that the exemption not only amplifies the CSRC’s 
regulatory and administrative power, but also, more importantly, it significantly reduces 
the applicability of the MBR in practice.754 As Hill has discovered, the frequent exercise 
of waiver power by the CSRC effectively ‘subvert[s] the operation of the mandatory bid 
rule altogether’.755 An extreme case presented by Li is that the CSRC had granted 
exemption from the MBR to all takeovers by private agreement, 121 in total, by the end 
of 2000.756  
In the past, the CSRC frequently gave exemptions to allow takeovers to go ahead without 
making a bid to all target shareholders, as the rule put too much burden on bidders, 
especially when the transfer of control triggering the threshold was state-owned shares. 
An exemption from MBR became much more difficult to obtain after the Takeover 
Measures 2006 came into force; these are more restrictive than the Takeover Measures 
2002 in terms of the grounds for exemption. Nevertheless, this is not because the MBR 
now makes more sense in China, but probably because the costs of MBR have become 
much lower by allowing partial bids in the Takeover Measures 2006 so that the over-wide 
exemptions to the MBR in the Takeover Measures 2002 can be narrowed down within a 
reasonable range.   
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However, the Takeover Measures 2006 add a catch-all provision, providing that the 
CSRC has the power to exempt the MBR in other circumstances deemed by the CSRC as 
necessary to development and change in the securities market and protect the lawful 
rights and interests of investors. As Yu has argued, this catch-all provision largely makes 
the MBR irrelevant in China.757 Moreover, it is argued that the waivers of the MBR 
issued by the CSRC could largely distort the takeover market because they can potentially 
be used to discriminate against certain market participants and provide others with 
favourable treatment.758  
All in all, the MBR intended to protect minority shareholders by ensuring a share in the 
control premium and providing an exit opportunity, is argued to have the opposite effect 
in the Chinese takeover market. Even if the bidder successfully obtains control of the 
target company, what is left for him is only synergy gains as the control premium is 
significantly diluted by the MBR.759 Although the MBR increases the compensation to 
minority shareholders in the case of a successful takeover, more importantly it reduces the 
likelihood of a takeover. As Weng has observed, the reality is that there are fewer 
takeovers taking place in China, ‘caused partially, if not completely, by the mandatory bid 
rule’.760 Adoption of the MBR is argued to effectively hinder the trade in controlling 
blocks, the dominant form for control shifts in China under its concentrated shareholding 
structure. 761 Armour et al have expressed a similar concern by noting that a full 
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mandatory bid can ‘stifle takeovers in countries where there are controlling 
shareholders’.762   
3.2 Partial Bid Particularly Dilutes Benefits  
Under the current concentrated corporate ownership structure in China, the MBR 
requirement of a general offer largely impedes the growth of the takeover market. A 
question faced by the Chinese legislators is to what extent MBR, which is intended to 
provide better protection to minority shareholders, will actually hinder rather than 
promote takeovers. As a result, aiming at ensuring an active takeover market to enhance 
the competitive ability of Chinese listed companies, legislators abandoned the original 
spirit of MBR by allowing minority shareholders to share only part of the control 
premiums, and curtailing their right to exit. The new approach introduced in Takeover 
Measures 2006 allows bidders to launch a partial bid once the threshold has been 
triggered, by stipulating that a bidder who has obtained a 30% shareholding in a listed 
company, shall make an offer to all shareholders of the listed company for a complete or 
partial acquisition of shares of the listed company.763 In the case that more shares are 
tendered than the bidder has offered to buy, the shares tendered must be purchased on a 
pro rata basis.764  
The reason why UK’s MBR is argued to go beyond US’s equal opportunity rule in 
protecting target minority shareholders is that it requires an acquirer, who obtains control 
of the target company, to offer to buy all the remaining shares from outstanding 
shareholders. Mandatory bids on all the outstanding shares are designed to reduce the risk 
that a controlling shareholder will sell his shares at a premium outside the market, leaving 
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remaining shareholders in the target company unable to sell their shares at a reasonable 
price. In other words, only an offer for all the outstanding shares ensures the protection of 
all the minority shareholders by providing for exit for every shareholder who does not 
agree with the takeover, without the need for pro rata acquisitions.765  
The extent of the protection for shareholders which MBR can provide is determined by 
the threshold at which the general bid must be launched and the price that must be paid; 
however, it is never determined by whether to allow a partial bid.766 The original spirit of 
an MBR is to require a bidder to offer all minority shareholders an exit opportunity on 
terms no less favourable than those offered to the controlling shareholders for their block 
of shares. Given that the mandatory bid offer is not for all the outstanding shares, the exit 
opportunity is not granted to all shareholders, because some are still left in a minority 
status in the company controlled by the new controller, without the opportunity of sharing 
the premium. As Pacheco has argued, if on acquiring control a purchaser is only required 
to offer to buy part of the shares of the target on a pro rata basis, then MBR does not 
provide the minority shareholders with the total exit that is expected.767  
The key difference between a mandatory bid and a partial bid is that, in the case of a 
mandatory bid, the controlling shareholder has to sell all his shares, so all other 
shareholders must have the same opportunity; whereas in the event of a partial bid, all 
shareholders are treated equally and will have the chance to sell a certain percentage of 
their shareholdings. As Davies and Hopt have pointed out, in order to give the minority 
the option to exit the company, the MBR should be accompanied by a prohibition on 
partial bids, even if there is a pro rata acceptance rule to make sure all minority 
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shareholders are treated equally.768 A mandatory partial bid for a minimum of 5% of the 
outstanding shares, stipulated in the Takeover Measures 2006, is not a real MBR as it 
violates the spirit of MBR to ensure the protection of all shareholders and thus greatly 
dilutes its original effect on the protection of minority shareholders.  
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Chapter 8 Recommendations for Chinese Takeover Law Reform 
1. Answering the Research Questions  
The UK and US, the first countries to introduce explicit takeover regulations, in 1968, 
have chosen significantly different regulatory regimes in responding to the conflicts of 
interest between the target board and target shareholders and between the bidder and 
target shareholders.  This is in spite of the fact that both countries have widely spread 
shareholdings in their public companies and a similarly developed securities market.  
It was found that the central issue in the UK’s takeover regulation is fairness among the 
target shareholders. The directors do not have power to employ any defensive measure to 
thwart an unwanted takeover bid unless the shareholders approve it and the bidder has to 
extend the offer to the remaining shareholders once obtaining 30% of shares in the target 
company. In the US, however, takeover law is designed to be more protective of 
managers than shareholders, but at the same time gives bidders more flexibility to launch 
a bid. Although the target directors owe fiduciary duties to the company, which prohibit 
them from improperly using their power, they have the ultimate say on adoption of 
defensive measures in the face of a takeover offer. 
In China, unlike the UK and US, the conflict of interest is chiefly between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders, because of the country’s highly concentrated 
shareholding structure. The Chinese takeover regulation is designed to maximise 
shareholders’ interests by facilitating beneficial takeovers and to minimise the risk of 
potential abuse of shareholders’ interests by other parties, including the target board, the 
bidders and the target controlling shareholders. The Takeover Measures 2006 
promulgated by the CSRC, associated with the Company Law and the Securities Law, 
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have completed China’s takeover regime and established a sound legal environment for 
the conduct of takeover transactions.  
There are, however, two notably divergent rules concerning takeovers in the UK’s City 
Code, namely NFR and MBR, which answer crucial questions which are at the centre of 
the debate: whether the board is allowed to employ takeover defences without shareholder 
approval, and whether the bidders have to launch a general bid on reaching a certain 
threshold. When discussing the pros and cons of the Chinese takeover regime, it was 
found that China has followed the UK model by adopting both NFR, to restrict a board’s 
ability to employ takeover defences; and MBR, to provide minority shareholders with an 
exit option in the event of a change of control.  
In allocating powers between directors and shareholders responding to takeover measures, 
the NFR is clearly supported so that shareholders can make decisions about their shares in 
the target company. The target board is prohibited from taking any action that would 
frustrate a takeover bid, without shareholder approval. If the directors can simply apply 
takeover defences without the shareholders’ consent, it is not only self-serving for the 
board at the cost of shareholders’ wealth, but also inefficient for the economy as a whole. 
Consequently, if shareholders want to be sure that frustration actions are employed in 
their interests, takeover defences must be subject to their approval.  
As noted above, Chinese legislators have adopted a similar regulatory response to 
takeover defences as the UK’s. This recognises shareholder decision making in relation to 
a takeover bid; as a general rule, the target directors are also entitled to make certain 
decisions and take defensive measures in response to a takeover bid, such as searching for 
a competing bidder without shareholder approval. Nevertheless, the target board has to 
perform the fiduciary duties owed to their company. The Takeover Measures 2006 takes 
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an ex ante approach like the City Code’s, addressing the conflict interest between the 
target board and shareholders by prohibiting the board from adopting any takeover 
defence without shareholders’ approval.  
It needs to be mentioned that under the current system of Chinese capital market where 
the key agency problem is between controlling majority and minority shareholders, the 
Takeover Measures 2006 keep silent on this problem. Although defensive measures 
against a takeover bid cannot be taken unless the board is explicitly authorised by a 
resolution of the shareholders’ meeting, the controlling shareholders and the actual 
controlling party might easily receive such approval at the meeting without the 
participation of minority shareholders. Therefore, having the shareholders’ meeting 
decide on the applicability of defensive actions might not be an effective method for non-
controlling shareholders. 
However, it has to be stressed that the agency problem between controlling and minority 
shareholders is not an acceptable argument to refute shareholder primacy. Requiring the 
shareholders’ consent to employ takeover defences should be a fundamental principle of 
the takeover regulation. The decision on takeover defence should not be left to the 
directors to decide, without the participation of the shareholders. Requiring the 
shareholders to confirm whether to launch a defensive measure at least provides a 
possible legal route for the shareholders to obtain a preliminary injunction to prohibit 
takeover defences without their consent.769 Ventoruzzo has further argued that the NFR 
increases the transparency of the adoption of frustration actions and gives non-controlling 
shareholders the opportunity to discuss the defences at the meeting and to obtain further 
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information from the directors.770 Therefore, what the Chinese legislators need to do is to 
make current takeover rules governing takeover defences more specific, in the meantime 
paying more attention to minority shareholder protection. 
With regard to the MBR, because the current Chinese shareholding structure is 
characterised by controlling shareholdings, it is suggested that the costs of MBR 
outweigh its benefits. It has been shown that when there is a controlling shareholder in the 
target company, the MBR makes it more costly to acquire control of the target. From this 
perspective, the takeover bid succeeds only if the bidder is willing and has the ability to 
extend the control premium to all the remaining shareholders in the target company. As a 
result, this rule allocates more surplus to the minority shareholders so that it becomes less 
attractive to the bidders to acquire control in the target company. Accordingly, this 
reduces the likelihood that the shareholders will receive a takeover premium.  
Although empirical evidence demonstrates that takeovers maximise the value of the target 
company and enhance managerial accountability by the threat of replacing inefficient 
management, takeovers rarely happen in China’s capital market. As Weng has suggested, 
one of reasons is that ‘Chinese takeover laws have a chilling effect towards potential 
corporate raiders’.771 In particular, the MBR seems to suit the British enterprise landscape, 
although this is not the case in China in the current economic situation. The MBR is ill-
suited and makes hostile takeovers in China even more unlikely. Any modification of the 
English-style MBR clearly implies that strictly following the original would not be 
efficient in the Chinese takeover environment.772  
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2. Recommendations on NFR 
2.1 Modifying Article 33 of Takeover Measures 2006 
Allowing target shareholders to decide the outcome of a takeover bid by imposing NFR is 
a rational regulatory choice by Chinese legislators. However, to bring them into line with 
the original model in the UK’s City Code, the provisions stipulating a rule similar to the 
NFR in the Takeover Measures 2006 need to be sharpened up and unambiguous. Rule 21 
of City Code on restrictions on frustrating action prohibits a target board from taking any 
‘frustrating actions’ rather than ‘defensive actions’ without the approval of the 
shareholders’ general meeting once an offer is imminent.773 It explicitly forbids the issue 
of retained shares and options, the sale or acquisition of assets of a material amount, and 
the stipulation of contracts other than in the ordinary course of business. Moreover, it 
should be kept in mind that the list of forbidden actions named in Rule 21 is not 
exhaustive, as the City Code forbids any actions taken by the target board with the effect 
of frustrating a takeover bid, regardless of what form they take.  
Similarly, the Chinese approach forbids those actions which ‘may make a significant 
impact on the assets, liabilities, interests or business results of the company’.774 However, 
it is hard to argue that all the actions that may have a significant impact on the assets, 
liabilities, interests or business results of the company, will necessarily have the effect of 
frustrating a takeover bid in any situation. They are still open to different interpretations. 
Furthermore, Article 8 of Takeover Measures 2006 prohibits target directors from 
obstructing a takeover offer by abusing their power to pursue their own interest at the cost 
of shareholders’. This can be interpreted as the target board still being allowed to launch 
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anti-takeover measures as long as they act within their powers and in the interests of the 
target shareholders.  
It is crucial to underline that the provisions of the current Takeover Measure 2006 with 
regard to takeover defences is less effective than the UK’s NFR, which requires the board 
to obtain the consent of shareholders before any actions which might frustrate the 
takeover. In order to affirm the shareholder-oriented approach, any action with the effect 
of thwarting a takeover bidder, irrespective of its form and the target board’s incentives, 
should be explicitly forbidden by the law. The Takeover Measures 2006, aiming to 
protect the lawful rights and interests of the target shareholders, should be as precise as 
the City Code in specifying that all defensive measures which may result in any takeover 
offer being frustrated must be approved by shareholders at the general meeting.  
2.2 Clarifying Directors’ Fiduciary Duties 
The Chinese regulatory response to the takeover defence is a combination of the UK and 
Delaware approaches; it prohibits directors from employing takeover defences during the 
offer period, at the same time imposing on directors their fiduciary duties throughout the 
whole of their term. This approach rules out the possibility of post-bid defensive 
measures employed by the target board to frustrate an unwanted bid, without the 
shareholders’ consent. Imposing fiduciary duties on the directors during the offer period 
is therefore not very useful, as the directors’ ability to use takeover defences is 
completely restricted by the NFR.  
However, the Chinese Company Law and Securities Law do not make any explicit rulings 
on the legitimacy of pre-bid defences used by the target board, nor is there any provision 
in the Takeover Measures 2006 governing the using of defensive tactics by the directors 
of a potential target company before the takeover is imminent. In prohibiting the target 
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board from adopting takeover defences in advance, in order to pursue their private 
interests at the expense of the shareholders, the concept of directors’ fiduciary duties 
becomes relevant. Directors are only subject to the fiduciary duties owed to the company 
when they choose anti-takeover mechanisms to entrench themselves prior to a takeover 
bid. 
Article 148 of the Company Law for the first time in China’s corporate law expressly 
stipulates directors’ fiduciary duties in an Anglo-American way. It recognises that the 
directors’ fiduciary duties have two aspects: duties of loyalty and of diligence. In the 
takeover of listed Chinese companies, the Takeover Measures 2006 also promulgate these 
two fiduciary obligations of the target board of directors. According to Article 8, when 
considering takeover defences, the target board owes duties of loyalty and diligence to the 
company and must make sure that any defensive tactics are beneficial to the target 
company and shareholders; the board must not abuse its powers by presenting an 
inappropriate obstacle to the attempted takeover. However, those path-dependent 
elements mentioned in Chapter 5, as well as the civil law system rooted in China, 
inevitably imply a winding road in the importation of common law fiduciary duties into 
Chinese jurisdiction. The incompleteness and ambiguity of the provisions is a priority for 
the legal reformist to deal with. 
In particular, the duty of loyalty requires that directors do not engage in actions which 
may damage the company and other shareholders’ interests, and exercise their rights in 
good faith and with a good manner. The specific prohibitions against duty of loyalty set 
forth in Article 149(1)-(8) of the Company Law end with the catch-all provision ‘other 
actions in breach of the duty of loyalty to the company’. However, surprisingly, the 
Company Law refers to the existence of a duty of diligence, but contains no further 
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provision with respect to it. This incompleteness makes the duty of diligence particularly 
hard to apply. Identification of breach of this duty is nearly impossible in the statutory 
law system, where the statute is the only legal source for the court to make the 
judgment.775  
Specifically, in the context of takeovers, although the Takeover Measures 2006 stipulate 
the general fiduciary duties of the target board, simply following the Company Law is 
considered over-abstract and misleading in practice.776 It prohibits the target board from 
placing an inappropriate obstacle in the way of a takeover bid, as an abuse of its powers. 
The provision is particularly confusing as it restricts the board’s defensive actions on two 
counts, placing an inappropriate obstacle and abusing its powers. Accordingly, it is 
unclear whether it is acceptable for the board to place an inappropriate obstacle to the 
takeovers as long as the board uses its power properly; or acceptable to use an appropriate 
obstacle even though abusing its power. Moreover, the absence of explanation of 
‘inappropriate obstacle’ makes its application even harder.  
Without doubt, the Company Law should be more specific on the duty of diligence and 
provide a standard for its application and for identifying breaches. The Takeover 
Measures 2006 should be clear and unambiguous in how to apply the fiduciary duties and 
add more guidance in the context of a target board adopting anti-takeover measures 
before the takeover bid is imminent. Much has been written on how to make the imported 
fiduciary duties more workable in China,777 and a fuller examination of fiduciary duties is 
outside the scope of this research. The issue most relevant to this research is that under 
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the current Chinese Company Law, as stated in Chapter 5, most pre-offer defensive 
measures are not within the scope of the target board’s ability but down to the decision of 
the shareholders’ meeting. Therefore, the main problem faced by the drafters of Chinese 
takeover law is not how to restrict a target board’s opportunistic behaviour prior to the 
declaration of tender offers, but the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders.  
Pursuant to the Company Law, the target board does not have the right to adopt any pre-
bid defences in the articles of association, without the shareholders’ consent. Any 
amendment to a company’s articles of association must be approved by the shareholders’ 
meeting.778 The board only has the power to initiate a proposal on those issues which 
have a significant impact on the interests of the company and its shareholders, and then 
call for a shareholders’ meeting to consider them. 779 Unlike the situation in the US, 
gaining control of a Chinese company’s board of directors does not necessarily mean the 
potential acquirer will obtain immediate control of the target company. 780 As such, the 
main agency problem that takeover regulation needs to address is to seek effective 
protection of minority shareholders by prohibiting controlling shareholders from 
manipulating the resolution on adoption or removal of takeover defences, no matter 
whether they are pre- or post-bid, at the minority shareholders’ expense.  
2.3 Enhancing the Protection of Minority Shareholders 
Under Articles 101(3) and 103 of the Company Law, shareholders separately or 
aggregately holding 10% or more of a company’s shares can call a special shareholders’ 
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meeting; those separately or aggregately holding 3% or more of the shares can put 
forward a proposal to the shareholders’ meeting for consideration. In the takeover 
scenario, the majority shareholders, therefore, may call a special shareholders’ meeting 
independently to adopt takeover defences; in the meantime, the minority shareholders 
also have the opportunity to propose takeover defences for approval by the meeting. 
Accordingly, both controlling and minority shareholders are in the same position in terms 
of initiating a takeover defence to be approved at the shareholders’ meeting. The main 
conflict of interest arises over the way in which the resolution at the shareholders’ 
meeting is decided. In this respect, the voting system plays a vital role.  
In accordance with Article 104 of the Company Law, the resolution on issues including 
amendment of articles of association, increasing or reducing the registered capital, merger, 
and division, dissolution and change of the company form, should be passed by 
shareholders representing two-thirds or more of the voting rights of the shareholders 
present at the meeting. The issues articulated in this provision cover almost all the 
measures which can be used to thwart a takeover bid. In order to better resolve this 
inherent conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders, the takeover law 
should stipulate in a more explicit and effective way the requirement for a two-thirds 
supermajority of shareholders voting at the shareholders’ meeting on the takeover-
frustrating actions articulated in Article 33 of Takeover Measures 2006, and on the 
defensive measures that existed prior to the takeover bid. Under this system, the 
controlling shareholders cannot find any regulatory gap to adopt or remove a takeover 
defence without minority shareholder participation.   
Moreover, it is important to make a controlling shareholder liable for a resolution passed 
at the shareholders’ meeting. This problem can be solved by imposing the fiduciary duties 
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of the controlling shareholders to the minority shareholders, similar to those of directors 
and prohibiting controlling shareholders from misusing their power to harm the non-
controlling shareholders’ interests. The non-controlling shareholders would therefore 
have the right to challenge the resolution before the court in light of the controlling 
shareholders’ abusive behaviour and significant damage caused to their interests. In terms 
of takeover defences, when controlling shareholders breach their fiduciary duty by 
employing the defences at the cost of minority shareholders, the minority shareholders 
could bring a suit to withdraw the defences and compensate the company and themselves 
for any loss it may have suffered. The regulatory advice on imposing fiduciary duties on 
the controlling shareholders will be provided later.  
3. Recommendations on MBR 
As discussed above, in a system with controlling shareholders, the agency problems and 
inherent conflict of interest is not between directors and dispersed shareholders, but rather 
between incumbent controlling shareholders, who attempt to extract private benefits from 
the target company, and non-controlling shareholders, who prefer equal treatment and a 
value-increasing bid. The takeover regulation seeks to address this problem either by 
requiring bidders to extend the same terms of purchase to the non-controlling 
shareholders in the target company or by prohibiting the existing controlling shareholders 
from exploiting their private benefits at the expense of non-controlling shareholders, 
whether they are incumbent controlling shareholders selling their block or the new 
controlling shareholders who obtain control after the bid.781  
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In particular, a duty could be imposed either on the acquirer of the controlling block to 
make a general offer to purchase the non-controlling shares at the same price as that paid 
for the control shift; or on the seller (incumbent controlling shareholders) to share the 
control premium with the non-selling minority shareholder and on the new controller 
(new controlling shareholders) not to harm existing minority shareholders’ interests after 
the completion of the takeover.782 The difference between these two approaches is that the 
former not only requires sharing the control premium with the minority shareholders, but 
also provides them with an exit right by requiring the bidder to extend the same premium 
to all the remaining minority shareholders in the target company. It is legislator’ job to 
make a regulatory choice on either imposing MBR to provide minority shareholders with 
an exit opportunity at the time of control shift, or imposing controller’s duties to protect 
the minority shareholders against unfair treatment. 
3.1 Abolishing Imported MBR  
With the development of globalisation, it is common to see one legal system borrow 
successful rules from other legal systems in order to create legal certainty and meet the 
needs of international legal harmonisation, especially in the business area. The same is 
true for China, which has been constantly learning from other systems in attempting to 
establish a sound legal framework. Its legislating process of new takeover regulations is 
also based on a study of foreign experience, with the aim of enhancing its market 
economy by attracting more foreign investments.  
With regard to the motivation for imitation, they are not inclusive. Some legislatures 
imitating other legal systems are simply motivated by saving time and cost, rather than by 
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pursuit of the best quality.783 In some extreme cases, the only reason for adopting a 
foreign model is that many other countries, particularly Western countries, have adopted 
these rules. Using a solution which has already been proved to work abroad may add to 
the prestige of that country, no matter whether it is workable in its own practice.784 Of 
course, it cannot be denied that some countries are more or less compelled to follow the 
particular legal system of other countries. No matter what the exact reason for imitating a 
foreign law, it is certain that the foreign rules may have a different impact on the legal 
system of the borrowing country.785  
There is always a potential risk that foreign legal institutions may be adopted wholesale 
from foreign experience, without adjustment to local circumstances. In an even worse 
scenario, when the policy makers borrow rules from a foreign legal system, they do not 
know how to apply them appropriately. Therefore, it is important to note that borrowing 
foreign legal solutions cannot be a simply copy, but a ‘careful survey of similar foreign 
institutions’ and ‘a reasonable transportation of those which may be retained, according to 
local conditions’.786 Likewise, Reitz has argued that significant modification will be 
required when one legal system transplants others because each legal system is regarded 
as ‘an at least partially unique legal system’.787  
Any legislation must be enacted to meet the needs of the people for whom it is made, as it 
is closely connected with the social, economic and political context in which it operates. 
In a similar vein, any adoption of transplanted legal rules in a foreign country is also 
subject to the local background. As Mann and Milhaupt have pointed out, the roles which 
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legal reformists play are not only to transplant foreign law, but more importantly, to 
improve the understanding of the outcome of transplanted rules as determined by 
‘cognitive biases, political ideologies and historical accidents’.788 Hence, the first step of 
transplantation is to understand how the rules arrived in their own countries and to 
recognise that the foreign rules may not function as well as expected after the transplant. 
It is argued that different ownership and corporate governance structures need different 
rules even if the aim of legislators in all countries is to enhance efficiency.789 Accordingly, 
Goerge et al have pointed out that similar rules applied in different types of corporate 
governance may not have the same effect, but rather an undesirable one.790 Good law 
does not always ensure a good effect in a different environment. It may be true that the 
MBR, which was adopted effectively in the UK, would not necessarily produce the 
desired result in China.791 Without careful consideration of the unique shareholding 
structure in Chinese listed companies, the costs associated with trying to adopt the MBR 
could be particularly high.792  
Through a properly regulated takeover market, Chinese legislators intend to achieve an 
active market for corporate control and at the same time sufficient protection for 
shareholders. In order to improve the corporate governance of Chinese listed companies, 
protection of minority shareholders’ interests is a priority of Chinese takeover law. In the 
Takeover Measures 2006, a set of equal treatment rules has been laid down to protect the 
interests of minority shareholders. For example, under the information disclosure rules, 
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the bidders are required to disclose the comprehensive information in a tender offer report 
to all the target shareholders.793 
However, these two goals may be in conflict. As already observed, the shareholder 
protection rules increase the gains of target shareholders, but diminish the bidder’s 
expected private benefits, resulting in a less active market for corporate control. Therefore, 
it is important to find a regulatory balance between these two goals. The regulation 
attempting to protect shareholder interests, such as substantial information disclosure 
rules and shareholders’ equal treatment rules, inevitably has some adverse effect on the 
development of the takeovers. However, there is no compelling reason to change them 
because they are widely accepted by most jurisdictions and are also necessary under the 
Chinese takeover law. 
However, a takeover rule like MBR that is intended to protect minorities in a system with 
a widespread ownership structure has the opposite effect on the takeover market in a 
country with controlling shareholders, like China. The political goal of maintaining 
control of the SOEs, and the concentrated ownership of Chinese listed companies, have 
completely changed the rationale of adopting MBR and made it irrelevant in practice.794 It 
cannot be denied that the Chinese government will significantly reduce its ownership in 
state-owned listed companies for economic purposes. Nevertheless, this will be a long 
and gradual process, because of path dependence. In the foreseeable future, what is 
certain is that the adoption of MBR cannot satisfactorily achieve the goal of improving 
efficiency of Chinese state-owned listed companies through an active takeover market. It 
cannot prevent the controllers from extracting private interests for themselves, but instead 
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diminishes the positive effect of the market for corporate control in replacing or 
disciplining inefficient management and improving corporate governance.795  
The costs of adopting MBR in China obviously outweigh the benefits. In recognising the 
disincentive effects of the MBR, its abolition is vital to the development of the market for 
corporate control, thus improving the corporate governance of Chinese listed companies. 
Therefore, in China, where the business environment is not like that of the City Code in 
the UK, considering its high costs and undesirable effects on the Chinese takeover market, 
the MBR is obviously not the solution and should be abolished. In addition, fiduciary 
duties on the controlling shareholders need to be imposed to ensure the protection of 
minority shareholders’ interests. 
3.2 Imposing Fiduciary Duties on Controlling Shareholders 
It is widely acknowledged that companies with highly concentrated ownership are 
generally under the control of controlling shareholders instead of professional managers, 
because the directors are usually nominated and appointed by the controlling shareholders 
and such directors always act in the interests of these shareholders. Through the proximity 
of the controlling shareholders and the board of directors, it is not hard to understand the 
controlling shareholders’ incentives and potential to expropriate gain from the minority 
shareholders.796 In China, as Cai has suggested, the largest shareholder in the listed 
company is capable of controlling the board of directors with more power than that 
allocated according to his pro rata shareholding.797 
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Science Research Network <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=802705> accessed 28 October 2012, 
35-36. 
796 Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer  (n65) 511. 
797 Cai (n525) 286.  
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There is a consensus that target controlling shareholders must be prevented from using 
the takeover as a vehicle to damage the interest of the target company or its minority 
shareholders. If their actions are likely to cause damage to the company and loss to the 
shareholders, they should be prohibited and penalised. To prevent abuse of the lawful 
rights of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders, rules to protect minority 
shareholders should be laid down in the general corporate law, imposing penalties on the 
controlling shareholders for any losses engaged by them.798   
Since this is not unique to the takeover scenario, but a common issue that corporate law 
should face within many contexts; it is not possible to rely on MBR to protect the 
minority shareholders against controllers’ abuse all the time. 799 As Davies and Hopt have 
remarked, for this purpose, ‘the mandatory bid rule constitutes a pre-emptive strike at 
majority oppression of minority shareholders and proceeds on the basis that general 
corporate law is not adequate to police the behaviour of controllers’.800 Therefore, in the 
absence of MBR, especially in the context of hostile takeovers, takeover regulation 
should generate more detailed rules with regard to fiduciary duties on controlling 
shareholders to protect the target company and minority shareholders’ lawful rights and 
interests. 
Fiduciary duty is a well-established common law principle, under which directors owe 
duties to shareholders and the company. The concept of fiduciary duties of directors has 
been imported into Article 148 of Chinese Company Law. However, whether controlling 
shareholders owes fiduciary duties to the company or to other shareholders remains 
                                                
798 Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The Mandatory Bid: A Critical Review’ in Klaus J. Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch (eds), European 
Takeovers – Law and Practice (Butterworths 1992) 357. 
799 Yu (n444) 10. Also see Jesper Lau Hansen, ‘The Mandatory Bid Rule: The Rise to Prominence of a Misconception’ 
(2003) 45 Scandinavian Studies in Law 173, 183. 
800 Davies and Hopt (n5) 253. 
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controversial. In the UK, no fiduciary duty is imposed on controlling shareholders toward 
non-controlling shareholders. However, the case law in some US states has recognised 
that controlling shareholders do owe fiduciary duties to the company and other 
shareholders, and has imposed an obligation on the controlling seller whenever the 
controllers obtain a control premium with the potential of prejudicing the non-controlling 
shareholders.801 The controlling shareholders are thus unable to exercise their power to 
transfer the control of the company for their own private benefit without sharing the same 
benefit with the minority. According to Pacheco, imposing fiduciary duties on controlling 
shareholders in the US provides substantially wider protection to minority shareholders, 
by ‘constraining the ongoing and operational extraction of private benefits by the 
controllers’, than does imposing an obligation on the acquirer to share the control 
premium in the UK.802 
In the case of Gerdes v Reynolds, the court held that the controlling shareholders should 
compensate the non-selling shareholders for foreseeable harm caused by the sale of 
control.803 Given that the sale of control can be argued as a corporate asset belonging to 
all shareholders, the controlling seller is required to share the premium proportionally 
with the non-controlling shareholders. 804  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
controlling shareholders are not required to share the premium obtained from a transfer of 
control in every case,805 only when it can be demonstrated that they acted in bad faith and 
unfairly prejudiced the minority shareholders. In the recent case In re Synthes, Inc. 
                                                
801 See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v Newmont Mining Corp 535 A 2d 1334 (Del 1987); Donahue v Rodd Electrotype Co of 
New England 367 Mass 578, 328 NE 2d 505 (1975); Linge v Ralston Purina Co 293 NW 2d 191 (Iowa Sup Ct 1980); 
Citron v Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp 569 A 2d 53 (Del 1989) and Kahn v Lynch Communication System Inc 
638 A 2d 1110 (Del 1994). Also see, Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises (3rd edn, West Group 1983) 653-61; Lynn A. Stout, ‘On the Export of US-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties 
to Other Cultures: Can A Transplant Take?’ in John Gillespie and Pip Nicholson (eds) Asia Socialism and Law Change: 
the Dynamics of Vietnamese Renewal and Chinese Reform (Asia Pacific Press 2005) 46-47. 
802 Pacheco (n418) 30.  
803 Gerdes v Reynolds 28 NY S 2d 622 (1941). 
804 Perlman v Feldmann 219 F 2d 173 (2d Cir 1955); Brown v Halbert 76 Cal Rptr 781 (1969). 
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Shareholders Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery reaffirmed that the controlling 
shareholders were in breach of their duty of loyalty to the minority shareholders only if 
they derived a ‘personal financial benefit to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the 
minority stockholders’.806 The Delaware court imposed fiduciary duties on controlling 
shareholders to ensure that they do not abuse their controlling power for their private 
interests at the expense of the minority shareholders. But as clarified in Synthes, the 
Delaware law does not go further to require the controlling shareholder to ‘subrogate his 
own interests so that the minority shareholders can get the deal that they want.’807  
General fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders cannot be found in either the Chinese 
Company Law or the Securities Law. What can be found are Articles 20 and 21 in the 
Company Law, which look most relevant. According to Article 20, all shareholders of a 
company shall exercise their rights in light of laws and shall not abuse their shareholders’ 
rights to harm the interests of the company or of other shareholders. Where any of the 
shareholders of a company causes any loss to the company or to other shareholders by 
abusing the shareholder’s rights, it shall be subject to compensation liability in 
accordance with the law. Under Article 21 of the Company Law, a duty is imposed on the 
controlling shareholders and de facto controller not to use their connected relationship to 
harm the company’s interests and thereby cause the company to suffer losses, or they 
shall be subject to compensation liability.  
Although Article 20 imposes duties on shareholders to other shareholders in the company, 
the explicit duties of controlling shareholders cannot be found in this provision. Article 21 
stipulates the principles that controlling shareholders must follow, but it does not clearly 
provide that the controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties to the other shareholders, 
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only preventing controlling shareholders from damaging the company’s interests. It only 
applies to the circumstance under which controlling shareholders harm the company’s 
interests by taking advantage of its connection relationship. As a result, a fiduciary 
relationship between the controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders has 
not been established at the national law level in China. 
Pursuant to Article 7 of the Takeover Measures 2006, it stipulates that no controlling 
shareholder or de facto controller of a target company may abuse the shareholder’s rights 
thereof to damage the lawful rights and interests of the target company or any other 
shareholders. If this damage occurs, the said controlling shareholders or de facto 
controller should eliminate the damages before the transfer of the control of the target 
company; otherwise, it shall use incomes from the transfer of the relevant shares to 
eliminate all the damages, and shall provide sufficient performance guarantee or 
arrangement for the damages that have not been eliminated, and obtain the approval from 
the shareholders’ meeting of the target company according to the articles of association. 
It is the 2006 Takeover Measures, which is at a lower legal level, that stipulates 
controlling shareholders’ duties to other shareholders by prohibiting abuse of their 
shareholders’ rights. Since the main source of law is statutes, and case law is not the legal 
source in China, the legislation needs to be specific and accurate. Unfortunately, the 
operation of controllers’ duties is currently outside the framework of national law. 
Therefore, the borrowed US principle of controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duties should 
be expressly written into Chinese national law; otherwise, the duties on the controlling 
shareholders may not have enforceable power before the court. According to Weng, any 
legislative default or gap is unacceptable as it will cause serious application problems and 
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will sometimes lead to judiciary corruption.808 Chinese Company Law must be clear and 
unambiguous in imposing controllers’ fiduciary duties to the company and other 
shareholders.  
Moreover, although Article 7 of the Takeover Measures 2006 stipulates the duties that 
controlling shareholders owe to the company and others shareholders by prohibiting the 
controlling shareholders from abusing their power, it does not clearly introduce the 
concept of fiduciary duty as does Article 8 for directors’ fiduciary duties; this latter 
stipulates that the directors owe a ‘fiduciary duty and an obligation of due diligence to the 
company’. As Xi has observed, detailed rules governing the fiduciary duties on 
controlling shareholders are apparently absent in China.809 Article 7 only prohibits 
controlling shareholders from abusing their shareholders’ right, to harm the interests of 
the company and other shareholders. This provision only stipulates an abstract statement 
of the principle.  
Hence, the Takeover Measures 2006 need to make clear that the controlling shareholders 
owe a fiduciary duty to the company and the other shareholders by requiring them to act 
in good faith; and to provide guidance to the controlling shareholders about how to apply 
the substance of the duties they owe. In addition, in the sale of control of a company, the 
Takeover Measures 2006 also need to require the controlling shareholders to compensate 
the minority shareholders if they breach their fiduciary duties and cause them foreseeable 
damage. Such damage includes selling to an asset stripper who, to their knowledge, 
intends to harm the company; diverting business opportunities to their own benefit and 
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excluding minority shareholders; and other similar misconduct resulting in exploitation of 
the minority shareholders’ status in the company. 
Furthermore, after introducing the provisions for statutory derivative actions into the 
Company Law in 2005, it is now clear that shareholders are entitled to bring actions in 
court against directors and senior managers of a listed company for breach of their duties 
(including fiduciary duties), even though the loss caused is to the company as a whole 
rather than to the shareholders directly.810 According to Article 152 of the Company Law, 
if the board of directors or senior executives breach their duties by violating the law, 
administrative regulations or articles of association, then shareholders who have held 1% 
or more of the total shares in the company for at least 180 days consecutively can initiate 
a lawsuit with a people’s court after exhausting internal remedies. 
Regarding the possibility of derivative suits against controlling shareholders when they 
breach their fiduciary duties, the answer is unclear under the current takeover regulations 
in China. In accordance with Article 152 of the Company Law, shareholders could initiate 
a derivative action in the case of the legal rights and interests of a company damaged ‘by 
others’ and experiencing losses. Chinese scholars are of the opinion that ‘others’ in this 
provision includes controlling shareholders and de facto controlling parties who owe 
fiduciary duties to the company.811 The minority shareholders should have the right to 
bring a legal claim against those who not only manage the company but also control it, 
for a remedy against the controller’s abuse. Hence, the Company Law should make it 
clear that in the event of any damage to the legal interest of the company by controlling 
shareholders and de facto controlling parties, the other shareholders can file a lawsuit 
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with a people’s court and advocate the compensation for damages caused by their 
misconduct on the company’s behalf.  
Article 152 also gives shareholders a different standing to initiate the derivative action 
against directors and others. Directors can be sued if they cause loss to the company by 
violating laws, administrative regulations or the articles of association during the course 
of performing their duties,812 while ‘others’ can be sued if they violate the lawful rights 
and interests of the company and cause loss. In China, as stated repeatedly above, the 
main agency problem is between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, 
not between managers and shareholders (as in the UK and US); no good reason has been 
found for making this difference between directors and controlling shareholders. The 
minority shareholders should be allowed to trigger the derivative suit against the 
controlling shareholder not only under the same conditions and procedures but also under 
the same standing as derivative suits against directors and senior managers. 813   
Last but not least, as controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties not only to the 
company but also to the minority shareholders, the remedy for the minority shareholders 
against the controlling shareholders for damages should not only be in the form of a 
derivative suit in the company’s name, but also be brought by the minority shareholders 
directly as individuals or as a group of injured shareholders. Thus, in the event of any 
losses to minority shareholders themselves, the Company Law should allow minority 
shareholders to pursue remedies against controlling shareholders if they can prove 
controlling shareholders’ misconduct; under Article 153, the Company Law gives 
shareholders a direct right to file a lawsuit in the people’s court against directors or senior 
                                                
812 Company Law, art 150. 
813 For more comprehensive discussions on derivative suits in China, see Donald C. Clarke and Nicholas C. Howson, 
‘Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China’ (2011) Social 
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managers if they damage the interests of shareholders by violating any law, 
administrative regulation or the articles of association.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
Instead of following either the UK or the US model, this research suggests that Chinese 
legislators assemble a combination of the pro-takeover elements of both regimes. On the 
one hand this means following the British NFR, to make sure the decision-making power 
on the fate of the takeover bid is allocated to target shareholders. On the other hand, it 
means imposing fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders similar to those developed in 
the US, and by abandoning the British MBR to remove its negative effect on the 
development of the takeover market in China.  
Although having NFR alone without MBR may not look convincing at first sight, it 
seems an appropriate path that would suit the current development of the Chinese 
takeover market. The protection of minority shareholders can be achieved by imposing a 
fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders to act in the best interests of all shareholders. 
Indeed, there is no system which aims at promoting a takeover market by imposing an 
NFR on the target board and at the same time gives the bidder maximum freedom to 
structure its bid without considering the shareholders’ interests. In protecting target 
shareholders, the bidder’s coercive behaviour can be largely restricted by the information 
disclosure rules and shareholder equal treatment rules. The drafters of Chinese takeover 
regulation need to consider the shareholders’ interests, although the demands of minority 
shareholders to share the control premium should not prevail over concerns about 
curtailing the operation of a market for corporate control in China.  
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Of course, as all shares of Chinese listed companies are now freely tradeable, the current 
shareholding structures of Chinese listed companies are undergoing some strategic 
changes. Although it is unlikely that controlling shareholders, including state shareholders, 
will sell all their shares in the listed company and leave the equity market fully fluid in 
the near future, it may be that aggressive Chinese economic reform will influence the 
capital structure of Chinese equity market and increase the number of listed companies 
with a more widespread ownership structure, although not on a scale comparable to the 
UK and US situation in the foreseeable future. Once the state elects to reduce control of 
most publicly listed companies, and there are a large number of listed companies not 
under the control of large single shareholders, this study should be reviewed to assess 
whether the imposition of MBR is appropriate in the changed Chinese enterprise 
landscape. All in all, there is never an end to regulatory effort to seek the most suitable 
takeover regime in order to achieve the optimal outcome.   
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